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FOREWORD
The pace and scope of change over the last decade have
indeed been extraordinary. The United States has been
confronted with not just the collapse of the Soviet empire
but also with revolutionary scientific breakthroughs, the
transformation of the global economy, and the erosion of
many of the basic premises of the Westphalian system of
international order. The U.S. policy community has
attempted to make sense of these and other changes by
recourse to bodies such as the National Defense Panel and
the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
(USNCS/21). The USNCS/21 is currently in the third phase
of its mandated activities. At the end of phase three, the
members of the Commission will recommend changes in the
institutions of the U.S. national security policymaking
system. Its conclusions are likely to stimulate a lively, and
much needed, debate.
The U.S. Army War College chose the theme of
“Organizing for National Security” for its Tenth Annual
Strategy Conference in order to contribute to the upcoming
debate about institutional reform. This volume provides a
summary of the proceedings of that conference. It includes
historical, analytical, and prescriptive articles relating to
the national security bureaucracy. Virtually all of the
authors accept that some degree of reform is necessary for a
system which can trace its roots back to the 1947 National
Security Act. Not surprisingly, they differ in their opinions
about which parts of the system are most in need of repair,
and in their specific recommendations. Several
contributors applaud the trend toward jointness in the
armed services and recommend that this serve as a model
for future reforms of the institutions responsible for
national security policymaking.
In order for institutional reform to succeed, it will have
to be guided by a coherent and compelling national strategy
which must, in turn, be anchored in widely-accepted
v

national interests. It will also have to be in accord with such
constitutional principles as civilian control of the armed
forces and the inviolability of the civil liberties of all
Americans. This is a tall order for U.S. policymakers.
Hopefully, the chapters in this volume will offer some useful
insights and some encouragement.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Douglas T. Stuart
The weekend of July 25-27, 1947, was an especially
hectic and stressful period for the Washington policy
community. Congress was rushing to wrap up its
end-of-term business before adjourning for the summer.
The budget was the most contentious issue, since the
Republican majority was still looking for ways to make good
on its promise to cut 15 percent from the $37.5 billion that
President Harry S. Truman had requested in January.
These deliberations were complicated by the fact that the
President had also asked Congress for supplemental
funding for aid to Greece and Turkey. Legislation also had
to be passed in order to terminate 175 war powers which the
President still had at his disposal from World War II.
One important piece of legislation was easily dispensed
with during this weekend. The so-called “unification bill,”
which had already been passed by the Senate, was approved
in the House by a voice vote on the afternoon of July 25. Few
commentators referred to the legislation by its official
name—The National Security Act (NSA). The ease with
which the legislation was passed belied the long process of
congressional hearings and the intense struggles which
preceded the final vote. The finished product was a
patchwork of compromises which raised many more
questions than they resolved. Commentators wondered, for
example, how a new “super” Secretary of Defense, with the
help of three assistants, would be able to exercise control
over the military services which were theoretically under
his authority. Some commentators asked how “jointness”
could be achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), without
a strong Chairman to control their deliberations. The future
1

of the National Security Council (NSC) was very uncertain,
since President Truman viewed it as a “second”—and
unnecessary—cabinet. Nor was it clear whether the new
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would be asked to do
more than simply assist the NSC in the coordination and
evaluation of intelligence information provided by the
separate branches of government.
Many of these questions were answered by the late
1950s. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had been
expanded and given greater authority as the Department of
Defense. The Joint Chiefs had acquired a Chairman,
although his powers were still circumscribed. The CIA had
evolved from being a support agency for the NSC into an
independent and influential component of the national
security system. Finally, the NSC had become established
at the “top of policy hill.”1
The national security bureaucracy which exists today
differs in important respects from the system which was in
place by the late 1950s. However, what is most striking
about the existing system is not how much has changed, but
how little. The Clinton administration came into office
committed to fundamental reform of the national security
bureaucracy, and some interesting changes have taken
place since that time. But these changes are better
understood as exercises in gardening rather than
architecture.
Over the last decade many experts and political leaders
have asserted that there is a self-evident need for structural
reform in the national security bureaucracy, in light of the
dramatic changes which have taken place since the collapse
of the Soviet empire. During the spring of 1999, the U.S.
Army War College selected this issue as the central focus of
its Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. Entitled Organizing
for National Security in the New Century, the conference
provided an opportunity for policy analysts, government
representatives, and academic experts to discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing arrangements for
2

national security policy making and to propose some
reforms. The organizers were careful to anchor these
discussions in presentations on the institutional history of
the national security bureaucracy.
The articles in this volume are based on the proceedings
of the Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. This publication
would not have been possible without the expert assistance
and guidance of several people, including Colonel Joseph
Cerami, Ms. Marianne Cowling, Ms. Victoria Kuhn,
Professor Douglas Lovelace, Jr., Ms. Rita Rummel, and Dr.
Earl Tilford. Special thanks must be reserved for Dr. Steven
Metz, who played an indispensable role in the design of the
conference and in the conceptualization of this book.
This volume will be published shortly before the election
of a new U.S. president. The next president will enter the
White House at a time when the United States is enjoying
unprecedented power and influence throughout the world,
and at a time when no nation in the world poses a direct
military threat to America’s survival. The new
administration would be well advised to take advantage of
this fortuitous situation to address fundamental problems
in our national security bureaucracy. Hopefully, this book
will provide some valuable guidance about what works and
what does not work in the existing system.
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 1
1. Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: President
Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” Diplomatic History,
No. 7, Fall 1983, pp. 307-26.
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CHAPTER 2
PRESENT AT THE LEGISLATION:
THE 1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Douglas T. Stuart
At a time when the two most commonly asked questions
about U.S. foreign policy are “Where are we going?” and
“Why are we doing this?,” it is only natural that people are
tempted to look back nostalgically to those periods in
American history when foreign policymaking shared many
characteristics with the field of architecture. I have been
given the enviable task of looking back to one such period,
when individuals like Harry Truman, George Marshall, and
James Forrestal wrestled with each other over big issues of
principle and policy. This article will focus on one of the most
intense debates of this period, which culminated in the
passage of the 1947 National Security Act (NSA). The NSA
is certainly one of the most important pieces of legislation of
the 20th century. It established the post-war National
Military Establishment, composed of the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and (a newly created) Air Force, all under
the authority of a Secretary of Defense with cabinet rank.
The legislation also provided a legal identity for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and created the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Council, the National Security
Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research
and Development Board.
The fact that the NSA has not received the kind of
scholarly attention that it deserves is partly attributable to
the inclination of most commentators to treat it as a footnote
in the history of the formative period of the Cold War. When
it is placed in this context, the story of the NSA tends to be
overshadowed by the dramatic events of that period. This
article begins from the premise that this is a misreading of
5

the history of the NSA. In fact, the 1947 Act cannot be
understood unless one goes back to debates and decisions
which took place during the late 1930s and early 1940s. It is
of more than historical significance that these debates and
decisions were both logically and chronologically prior to
post-war discussions about the nature and implications of
the Soviet threat. Because once it is made clear that the
national security state has roots which run much deeper
than the early Cold War era, we have a basis for
understanding why there has been so little structural
change in the national security system since the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
One useful date for beginning this story is July 1937,
when, in the wake of the Japanese invasion of China,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt seems to have made the
decision to move the nation away from a posture of “well
ordered neutrality” and toward military preparedness.
Over the next 4 years, the President managed a cautious
campaign of half-steps, which were designed to give the
United States a running start in the event that war was
unavoidable.
Aside from the specific concerns that Roosevelt had
about what the Japanese and Germans were saying and
doing in Asia and Europe, respectively, the President was
preoccupied with two broader and deeper trends in world
affairs. First, as a student of geopolitics, he was increasingly
concerned about the rapidly improving technologies of air
power, which seemed to be on the verge of ending forever
America’s historic situation of relative invulnerability. Billy
Mitchell had been making this argument forcefully and
effectively since the early 1930s:
What will the future hold for us? Undoubtedly an attack on the
great centers of population. If a European country attacks the
United States, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and
Washington, D.C. will be the first targets.1
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The President demonstrated his sensitivity to such
arguments in an address to Congress on May 16, 1940, in
which he noted that although the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans had served as “reasonably adequate defensive
barriers” in the past, they could no longer be relied upon to
protect the nation. Military preparedness, which could only
be achieved by increased defense spending, had to take the
place of geographic isolation as the basis for American
national security.
FDR’s second fundamental concern in the late 1930s had
to do with the global spread of totalitarian governments.
Since coming to office in the midst of the depression,
Roosevelt had watched as dictatorial regimes spread across
the globe. Many American commentators celebrated the
dynamism and efficiencies of these authoritarian systems,
while describing the U.S. system pejoratively as a “mature
economy.” Roosevelt and his colleagues were also acutely
aware of the natural advantages that dictatorships enjoyed
in foreign affairs, and in their ability to shift their nation’s
economies into a warfighting mode at very short notice. As
early as January 1933, Roosevelt was advised by Walter
Lippmann that “The situation is critical, Franklin. You may
have no alternative but to assume dictatorial power.”2
The President was too much of an optimist, too confident
of his own skills as a leader, and too convinced of the
inherent strengths of American democracy to entertain the
notion that dictatorship was the wave of the future in the
United States. He was also encouraged by the fact that
America had at its disposal a community of experts who
represented a relatively new field of study called public
administration, which promised to employ theories of
management science to create efficiencies in both the
private and public sectors which would make the United
States competitive with the dictatorships of the world
without doing violence to our constitutional system.
As the war approached, one particular book seemed to
capture both the challenges of the modern world and the
7

potential for management science to make the United
States competitive and secure. The book was The Impact of
War, published in 1941 by E. Pendleton Herring, a Professor
in Harvard’s Government department who was also
associated with Harvard’s new Graduate School of Public
Administration. It was one of the first books to use the term
“national security,” and it was certainly the most
authoritative pre-war attempt to describe what a national
security bureaucracy should look like. Herring argued that
our history had not prepared us for the challenges of the
modern world because it had encouraged Americans to hold
a “persistent suspicion of militarism.” He called for a new
approach to foreign policymaking, which would include a
permanent and influential place for military advisers at the
top levels of government in times of both war and peace. He
also recommended that the United States take advantage of
new technologies of communication and transportation to
enhance “centralization, standardization and
regimentation” in ways that would transform our
government from a “negative state” to a “positive state.”
Herring was confident that a more cooperative relationship
could also be established between the White House and
Congress, because “the pressure of circumstances closes the
separation of powers.” He claimed that radical reform of the
foreign policymaking system was necessary because of the
threats that the United States was facing in 1941. But he
also stressed that the changes that he was proposing would
be necessary for our country in a period of peace as well,
because they would undergird a dynamic and influential
foreign policy. “The Roman Phalanx,” Herring reminded his
readers, “was a necessary preliminary to the Pax Romana.”3
Professor Herring’s book was well received by the policy
community. Reviewing the book for The Herald Tribune,
Louis Hacker noted that:
If Pendleton Herring’s book is a sign of the times, we are at last
in the process of confronting our national problems realistically.
It should be said at once that it is one of the most significant
analyses produced by the current emergency.4
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Two months after Hacker reviewed the Impact of War,
Professor Herring’s thesis was overwhelmingly accepted by
the American people—as a result of the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The importance of Pearl Harbor is hard to
exaggerate in any study of American national security.
After December 7, 1941, the American people favored a new
approach to foreign policymaking which gave a privileged
status to the military while also creating new procedures for
civilian-military collaboration.
The experiences of World War II tended to confirm both
the lessons of Pearl Harbor and the wisdom of Herring’s
thesis. During the war there was some interesting
discussion about what a post-war foreign policy system
should look like, but the more important contribution of the
war was the precedents that were set by the establishment
of such entities as the Joint Chiefs, the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) and the State-War-Navy-Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC). As a consultant to the War
Department, the Navy Department and the Bureau of the
Budget, Herring was one of a handful of experts who studied
closely the functioning of these and other federal agencies
during the war. He also chaired the Committee of Records of
War Administration which published in 1946 the official
administrative history of the war effort.5
One of the principal architects of the wartime
decisionmaking apparatus was also one of the people with
the strongest opinions about the need for specific post-war
reforms. George Marshall’s experience as Army Chief of
Staff during World War II confirmed his pre-war views on
the need for a complete unification of the armed services.
When he attempted to raise this issue with Roosevelt and
others during the war, he was routinely rebuffed on the
grounds that a substantive discussion of this option while
the country was at war might undermine the war effort.
Marshall was not alone in arguing for the unification of the
armed forces, however. One influential ally was Senator
Harry Truman, who published an article in the August 26,
1944, issue of Collier’s magazine entitled “Our Armed
9

Forces Must Be Unified.” Truman concluded the article with
the statement that:
The road, as I see it, stretches straight and with no turns . . . The
end, of course, must be the integration of every element of
America’s defense in one department under one authoritative,
responsible head. Call it the War Department or the
Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is
one department . . . One team with all the reins in one hand . . .
Under such a set-up another Pearl Harbor will not have to be
feared.6

Truman attributed his convictions about the need for
unification to his own experiences in the military during
World War I, to the lessons he had learned as a member of
the Senate Appropriations and Military Affairs
Committees, to his chairmanship of the Special Committee
to Investigate the National Defense Program and, above all,
to the “Record of the Pearl Harbor Hearings.”7
During the war, FDR’s opposition made it hard for
Marshall to cooperate publicly with allies like Truman, so
the General had to content himself with efforts to put the
need for unification on record within the military. He did so
by highlighting the findings of the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee (JSSC) Report (March 1944) and the Richardson
Committee Report (April 1945). Both studies came out in
favor of the principle of unification. Marshall had great
difficulty in building upon such general statements,
however. In a memo dated April 17, 1944, to Fleet Admiral
Ernest King, Marshall pressed the argument that since the
JSSC study had recommended that the Joint Chiefs
“approve for purposes of study the principle of three services
within one military organization . . .” the leadership of the
War and Navy Departments should begin discussions
aimed at developing plans for a “sound organization at the
top . . .” to administer the new system. He also warned that
Congress was beginning to look into the issue of unification,
and that “If we cannot solve the question, it is going to be
solved for us and probably in a manner that neither the War
10

nor the Navy Departments would desire.”8 Marshall’s
pressure tactics backfired, however, because they put the
Navy leadership on the defensive and convinced them to
close ranks with their allies in Congress to resist
unification.
It is worth noting that prior to World War II, the services
spoke with one voice in their opposition to unification. This
was due not only to the fact that both services wanted to
preserve their independence but also to the fact that
Congress was primarily interested in unification as a
pretext for making deep cuts in the defense budget. A
statement in 1932 by Army Chief of Staff Douglas
MacArthur in opposition to one such legislative proposal is
typical of the common position taken by the Army and Navy
during this period;
. . . I give it as my fixed opinion that such an amalgamation as
proposed would endanger victory for the United States in case
of war. . . . Pass this bill and every potential enemy of the
United States will rejoice.9

By the second year of the war, however, most Army
spokesmen agreed with Secretary of War Henry Stimson
that in an age of “triphibious warfare” the services could no
longer afford to think or act in isolation from each other. The
Army’s new position was summarized in a report to General
Marshall by Brigadier General William F. Tompkins,
Director of the Special Planning Division of the War
Department in October 1943:
. . . This war is, and future wars undoubtedly will be, largely a
series of combined operations in each of which ground, air, and
sea forces must be employed together and coordinated under
one directing head . . . .10

Marshall and some of his colleagues in the War Department
were also very sensitive to the risk that, if unification was
not accomplished, it would be the Army which would take
the most serious hits from budget cutters when the war
ended.
11

While the experience of Pearl Harbor and the first stages
of the war convinced the Army leadership that unity of
command had to be established at the top, the Navy, with its
tradition of self-reliant solutions to challenges from not just
the sea, but the land and air as well, claimed that it had
already solved the problem of unity of command—within its
own service. This argument is best illustrated by the
comments of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Artemus
Gates, during the 1944 Unification Hearings by the House
Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (Woodrum
Committee). Gates argued that if “consolidation” was
necessary, the government should consider “merging the
whole military establishment into the existing Navy” since
it already had an integrated force with sea, land, and air
components.11
The mix of principled and particularist interests which
made the debate over unification so difficult and intense
also complicated post-war discussions about the reform,
preservation, or elimination of other entities which had
been established during the war. For example, most people
believed that some type of intelligence service was going to
be necessary after the war. But all of the major institutional
players also understood that control of information would be
an enormous source of post-war power and influence, and
every agency wanted a piece of the action. The Truman
administration at first attempted to resolve the inevitable
turf war by coordination schemes—most notably the
creation of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and
the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).12 In his memoirs,
Dean Acheson speaks with disdain of all such formulas for
coordination, noting that “A good many of us had cut our
teeth and throats on this sort of nonsense.”13 In this
instance, at least, Acheson’s suspicions concerning
inter-agency coordination proved well founded, and
Truman had to accept that some form of independent entity
would have to be created to centralize intelligence.
Unfortunately, William Donovan and his colleagues in the
OSS had made so many enemies in Washington during the
12

war that the creation of a successor organization was
extremely controversial.
The Washington policy community also recognized that
after the war the government would need a new system for
consultation between the civilian and military departments
involved in foreign and security affairs. Here the model was
the aforementioned SWNCC, even though the wartime
record of this organization was quite limited. 1 4
Policymakers also studied British institutions and
procedures for civilian-military consultation in times of war
and peace. The British Committee on Imperial Defence was
of special interest as a model for civil-military cooperation.
It was left to Truman and his advisors, however, to decide
how much power such an entity should be given, and who, or
what agency, should lead it.
The Truman administration also needed to develop the
institutional machinery to harness the power of science and
technology in the post-war era. The Office of Scientific
Research and Development(OSRD), under the dynamic
leadership of Vannevar Bush, had evolved during World
War II into a very influential institution, with its own
budget, direct access to the President and key congressmen,
and with close positive ties to the leadership of the War and
Navy Departments. Encouraged by the success of the OSRD
during the war, Senator Harley Kilgore and others pressed
for the creation of a strong post-war agency to direct all
aspects of scientific research and development. They were
challenged, however, by spokesmen for various interest
groups—scientists, businessmen, military leaders—who
were concerned about preserving their autonomy and their
access to scientific innovations.15
Finally, Truman and his advisers had to decide how
much control the government should attempt to acquire
over the post-war economy. In this regard, the lessons of
World War II were a matter of dispute. Depending upon how
generous one wanted to be, Roosevelt’s management of the
wartime economy could be described as multidirectional or
13

directionless. One insider, who clearly leaned toward the
latter interpretation, described the President’s efforts as
“bitched, botched, and buggered from start to finish.”16 But
most people looked at America’s wartime experience and
concurred with the judgment of the Bureau of the Budget’s
post-war report on The United States At War: “The record is
one in which the American people can take pride.” Most
Americans also agreed with the principal conclusion of the
Bureau’s study:
The speed with which the democracies did accept the challenge
and the manner in which they overwhelmed those who sought
gain through war suggests that there is no need to reexamine
the claims to administrative superiority of authoritarian
governments.17

America had won the war by “resisting even the semblance
of autocratic rule,” by working with big business and by
encouraging the natural competitive advantages of a
democratic capitalist system. Based on these lessons, most
Americans were reticent to give Washington too much
control over the post-war economy.
All of these issues began to converge on President
Truman in the summer of 1945, as both Congress and the
media became more involved in the debates over the
creation of post-war institutions. By this time, many
individuals in the Navy leadership had concluded that they
had already lost the battle over armed forces unification,
and that the services would be combined in accordance with
Marshall’s and Truman’s wishes. A key problem for the
Navy in the management of its campaign against
unification was that it did not seem to stand for anything
other than resistance to innovation. This problem was
solved, however, when Navy Secretary Forrestal asked his
old friend Ferdinand Eberstadt to undertake a study of the
whole unification issue. Eberstadt had served as Director of
the Army Navy Munitions Board during the war. The
experience had left him with a deep disdain for both FDR
(“an apostle of confusion”) and Truman.18 On the other
14

hand, Eberstadt had gained an appreciation of the military
services, and of their ability to cooperate to accomplish
common goals. Eberstadt made it clear to his staff at the
outset that it was important that they retain their
independence and not be perceived as merely a propaganda
arm of the Navy Department. In fact, however, the
Eberstadt report was a Navy product, commissioned by the
Navy and staffed almost entirely by Naval officers, and
Eberstadt himself was, as Forrestal had assured Admiral
King, “a member of the Navy team.”19
To put the matter simply, Eberstadt felt that the record
of interservice coordination during the war was
commendable, and that the wartime experience did not
demonstrate the need for full unification. He also worried
about the establishment of any “General Staff”
arrangement, or the creation of a powerful Chief of Staff in
peacetime, as potential threats to the tradition of civilian
control of the military.
But Eberstadt was not brought in to be just another
opponent of unification. The final report that Eberstadt
presented to Forrestal in September of 1945 argued that the
issue of armed forces unification was just a small part of a
necessarily larger debate about post-war policy
coordination. New arrangements needed to be put in place
in order to facilitate civilian-military cooperation on issues
of foreign policy, defense, science, and economic planning.
New machinery to coordinate intelligence gathering and
analysis was required. Above all, a new attitude had to be
nurtured in Washington—informed by the logic of national
security. If much of Eberstadt’s report sounded like
Herring’s arguments in 1941, part of the reason was that
Herring served as one of Eberstadt’s primary assistants in
the drafting of the report.20
The Navy did not like every conclusion in the Eberstadt
report. In particular, they bristled at the study’s support for
the establishment of a separate Air Force. Eberstadt’s
report nonetheless gave the Navy the ammunition that it
15

needed to recruit both public and congressional support for
a system of coordinated agencies for foreign and defense
policymaking as an alternative to the unification of the
armed services. When the National Security Act was finally
signed into law nearly 2 years later (on July 26, 1947), it
bore a striking resemblance to the recommendations which
were put forth by Eberstadt and his team. Rather than a
single, unified military force, the legislation established a
National Military Establishment (NME), with three
independent services. The Navy failed to block the creation
of a separate Air Force, but obtained statutory protections
for land-based Naval Air and for the Marine Corps. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff was transformed from a temporary
wartime arrangement to a permanent component of the
NME, but the Chiefs were expected to work through (and
under) the newly created Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Joint Chiefs were given their own staff, of not more than
100 people, but the bill did not allow for the creation of a JCS
chairman, who might have been able to bolster the
negotiating position of the Chiefs in their dealings with the
Secretary of Defense over issues that had the support of all
three services.
The new Secretary of Defense, meanwhile, was nothing
like the “super” cabinet member that some journalists
described at the time. In fact, Eberstadt testified on the last
day of the Senate hearings on the National Security Act that
the powers delegated to the Secretary of Defense were
“disturbingly general and indefinite.” He noted that the
proposed legislation authorized the Secretary to
“administer” the entire NME, but did not give him the
requisite authority to accomplish this task. He also worried
that the proposed bill lacked a “definite mechanism for
fostering unity and teamwork among the military services
through appropriate programs of joint education and
training at various stages.”21
The NME looked nothing like the ambitious plans for
armed forces unification espoused by Truman, Marshall
and most of the Army leadership. Kenneth Royall, the
16

incoming Secretary of the Army, complained that the new
arrangement ." . .will not save money, will not be efficient,
and will not prevent interservice rivalry.”22 Supporters of
the Navy, who could afford to be magnanimous in victory,
offered reassuring statements about the proven ability of
the services to work together in defense of the national
interest. But the Navy also moved quickly to prepare for the
possibility that the National Security Act was just one
battle in a long war over unification. Shortly after the
passage of the legislation, the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations created OP 23, a study group whose mandate
was to keep the Navy leadership informed of all
developments relating to the issue of unification, and
prepare for a new round of attacks by the Army. According
to Admiral Arleigh Burke, who took over direction of OP 23
in 1948, “It was a jolt to senior naval officials” when the
Army began to make a new case for unification shortly after
the passage of the National Security Act.23 It was left to the
first Secretary of Defense to referee the continuing dispute
between the Navy and the Army, and to help the two
traditional services to make room for a very ambitious and
assertive Air Force.
The NME was not the only portion of the new national
security bureaucracy to be subjected to severe challenges
during the period immediately following the passage of the
legislation. Other institutions created by the 1947 Act were
also tested, and some did not survive the shake-out. The
National Security Resources Board was the most significant
failure. The framers of the 1947 Act established the NSRB
to insure rapid, comprehensive, and efficient mobilization of
the nation’s resources in the event of a new threat to
national security. Eberstadt believed that, in accordance
with his recommendations,
The Statute [NSA] created no more important agency than the
National Security Resources Board. It has been placed on the
same level as the National Security Council and the Military
Establishment—directly under and responsible to the
President himself.
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He described the NSRB as “a kind of economic and social
general staff” which should wield during peacetime
whatever powers were necessary to adequately prepare for
a national emergency.24 As previously mentioned, however,
Americans came out of the war with a new confidence in
unfettered capitalism and a new suspicion of government
efforts to regulate the economy. And no one was more
suspicious of “general staffs” with open-ended mandates
than Truman. Over the next few years, the President
resisted the efforts by Arthur Hill, the abrasive Chairman of
the NSRB, to exploit the growing national concern about the
Soviet threat to expand the influence of his agency. During
the Korean War, the President used the situation of limited
national emergency to shift many of the responsibilities of
the NSRB to a new Office of Defense Mobilization. The
NSRB was finally abolished by the Reorganization Act of
1953, and much of the responsibility for mobilization
planning devolved to the separate military services.
Truman was able to draw upon the support of the Service
Secretaries in his campaign to contain the NSRB because
the armed forces feared any new institutional constraints
on their budgeting and contracting activities. The armed
services also resisted efforts to transform the Research and
Development Board (RDB), which was established by the
1947 Act under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, into a
regulatory agency with direct control over their laboratories
and contracting activities. Vannevar Bush accepted the
position of Director of the new science agency because he
believed that the office could provide him with the same
kind of power and influence that he had exercised during
the war. This was a naive assumption, since by the time that
Bush took over at RDB, the armed services had established
themselves as independent (and indispensable) sponsors of
basic research at the major laboratories and universities
across the country. Pascal Zachary describes Bush’s efforts
to use the RDB to reign in the military services as “a
slow-motion automobile wreck.”25
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While agencies like the NSRB and the RDB did not
survive the shakeout period, other creations of the 1947 Act
survived challenges during their formative years and then
prospered in the Cold War atmosphere of 1950s
Washington. The National Security Council demonstrated
the most impressive ability to endure in a threatening
post-war environment. President Truman supported in
principle the creation of a successor to the wartime SWNCC
for the coordination of civilian and military advice. He
nonetheless worried about the possibility that the new
agency would impinge upon the constitutionally-designated
powers of the President. Consequently, Truman kept tight
control over the NSC after its establishment, and rarely
called meetings of the organization prior to the onset of the
Korean War. The NSC nonetheless persisted into the
Eisenhower era, and then began to take root at the “top of
policy hill."26
Conclusion.
This brief introductory article can only tell a small part
of the story of the debates which culminated in the passage
of the 1947 National Security Act and the struggles which
immediately followed the passage of the legislation. The Act
is best understood as a major setback for both Truman and
Marshall. Both men were publicly committed to the
unification of the armed forces at the end of World War II,
and both were frustrated by the very effective campaign of
resistance to unification which was organized by the Navy
and its friends in Congress. Truman and Marshall were
nonetheless able to shake off this defeat, make the best of
the situation, and move on to other issues. The biggest loser
in all of the struggles surrounding the 1947 National
Security Act was the State Department, which discovered
over time that the new arrangements institutionalized the
marginalization of State in ways that had been
understandable during the war but were unprecedented in
peacetime. State tried to resist these trends, of course. In his
first memo to the President after becoming Secretary of
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State, George Marshall opposed the creation of both the CIA
and the NSC, as infringements on the constitutionally
designated authority of both the President and the State
Department. 27 Dean Acheson also fought a valiant
rear-guard action to preserve State’s influence within the
policy community. His use of the Policy Planning Staff to
formulate NSC-68 is a particularly interesting example of
this campaign. By the time that Acheson left State,
however, the momentum had clearly shifted in favor of the
Pentagon-NSC nexus. One illustration of this fact is that on
his first day in office as Acheson’s replacement, John Foster
Dulles advised Paul Nitze that the important work of the
Policy Planning Staff within State would need to be shifted
to the National Security Council, and that he, as Secretary
of State, hoped to be able to spend 90 percent of his time with
the NSC people.28
One of the ironies of this story is that Forrestal, who can
be counted as the big winner in the struggle, was crushed by
the machinery which he was personally responsible for
creating.
Which leads to an obvious question: Why is it that, after
having succeeded in blocking efforts to establish the
Secretary of Defense as an influential player in the new
National Military Establishment, Forrestal accepted
Truman’s offer to become the first Secretary? The answer
seems to be that Forrestal saw the Secretary’s power not
within the National Military Establishment per se, but
rather in the larger network of national security
institutions created by the National Security Act. In a
meeting held in his office just days after his appointment as
Secretary of Defense, Forrestal obtained support for his
plan to locate the National Security Resources Board, the
National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board,
and the office of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency “as close as possible to the Secretary of Defense”
within the Pentagon. It was also suggested that the building
be renamed the “National Defense Building.”29 Forrestal
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also assumed that the NSC would be the real driving force in
the new national security system, and that the President
would not be able to routinely perform his duties as ex officio
chairman of the NSC. Under these circumstances, Forrestal
believed that the President would designate the Secretary
of Defense as the “presiding officer” of the NSC and that this
would be his power base.30 Just one week after the Pentagon
meeting, however, Truman’s assistant Clark Clifford sent
the President a long memo in which he recommended that
“In the absence of the President, it would seem appropriate
that the Secretary of State—as ranking member—serve as
Chairman [of the NSC].”31 In fact, Truman resolved the
issue by rarely convening the NSC prior to the Korean War.
I will conclude by considering Ernest May’s observation
that nothing in the 1947 legislation made it inevitable that
the government would come to look like a wartime
government, “with the military ascendant and
military-security concerns dominant.”32 This is true if one
looks at the institutions which were created by the
legislation, but not at the debates which go back to the
pre-World War II era. These debates make it clear that the
United States was about to embark on a new foreign policy,
based not only on new ambitions, but on new fears, which
would not be mitigated by victory over the German and
Japanese enemies. Nor, for that matter, by the collapse of
the Soviet enemy 5 decades later.
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CHAPTER 3
IKE AND THE BIRTH OF THE CINCS:
THE CONTINUITY OF UNITY OF COMMAND
David Jablonsky
“The past is never dead,” Gavin Stevens tells Temple
Drake in William Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun. “It’s not
even past.” 1 This was particularly true for Dwight
Eisenhower in April 1958 when, as President of the United
States, he outlined proposals to Congress for the
reorganization of the Defense Department. The proposals
were primarily concerned with the principle of unity of
command at the highest levels. The central focus was the
unified command, the multi-service combatant structure
used to divide military responsibility into theaters
throughout the world. The primary issue was the nature
and extent of authority: By the commanders-in-chief
(CINCs) of the unified commands over their component
commanders and by the President and the Secretary of
Defense over the CINCs.
The issue of unity of command had its origins in the
interwar years, when the Joint Board of the Army and Navy
prescribed the primary method of coordination between the
services to be mutual cooperation, the method in effect at
the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In that
disaster, the investigating committee concluded, “the
inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by
mutual cooperation were exposed.”2 As a consequence,
shortly after Eisenhower joined the War Department’s War
Plans Division (WPD) in 1941, there was a general
consensus on the need for unity of command in the field.
Soon, he was involved in discussions about all aspects of
unified commands and unified direction of those commands
from Washington. For the next 17 years he would
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consistently continue this involvement, whether as CINC of
various unified and combined commands, as Chief of Staff of
the Army, as acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), or as President of the United States. Throughout that
period there was a consistency in his approach to unity of
command that was based on an abiding belief in jointness, a
belief, as he wrote in his 1958 proposals, that
separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever
again we should be involved in war, we will fight it . . . with all
services, as one single concentrated effort.3

The War Years.
There were many notable accomplishments at the
U.S.-U.K. ARCADIA Conference which took place in
Washington from December 23, 1941, to January 14, 1942.
Chief among them was the informal emergence by February
9, 1942, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as counterparts to the
British Chiefs in the newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff
(CCS). Equally important was the British acceptance of the
American approach to unified command. At the time of the
ARCADIA Conference, the British had been fighting for
over two years under a committee system in each theater
composed of “Commanders in Chief” from the three services,
none of whom was provided full authority or responsibility
for the total theater operation. It was Eisenhower’s job in
WPD to prepare General George C. Marshall for his attempt
at the second meeting to overcome the British preference for
this system and to gain agreement for a unified command
structure. The strength of the Allied effort in any theater, he
advised in a memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff,
would be greatly increased through single, intelligent
command. The many organizations . . . cannot possibly operate
at maximum effectiveness so long as cooperation alone dictates
their employment, no matter how sincere a purpose may inspire
the cooperative effort.4
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The next day, Christmas 1941, Marshall introduced the
question of unified command in each “natural theater,”
arguing the need for one commander on the ground to act as
a “clearing house” for all directives and recommendations
and to provide general direction to theater strategic and
tactical operations.5 The British were unconvinced. After
the meeting, Marshall directed Eisenhower to prepare a
letter that “would serve as a concrete suggestion” for
establishing a unified command in the Pacific Theater, the
only area in which the combined forces of the Allies were
actually fighting.6
Eisenhower’s draft directive for the command known as
ABDA (Australia, British, Dutch, American) was designed
to make the concept of unified command more palatable by
demonstrating that there would be no risk to the interests of
any of the powers involved. To this end, he placed numerous
restrictions on the actions of the supreme commander of the
new theater that were as severe as those under which
Marshall Foch had labored as Allied Commander in 1918.
After obtaining approval of Eisenhower’s draft directive at a
bedside conference with President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Marshall presented it to the American and British Chiefs.
After extensive discussions, the CCS and the two heads of
state agreed by early January on a directive similar to
Eisenhower’s draft to the ABDA Supreme Commander,
General Archibald Wavell, the former CINC of British
forces in India. It was a masterful achievement by Marshall
who had accomplished his primary objective at ARCADIA of
agreement to the principle he believed should govern all
command structure. “Unity of command in ABDA area
seems assured,” a tired Eisenhower noted on his writing
pad. “Good start!—but what an effort. Talk—talk—talk.”7
Eisenhower’s key role in discussions about unity of
command was due to a number of organizational changes in
Washington. Marshall was reorganizing the War
Department in a manner designed to give the position of
Chief of Staff broad and unequivocal powers over the entire
Army. This, in turn, had the effect of placing a great amount
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of power in WPD, which was renamed Operations Division
(OPD) on March 22,1942. Marshall turned to that agency,
as Ike noted when he became Chief of WPD, “for all the Joint
and Combined work . . . , all plans and operations so far as
actual theaters are concerned.”8 Equally important was the
ad hoc emergence of the JCS as a body that reported to the
President, the only civilian in the chain of command, and
that issued orders and supervised theater commanders
through one of its members acting as the executive agent for
the Joint Chiefs. The result was that Eisenhower was
constantly involved at the highest level in all matters
concerned with unified and combined commands. In March,
for instance, he drafted a “former Naval person” message on
the command status in China for Roosevelt to dispatch to
Winston Churchill.9 And that same month, when the
President proposed a division of global responsibility
between the United States and the United Kingdom into
three general areas, it was Eisenhower who created a study
justifying the proposals that was accepted informally by
both heads of state and their chiefs. Under the
arrangement, operational responsibility was given to the
United States for the Pacific area, to the United Kingdom
for the Indian Ocean and Middle East, and jointly to both
countries for Europe and the Atlantic. Although there was
never any formal approval of the Eisenhower study, the
Allies acted for the remainder of the war as if there had
been.10
By the time of his global study, Eisenhower was also
heavily involved as the newly promoted head of WPD in the
issue of unified commands within the American forces. In
the U.S.-dominated Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur
would not serve under a naval officer, and the Navy was
opposed to placing most of its ships under his control. As a
solution, Eisenhower helped to establish two separate
commands in the Pacific. On March 9, 1942, he prepared a
memorandum for Marshall to the JCS outlining a detailed
division of the Pacific into two theaters of operation, which
was approved after a few compromises at the JCS meeting
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that same day. At the end of the month, the Joint Chiefs
issued a directive establishing the two Pacific Commands:
the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under General
MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under
Admiral Chester Nimitz. The next week, Eisenhower
drafted a directive to MacArthur defining the SWPA
boundaries and establishing the new command
arrangements. The CCS was to exercise general jurisdiction
over grand strategic policy; the JCS would exercise specific
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to theater
operational strategy in SWPA, with the Army Chief of Staff
acting as the executive agent: “All instructions to you will be
issued by or through him.”11 As for the combined aspects of
the new command, Eisenhower was careful to provide more
authority to the new CINC than he had granted under the
political limitations of the ABDA structure. “Commanders
of all armed forces within your area,” he concluded,
will be immediately informed by their respective governments
that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions
issued by you in conformity with this directive will be
considered by such commanders as emanating from their
respective governments.12

Other command arrangements with the Navy were not
always so easy to work out during the winter and spring of
1942. Eisenhower did not question Admiral Ernest King’s
overall commitment to jointness. “He said at one time to
me,” he recalled later of an encounter at the time with the
irascible CNO, “. . . one of the things I continually search
myself for is to see whether I am acting according to logic or
merely out of blind loyalties of 40 years in the Navy.”13
Nevertheless, King proposed separate Army and Navy
commands in the Caribbean, which Eisenhower advised
Marshall to resist because “the Army looks upon the area as
a single theater.”14 There was also a constant battle with the
Navy over unity of coastal command, which Eisenhower
eventually brought to a successful conclusion. It could be an
exasperating process. “Fox Conner was right about allies,”
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he wrote on his desk pad in February. “He could well have
included the Navy!”15
Eisenhower may have been referring to his experience
that same month as a permanent member, along with a
naval counterpart, of the Joint Planning Committee (JPC),
tasked the previous summer by the Joint Board to report on
a recommendation to establish a Joint General Staff from
both services as well as the position for “an officer of the
Army or the Navy as Chief of the Joint General Staff.” The
JPC report at the end of February was signed by both men,
announcing their inability to agree and the irreconcilability
of their respective positions. The Admiral favored
increasingly joint relations, but advised that only a
combination of extended time and education could instruct
officers of one service sufficiently about the other service to
make any joint general staff either feasible or advisable.
Eisenhower, on the other hand, favored the
recommendation, emphasizing that “coordination by
cooperation is ineffective,” and that officers assigned to a
joint staff billet would soon discover that “their exclusive
responsibility to the Commander in Chief for the operations
of all the armed forces should tend to free them from the
purely service points of view.”16 As a result of the lack of
agreement between the Army and Navy, the matter was
deferred for later study; and, by the time it was raised again
more than a year later, it had merged into the studies that
would bring increasing focus on the larger issue of armed
forces unification.
For Eisenhower, there were two important and
interrelated consequences from these experiences at OPD.
To begin with, Marshall recognized his growing expertise in
the complex world of unified and combined commands and
had him in May 1942 draw up a directive for the future
American commander in a European Theater of Operations
(ETO). The second consequence was that Eisenhower had
become convinced that there should be no restrictions on the
authority of the commander as he had written into his
earlier proposal at ARCADIA for the ABDA commander.
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The head of the ETO must have complete control over the
planning and implementation of operations. “It is
essential,” Eisenhower insisted, “. . . that absolute unity of
command should be exercised by the Theater Commander
to be designated.”17
When Eisenhower was appointed in June 1942 to carry
out his own directive for the ETO, he knew from a visit to
England the previous month that he could expect resistance
from the British to the formation of unified commands for
any Allied operation. These expectations were confirmed in
August when Eisenhower was appointed as commander of
the Allied North African expedition and attempted to
establish control over all the services of both countries, to
include direct command of the ground forces not only for the
landings, but for the follow-up operations as well. The
British authorities, however, provided a directive for their
First Army Commander that was essentially a copy of a
1918 directive, reserving all tactical control to the British
commander who could appeal to the British government if
he thought his forces might be “imperiled” by allied
direction.18 Eisenhower protested that the instructions
violated every concept concerning unity of command and
should be rewritten
in the form of a short statement of principles, emphasizing
unity of the whole" and the purpose of both countries" to unify
the Allied force and to centralize responsibility for its
operation. . . .19

It was the new commander at his best—conciliatory,
impersonal and objective, yet quietly passionate about
unity of command and unified operations. In the end, the
British agreed to his request, thus establishing an
important new basis for Allied operations. “From the day I
came over here,” an elated Eisenhower wrote Marshall in
October,
I have dinned into the British the fact that you considered
unity of command to exist only when the Commander of an
Allied Force had the same authority . . . with respect to all
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troops involved, as he had to those of his own nationality. I am
now benefiting from this crusade. . . .20

The issue appeared again, however, when the CCS
issued directives in late January 1943, stipulating that
Eisenhower’s three deputies would “cooperate” with each
other in planning and executing the invasion of Sicily.21 To
compound the matter, the three subordinate air, land and
sea commanders were all British: Air Chief Marshal Arthur
Tedder, General Harold Alexander, and Admiral Andrew
Cunningham. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determined to
operate his theater as a truly unified command. The British
system of cooperation, he emphasized in a passionate
message to Marshall, was inadequate to the demands of
modern conflict. A theater CINC must be free to make
decisions “under the principle of unity of command;” and in
the future he would be on his guard “to prevent any
important military venture depending for its control and
direction upon the ‘committee’ system of command.”22
Eisenhower succeeded in this goal for the Sicily
operation by means of his internal administrative
arrangements as well as by the force of his own personality
and his focus on unity of command. He maintained close
contact with his air and sea commanders, co-locating their
headquarters with his own in the St. Georges Hotel in
Algiers. And although he permitted Alexander to command
only those ground forces actually engaged in combat, he
maintained close liaison with the British general through
personal visits, phone calls, messages, and the exchange of
staff officers. Ultimately, the three commanders responded
to Eisenhower’s efforts as commander-in-chief and helped
him create the organization for unified command that the
Combined Chiefs had denied him in a formal directive.
By the end of the Sicilian campaign, Eisenhower had
strengthened his position with a command structure that
was approaching the ideal organization that he had
outlined to the British Chiefs the previous August.
Alexander was in charge of those land forces in Sicily
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engaged in actual operations, while Eisenhower retained
his position of overall ground commander. And acting
directly under him, Tedder and Cunningham had complete
control of the theater air and sea forces. So impressed were
the Combined Chiefs with the control exercised by
Eisenhower under his unified structure, that they
authorized him full discretion in choosing the times and
places for future landings in his Mediterranean theater. In
September 1943, Eisenhower summarized his views on
these experiences to Lord Louis Mountbatten, recently
appointed by the CCS as Supreme Commander of the
Southeast Asia Theater and anxious for advice “on the
pitfalls to avoid and the line you consider one should take
up.”23 Mountbatten’s three deputies, Eisenhower advised,
would be accustomed to dealing directly with their own
national ministers and would have senior subordinates of
opposite nationality who would also deal directly with the
authorities from their own countries. He recommended that
these channels “should be interfered with as little as
possible,” but cautioned Mountbatten that no one else must
be allowed to communicate with the Combined Chiefs. The
practical result, he concluded, “was that final
recommendations as to operations . . . and requests for
needed resources must likewise pass through you.”
Drawing upon his own experiences with the Combined
Chiefs, and the strengths of the personal traits that had
allowed him to operate fully as a CINC without a formal
charter of complete control, he concluded that:
while the set-up may be somewhat artificial and not always so
clear-cut as you might desire, your personality and good sense
must make it work. Otherwise Allied action in any theater
will be impossible.24

A few months later, after being appointed to command
OVERLORD, Eisenhower once again encountered
situations that were not so “clear-cut” as he attempted to
resolve organizational problems concerning his new
command structure under Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). In the Mediterranean, he
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had commanded all the U.K. and U.S. military assets in his
theater. In his new capacity, he did not initially have control
of the British and American strategic bombing forces—an
important point for him based on the recent experiences at
Salerno. As a consequence, Eisenhower requested that, at
least for several months before and after the Normandy
invasion, the bombers be placed at his disposal to destroy
the railroad infrastructure in France and the Low Countries
and to prevent speedy German reinforcements once the
location of the cross-channel assault had been revealed.
Initially, the SHAEF Commander’s proposal for what came
to be called the “Transportation Plan” was resisted by the
commanders of the two strategic bombing forces, who
perceived their primary missions as the destruction of the
industrial infrastructure in the German heartland. The
arguments over the issue swept back and forth during
February and March 1944. Eisenhower remained adamant,
finally forcing a decision in his favor by being prepared “to
inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that unless the matter
is settled at once I will request relief from this command.”25
Eisenhower’s stance, Stephen Ambrose points out
concerning the ultimate effectiveness of the Transportation
Plan, “was perhaps his greatest single contribution to the
success of OVERLORD.”26
Eisenhower also drew on his Mediterranean experience
when he stipulated that General Bernard Montgomery was
to command only the ground forces committed to the
Normandy assault. Once the Allied forces had achieved a
breakout from the landing beaches, Eisenhower planned to
have the British general revert to command of one army
group of British and Canadian armies, while General Omar
Bradley would take command of the other army group of
American forces. At one point, Montgomery proposed that
he continue as a ground force commander after Normandy
through the fall of 1944 while retaining command of his
army group—an idea that Eisenhower termed “fantastic”
since it would have placed the British commander “in a
position to draw at will, in support of his own ideas, upon the
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strength of the entire command.”27 Eisenhower was on to
something. For later, when the British were unable to
persuade him to change his so-called “broad-front” strategy
for moving on the Rhine and the industrial heartland of
Germany, they raised the idea of altering SHAEF’s
command structure in order to achieve their objectives for a
single thrust to Berlin. At Montgomery’s suggestion, the
British Chiefs proposed that General Alexander, then CINC
of the Mediterranean Theater, substitute for Tedder as
SHAEF deputy and assume the role of a single ground
commander to ease Eisenhower’s task of both planning and
implementing the European War. Eisenhower was
adamant in his refusal, notifying General Alan Brooke, the
head of the British Imperial Staff, that there could never be
any question “of placing between me and my Army Group
Commanders any intermediary headquarters either official
or unofficial.”28
This lack of a land commander, as Montgomery pointed
out, diminished overall direction on the battlefield. But it
was a price that was paid to hold together the alliance, for as
Alexander had demonstrated as ground commander in the
other theaters, the same pressures would apply to whoever
was in charge. And those pressures, as Eisenhower well
knew, could come from the very top, as demonstrated by the
vehemence with which Brooke and Marshall defended the
interests of their respective armies, even when those forces
were under his command.
In the end, there was no other commander on either side
in World War II who had more complex unified and
combined command experiences than Eisenhower.
Moreover, it is easy to forget from a perspective of over
half-a-century how unique those experiences were. Until
that conflict, no American had ever been in charge of a large
unified command consisting of armies, navies, and
airforces; and none had ever directed an allied command.
There were, of course, unified and combined operations in
other theaters of the global war. But they were less complex:
in the Central Pacific because the forces were primarily
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naval; and in the Southwest Pacific, the Middle East, and
Southwest Asia because the forces were much smaller in
each theater. Finally, in the European and African theaters,
the German, Italian, and Russian forces were dominated by
army ground troops with no attempts to organize these
forces jointly under anything approaching unified
commands. And in fact, only Japan among the Axis powers
attempted to unite its three services under the command of
one officer.
The Post-War Years.
From the end of World War II until he assumed the
Presidency of the United States in 1953, Eisenhower served
in a number of positions that caused him to maintain his
focus on the principle of unity of command, but in an
environment that was far more complex and far less
malleable than he had been accustomed to as a wartime
Supreme Commander. In that position, there had been a
single overriding goal. But during his tenure as Army Chief
of Staff from December 1945 to February 1948, Eisenhower
entered political-military conflicts as the military head of
one of the services, an interested party who, despite being
primus inter pares in prestige, was only one among equals in
power. After SHAEF, it was a time of frustration for
Eisenhower. Shortly after assuming his new duties, he
wrote his son that the position of Army Chief “was a sorry
place to light after having commanded a theater of war.”29
And more than halfway through his tenure, he confided that
“since my own method worked well for me when I was a little
‘Czar’ in my own sector, I find it difficult to readjust to the
demands of this city.”30
Much of the frustration had to do with Eisenhower’s
efforts to achieve unity of command at all levels. In the field,
despite a general agreement to retain the unified command
system in peacetime, there were major disagreements
between the Navy and the Army over which service would
have command of various Pacific areas. Throughout the
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spring and summer of 1946, the new Army Chief of Staff was
constantly involved in representing General MacArthur’s
position to the JCS. But there were pressures for
compromise, as he noted in August, in the form of “the
report of the Pearl Harbor Committee, the urgent desires of
the two Secretaries for an early solution to the problem, and
the demands of the press and public for elimination of ‘Pearl
Harbor’ conditions.”31 Moreover, Eisenhower had also
enlarged the issue by that time to encompass a global
structure to achieve “sound unified command
arrangements at the earliest possible time” in “other
theaters and areas in the world where in certain cases the
situation is at least as acute as in the Pacific.”32 In
September, he forwarded a draft global unified command
plan to the JCS which outlined the roles of the Joint Chiefs,
as well as of unified and component commanders. The
proposal, however, also included a new plan for the Pacific
that was unacceptable to the Navy. At the same time, the
Navy also rejected an Air Force proposal that the Strategic
Air Command (SAC), operating under one commander on a
global basis, should be supported by other CINCs.
By early December, an increasingly impatient
Eisenhower had worked out compromise wording on SAC
authority acceptable to both services, and had made
important concessions to the Navy in the Pacific, leaving
MacArthur without any reference to that ocean in his title.
It was a far different experience than the heady wartime
days at OPD four years before, when Eisenhower had
written the directive for MacArthur’s command of a major
Pacific theater of operations. When President Harry S.
Truman approved the first Unified Command Plan on
December 14, 1946, MacArthur was designated
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), one of seven
unified commands, and one which limited his authority in
effect to the Philippines, Korea, and Japan. Most
importantly, however, the document retained Eisenhower’s
proposals, based on recent changes to the 1935 manual,
Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), for the role of
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commanders in the global unified plan. Unified commands
would consist of two or more components, each component to
be commanded by an officer authorized to communicate
directly with his appropriate service headquarters
concerning administration, logistics, and training. The
commander of the unified command would operate with a
joint staff composed of appropriate members of the service
components under his command. Finally, the JCS would
exercise strategic direction, as it had in wartime, assigning
forces to the unified commands as well as stipulating the
missions and tasks for those commands. The JCS would also
continue the wartime practice of designating a service chief
to act as an executive agent for the Joint Chiefs to oversee
the operation of each unified command.33
All in all, the first Unified Command Plan was a
tremendous accomplishment for the new Army Chief of
Staff—the result of conciliation, principled compromise,
and the ability to move beyond service parochialism to a
global vision. Typically, Eisenhower played down the
Service infighting and his pivotal role when he reminded a
Congressional Committee the following May that his
wartime experience
was that of a unified single commander, having all services
under my command. . . .
The team that I saw developed in that area, in my conviction,
was the only kind of team that could have won the European
war. I think that lesson is so clearly understood by all of us that
there is no one of the services that objects or would tolerate any
other solution except the single command in a single theater of
war. We have believed that so much that we have attempted to
carry that into our peacetime practices in attempting to set up a
single commander in the Western Pacific, the Central Pacific, in
the Caribbean, and so on. No matter from what service he
comes, he commands the operations, the defenses and strategic
concerns in those areas.34

The presence of the Army Chief at the congressional
hearing was also a reflection of the larger issue of defense
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unification that had been festering since early in the war.
For Eisenhower, the successful wartime experience in the
field under unity of command made a compelling argument
for unification at the highest level of the armed forces with
clear and accountable authority down to the unified
commanders in the field. “I am convinced,” he testified in
November 1945,
that unless we have unity of direction in Washington, through
the years of peace that be ahead, we may enter another
emergency, in a time to come, as we did in Pearl Harbor.35

To this end, he favored the War Department proposal to
unify all services under a single, cabinet-level head, a
Secretary of National Defense, who would in turn be served
by a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Navy, on
the other hand, proposed to maintain a coordinate, not a
unified organization, with a committee system to adjust
activities of the War and Navy departments and to integrate
military policy and programs with overall domestic and
international requirements.
Both services outlined their proposals before a Senate
committee in October 1945. The War Department plan, as
presented by General J. Lawton Collins, was confusing and
inconsistent, particularly in the peculiar dual relationship
of the service chiefs as subordinates to the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces in the departmental hierarchy, but as
equal members of the advisory Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
addition, the solid command line used by Collins on his
chart clearly showed the theater commanders directly
under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, thus implying
that he alone would direct operations by the CINCs in the
field. Collins was at great pains to emphasize that the single
Chief of Staff would not have a large staff and that the
individual service chiefs would continue to act for the Joint
Chiefs as executive agents to carry out the JCS directives
with the operational staffs of their own services. But 2
weeks later, before the same committee, Eisenhower
rejected the solid command line on the organizational chart.
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The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, he recommended,
should be removed from the chain of command between the
Secretary on the one hand and the service chiefs and theater
commanders on the other, and be depicted in the advisory
organizational box of the JCS as the chief advisor to the
civilian head. Eisenhower was sure that this had been the
original intent since “by drawing him as he appears on the
chart, it looks like he is the fabulous man on horseback that
we are always talking about.”36
On December 19, 1945, President Truman sent a
unification message to Congress that clearly favored the
single department proposed in the Collins Plan.
Nevertheless, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was
optimistic as the new year began, since the new Army Chief
of Staff and his naval counterpart, Admiral Chester Nimitz,
had already begun negotiations that appeared likely to
settle what the Secretary termed the unification lawsuit.
“Eisenhower is a good practical Dutchman and so is
Nimitz,” Forrestal observed, “and between them I believe
we will make progress.” 37 Another year would pass,
however, before both chiefs and both service secretaries
could arrive at a draft proposal for unification, and even
then it required presidential decisions on several
intractable issues. Eisenhower was committed throughout
the process to establishing overall unity of command
exercised by a civilian secretary. “I personally do not care
what the language of the bill is,” he testified to Congress
that spring.
I want to get started with a man to whom we can all go, a civilian
who comes down here and tells you people. . . . “Here is the
picture of national security of the country; here is what we think
we need. . . .” That is important to me.38

The compromise unification proposal was dispatched to
Congress early in 1947 and emerged with some
modifications after prolonged hearings and deliberations on
July 26 as the National Security Act. The new law created a
coordinated defense establishment more in keeping with
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the Navy model—an organization which Eisenhower aptly
characterized as “little more than a weak confederation of
sovereign military units.”39 The compromise was most
noticeable in the powers provided to the Secretary of
Defense, who instead of presiding over one single executive
branch department, was to head a National Military
Establishment consisting of three executive departments,
one for each service and administered by cabinet-level
secretaries. The services, which now included an Air Force,
retained their essential autonomy as well as the roles and
missions that had emerged from the war—a status
explicitly acknowledged in the Act’s provision “for their
authoritative coordination and unified direction under
civilian control but not to merge them.” Equally important,
the Act established the JCS as a permanent organization
served by a joint staff limited to 100 officers divided with
equal numbers from each of the military departments. The
Joint Chiefs were provided with statutory authorization to
continue their wartime roles: To act as the principal
military advisors to the President and the Secretary of
Defense; to prepare strategic plans and provide for the
strategic direction of the armed forces; and “to establish
unified commands in strategic areas when such unified
commands are in the interest of national security.”40
Despite his support for the unification compromise,
Eisenhower revealed some key reservations in his
occasionally unguarded testimony to the House and Senate
committees in the spring of 1947. The idea that the JCS
would continue as a collaborative, coordinated body
obviously bothered him when he acknowledged under
persistent questioning that
there is weakness in any council running a war. . . . In war, you
must have a decision. A bum decision is better than none. And
the trouble is that when you get three, you finally get none.41

One solution was a single Chief of Staff, which he admitted
was his personal preference, but too disruptive an issue.
“Time may bring it about, and it may show that this is the
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better system.”42 In the meantime, it was necessary to
establish a truly joint culture. It was a basic fact, he pointed
out, that
when you have kept services apart and you wait until men are
50 before they begin to meet and know much about each other, it
is pretty difficult to develop the kind of team play that applies on
one of the Knute Rockne football teams.43

A year later, Eisenhower returned to the theme in his
farewell memorandum to Secretary of Defense Forrestal.
“Someday it will be possible,” he wrote,
to give to selected officers of the several services ‘combined arms’
commissions that will transcend in prestige and in public regard
anything they could hold of comparable rank in one of the
individual services.44

The memorandum was also a reminder of the need for an
evolutionary approach to the provisions of the National
Security Act.
There should be no hesitancy in using the ‘trial and error’
method so long as these proceed from minor innovation toward
larger and more radical objectives in final result.45

The two men were able to act on this advice when, less
than a year later, Forrestal asked Eisenhower to serve as
his adviser and informal Chairman of the JCS. From
December 1948 to July 1949, Eisenhower divided his time
between his duties as President of Columbia University and
his responsibilities as Chairman in increasingly tense
sessions with the Joint Chiefs. He later recalled that, as
Chairman, “I was an umpire between disputing services;
sometimes a hatchet man on what Fox Conner used to call
Fool Schemes.”46 A major motivation for Forrestal was to
use Eisenhower effectively as a senior military adviser
interacting with the JCS in order to obtain an amendment
to the National Security Act that would provide a
permanent Chairman for that body. “With Ike here for 60
days,” he confided in his diary, “I think we can get the
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pattern set and prove its workability by pragmatic
experience.”47 At first, however, Eisenhower was more
inclined to focus on a self-imposed majority rule procedure
for the JCS, whereby if the Joint Chiefs failed three times to
reach unanimity on a given issue, the majority view would
prevail. But after his initial experiences of attempting to
adjudicate bitter interservice parochial disputes, he
changed his mind. “The JCS need a chairman at the very
least—and by that I mean a fourth member who can divorce
himself from his service background.”48
By that time, Eisenhower was heavily involved in all
aspects of proposed changes to the 1947 Act. The Chairman,
he suggested, should “take precedence” over all others, but
be a non-voting member of the JCS, a move that would “tend
to allay suspicions that the man was going to be an arbitrary
boss.”49 Nor should there be any fixed ceiling for the Joint
Staff. In addition, he was particularly concerned that the
right of service secretaries to appeal directly to the
President and the Director of the Budget be eliminated. It
was a matter, after all, of the centralizing spirit of the law
and how that was to be conveyed in the proposed
amendments.
I think that the language should carry the clear intent of
Congress to place the maximum amount of authority in the
hands of the Secretary of Defense with restrictions imposed in
only a few vital areas where obviously Congress should dictate
the type of organization desired. My impression of the law as
now written is that it sets up an official upon whom is placed
great responsibility and then a deliberate shackle was
imposed upon him to the extent that his effectiveness is
curtailed.50

On August 10, President Truman signed PL 216, the
National Security Amendments of 1949, which transformed
the National Military Establishment into the executive
Department of Defense. The amendments, reflecting some
congressional modifications, remained essentially
concerned with the two issues for which Eisenhower had
provided input: The extent to which the Secretary of
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Defense’s formal authority was to be increased and the
scope of the authority of the Chairman position that was to
be added to the JCS. In terms of the Secretary, the
qualifying “general” was removed from the original
description of his “direction, authority, and control.”
Equally important, the service secretaries lost considerable
power with their removal from the National Security
Council and their loss of cabinet status, although they still
retained statutory obligation to “separately” administer
what were now military departments. As for the
recommendation that the Chairman “head” the JCS and act
as the principal adviser to the President and the Secretary
of Defense, Congress agreed that he would preside over the
Joint Chiefs as a non-voting member. The JCS, however, not
the chairman, would be the principal advisers and in this
capacity would be aided by a Joint Staff increased to 210. In
addition, although the service secretaries and military
chiefs were no longer permitted to deal directly with the
President or the Budget Director as Eisenhower had
recommended, they were allowed, after informing the
Secretary, to take to Congress, “any recommendations
relating to the Department of Defense.” Finally, the new law
specifically prohibited any of the major combat functions of
the military departments from being “transferred,
reassigned, abolished or consolidated.”51
This last prohibition reflected the continued sensitivity
to service roles and missions, an issue deliberately not
addressed in detail in 1947. This issue had ostensibly been
settled by the so-called Key West Agreement, hammered
out by Forrestal and the JCS in April 1948, 2 months after
Eisenhower quit as Army Chief. Equally important, it was a
reflection of trends set in train by the Key West Agreement
that would increase the tensions between the authority of
service component commanders and that of unified
commanders. To begin with, the overwhelming interest of
the chiefs at that conference was to protect the integrity of
their service activities in operational commands involving
more than one service. Moreover, the agreement provided
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that the JCS continue the well established practice of
designating one of its members as executive agent for each
unified command. All this was compounded by the 1949 Act,
which not only explicitly forbade the Secretary to interfere
with the combat functions of the forces being assigned to
unified commands, but increased the power of the service
chiefs even as it diminished that of the service secretaries.
The chiefs, of course, were still individually responsible to
their secretaries. But collectively the Joint Chiefs were the
principal military advisers of the Secretary of Defense; and
since they were the only service departmental
representatives provided a statutory role in the
departmental policy process, they became, as they had in
World War II, the spokesmen for their services.
These trends culminated in 1951 with the publication of
the Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) manual, the first
joint document to supercede the 1935 JAAN. In the first
post-war change to the old document, which Eisenhower
had cited in establishing the first Unified Command Plan,
the CINCs were explicitly given command over service
components, as the organizational norm. In the new
document, that command was couched in terms of exception
and even then in terms that were solicitous of the services.
Unless authorized to do so by the appointing authority, the
commander of a unified command does not exercise direct
command of any of the Service components or of a subordinate
force. In exercising command, he shall take cognizance of the
prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service component
commanders. . . .52

By 1951, Eisenhower had assumed duties as the first
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a position
as much political as military, which within a few months he
was referring to as “this dismaying and unattractive
assignment. . . .”53 Part of his frustration had to do with
conflicting parochial national interests—whether it was the
British insistence that one of their admirals be CINC of
either the Atlantic or Mediterranean Command, or French
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suspicions of any attempts to rearm the Germans. The
German issue was particularly frustrating because it
involved Eisenhower in discussions about centralized
command in a European Defense Force in which he
believed, but which was doomed to failure precisely because
of the degree of national integration down the chain of
command that he found so attractive. In fact, much of
Eisenhower’s frustration was focused on the Joint Chiefs
who complicated his efforts to build a unified structure by
indulging in service rivalries in their dealings with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by refusing to
share intelligence as well as atomic weapons and secrets,
and by resisting efforts to transfer operational control of
U.S. units to NATO. These types of problems were
symbolized by IRONBARK, the JCS war plan that had as a
basic assumption that NATO forces could delay but not
prevent the onslaught of communist forces across Europe.
This assumption was at odds with the political-military
NATO strategy that required a vigorous defense along the
Rhine, for which the Europeans were struggling to provide
manpower and resources. Eisenhower recognized the need
for the JCS to prepare emergency war plans on a global
basis. “However, with respect to my area,” he reminded
them,
the fact that the U.S. has taken the lead in establishing a unified
command structure, and has, with other nations, agreed to
place its forces under that command, makes it mandatory that
U.S. emergency plans recognize clearly my authority as the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. . . . I consider, therefore,
that it must be made absolutely clear that the directive of the
President, placing all U.S. forces in Europe under my
operational command for the accomplishment of my mission,
has no qualifications or limitations. . . .54

The Presidency.
Eisenhower’s earlier experiences concerning unity of
command virtually assured that defense reorganization
would be an immediate priority for him when he assumed
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the office of President in January 1953. It was still, as he
had believed since agreeing to the 1947 compromise, a
matter of organizational evolution. “Valuable lessons have
been learned through six years of trial by experience.”
Moreover, there were what he termed “changing conditions”
in the domestic and international arena. To begin with,
America would have to continue to live through years that
were “neither of total war nor total peace,” in which large
standing forces would have to be used efficiently and
effectively in unified commands around the world to
reassure allies, to deter aggression, and, if deterrence failed,
to fight and win. Efficiency was the key to maintaining
freedom and economic solvency, both of which he believed
were vital components of national security. At the same
time, Eisenhower still had concerns about the lack of full
centralized civilian control, which had not been alleviated
by the 1949 Act or the experiences in the intervening years.
In fact, even as the status of the service secretaries had
declined in the wake of that Act, the JCS had returned to its
dominant position of World War II in the Korean conflict,
directing combat operations and dealing directly with the
President concerning implementation of United Nations
(U.N.) directives. As a consequence, the new President
believed there was a need to reduce the role and political
power of the JCS, which had already begun to deadlock on
reduced budgetary allocations as the Korean War came to
an end.55
To resolve these issues, Eisenhower appointed the
Rockefeller Committee in early February to develop specific
recommendations for Department of Defense (DoD)
reorganization. The April 11 Committee Report continued
the general tenor of the criticism concerning the JCS,
concluding that in order for the Joint Chiefs “to rise above
the particular views of their respective services,” they must
be moved out of all command channels and serve only as a
planning and advisory staff.56 This conclusion, however,
presented the committee with a dilemma. One group
believed that the only way the Joint Chiefs would transcend
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service interests was to end their relationships with the
services. They recommended a hierarchical, general staff
model that would terminate the “dual-hat” role of the JCS.
Acting solely in a “staff” capacity for the Secretary, the Joint
Chiefs would turn naturally from “parochial” to “national”
advice. Another group opposed a complete separation
between operational and planning responsibilities. The
compromise was to strengthen the position of the Chairman
in order to bring about a reorientation of the JCS and its
subordinate staff structure, in which the JCS staff role for
the Secretary would be emphasized and the role of the chiefs
as service representatives would be de-emphasized, but not
ended.57
Eisenhower incorporated this compromise proposal, as
well as other committee recommendations, into his April 30
message forwarding the reorganization plan to Congress.
He was careful to point out that the JCS, as provided in the
1947 National Security Act, “are not a command body, but
are the principal military advisers to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.”58
In their dual-hat capacity, however, the JCS could not plan
effectively on joint matters while fulfilling their
responsibilities to the secretaries for the efficiency of their
services and their readiness for war. One way to further the
strategic planning and military advisory capabilities of the
“clearly overworked” chiefs, the solicitous President
concluded, was to make the Chairman solely responsible for
managing the work of the Joint Staff and its Director, to
include the provision that the service of officers on that staff
would be subject to the Chairman’s approval.
Eisenhower was equally solicitous on the related issue of
clarifying lines of civilian authority, which he assured
Congress could be attained without any legislative change.
It was simply a matter of altering by executive order that
part of the Key West Agreement that had legalized the Joint
Chiefs executive agent system for each unified command.
This practice, the President emphasized, had led to
“considerable confusion and misunderstanding” with
48

respect to the relationships of the JCS to the Secretary of
Defense and of the individual service chiefs to their service
secretaries. As a consequence, he intended to direct the
Secretary of Defense to revise the Key West Agreement and
to designate a military department as executive agent for
each unified command. “Under this new arrangement,” he
concluded, “the channel of responsibility and authority to a
commander of a unified command will unmistakably be
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
designated civilian Secretary of a military department.” At
the same time, however, Eisenhower also included almost
verbatim what the Rockefeller Committee termed “an
important proviso” as part of its internal compromise—a
compromise in this case that continued the ambiguity in the
chain of command.
It will be understood, however, that for the strategic direction
and operational control of forces and for the conduct of combat
operations, the military chief of the designated military
department will be authorized by the Secretary of Defense to
receive and transmit reports and orders and to act for that
department in its executive agency capacity. This
arrangement will make it always possible to deal promptly
with emergency or wartime situations.

In October 1953, the Secretary of Defense issued the
executive order revision of the Key West Agreement derived
from the President’s April 30 message. The actual
legislation concerning the reorganization plan had already
passed at the end of June. In the hearings on that
legislation, there were some traditional concerns that the
changes concerning the Chairman could lead to a man on
horseback. But after “clarifying the matter” for legislative
leaders, Eisenhower was generally able to quiet these
concerns.59 In addition, there was a general tendency on the
part of most congressmen and witnesses in the hearings to
defer to the new leader who had justified his reorganization
request as “a former soldier who has experienced modern
war at first hand, and now as President and Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces and the United States.” 60
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Admiral Leahy, for instance, testified that the changes
proposed in the plan would create a system greatly different
from the World War II experience. But since the United
States had been so successful in that conflict, the committee
chairman asked, why should the changes in the
reorganization plan be approved? “President Eisenhower
wants it,” the Admiral replied; “that is all.” Was that the
only reason, the chairman continued. “That is the only
reason I can see,” Leahy explained.
. . . . He has been a grand soldier and he has been in it all his life.
When people ask me whether I object to this or not, I say, “How
can I object to it if the President approves it?” He has more
experience in wars than I have had. He is recognized as an
expert. So if he wants it why not let him have it? That is my
answer to it.61

This kind of deference had long since disappeared by
Eisenhower’s second term. There were new tensions within
the military establishment brought about by the rising cost
of fielding modern forces for war in an environment of fixed
budgets. All this was intensified by the October 1957 Soviet
launch of Sputnik, which led to renewed public debate
concerning DoD organizational structure and to alarming
predictions from independent studies and committees.
Eisenhower had already formed several advisory groups on
the subject, primarily to reinforce his ideas on unity of
command. “Military organization was a subject I had long
lived with,” he recalled later in classic understatement; “. . .
I had definite ideas of the corrective measures that needed
to be taken.”62 On January 9, 1958, he presented his State of
the Union address to Congress and listed DoD
reorganization as the top priority of the eight tasks he set
out for his administration. He would send specific
recommendations to Congress by separate message, he
concluded, to enthusiastic applause.
That message on April 3 represented the culmination of
Eisenhower’s thoughts and experiences concerning unity of
command since the early days of World War II. That conflict
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had proved that warfare could no longer be waged
effectively under separate service efforts. But in the debates
and eventual compromise that marked the 1947
reorganization, “the lessons were lost, tradition won. . . .”63
In 1949 and 1953, there were reforms leading to increased
centralization and authority for the Secretary of
Defense—all necessary given the new technologies and the
Cold War requirements for readiness and deterrence. The
process had been slowed, however, by concerted resistance
from the separate services and their friends in Congress.
The service leaders, Eisenhower emphasized, were honest
in their forceful presentations of their views on the
importance of their programs in the overall national effort.
But service responsibilities and activities must always be only
the branches, not the central trunk of the national security
tree. . . . We must cling no longer to statutory authority. We
must free ourselves of emotional attachments to service
systems of an era that is no more.

The central theme of Eisenhower’s April proposals, as it
had been in his 1945 Congressional testimony, was that
unity of command must run in a symbiotic thread from the
highest level down into the theater commands.
The need for greater unity today is most acute at two
points—in the office of the Secretary of Defense and in the
major operational commands responsible for actual combat in
the event of war.

In terms of the operational level, the President specifically
addressed the organizational deficiencies of the unified
commands that limited the CINCs authority over the
component commands, their influence over resources, and
their ability to promote greater unity of effort within their
commands. The solution was to build upon the World War II
experience and organize forces into “truly unified”
commands as the “cutting edge” of the entire defense
organization.
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Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I
emphasize that each unified commander must have
unquestioned authority over all units of his command.

The key to reform in the field was clear command lines
from the President to the CINCs in order to avoid confusion
of authority and defusion of responsibilities. The existing
chain of command from the 1953 reorganization,
Eisenhower explained, had expanded from the service
secretaries to the point that “ultimately the chief of an
individual service issues in the name of the Secretary of
Defense orders to a unified commander.” That this was
“staff” taking over responsibilities of the “line” was
self-evident, since the role of the Joint Chiefs, he reminded
the Congress, should be only to furnish professional advice
and staff assistance to the Secretary of Defense. To this end,
he had directed the Secretary to discontinue the use of
military departments as executive agents for unified
commands. “I consider this chain of command cumbersome
and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of
war,” Eisenhower emphasized. “Clearly, Secretaries of
military departments and chiefs of individual services
should be removed from the command channel.”
The result was an operational chain of command
“running from the Commander in Chief and Secretary of
Defense directly to unified commands.” At the same time,
Eisenhower planned to maintain the support channel to the
CINCs through the military departments which, relieved by
his directive of responsibility for military operations, could
concentrate on the administration, training, and logistics of
their service forces assigned by the Secretary to the unified
commands. But for this support channel to work, provisions
in the current law must be eliminated, such as the one
prescribing “separate administration” by the service
secretaries of their departments which inflicted “needless
and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secretary of
Defense.” And chief among such provisions, as Eisenhower
examined the command linkage to the CINCs, was the
specter of service functions that always hovered on the
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fringes of such considerations. The 1949 law had contained
the first explicit statutory limitations on executive
alterations of combatant functions—an ironic outcome of
the efforts that year to clarify and strengthen the Defense
Secretary’s power. Now in the spring of 1958, Eisenhower
proposed in the strongest terms that these restrictions be
amended in order “to remove any possible obstacles to the
full unity of our commands and the full command over them
by unified commanders!” This recommendation, he added,
did not contemplate any repeal of laws prescribing the
composition of the services, nor would it have such an effect.
All these changes would also require the JCS to change.
In order for that body to assist the Secretary of Defense in
his exercise of direction over the unified commands,
Eisenhower asked Congress to raise or remove the statutory
limit of 210 officers on the Joint Staff, and to authorize the
Chairman to assign duties to that staff and to appoint its
Director. As for the service chiefs, the President was as
solicitous as he had been in 1953 of their dual-hat
“burdens.” He proposed, therefore, that the law be changed
to emphasize that each chief was authorized to delegate
much of his service responsibilities to his vice chief, thus
allowing him to make the JCS role the primary duty.
Finally, Eisenhower served notice to Congress that he was
changing the Joint Staff committee system, which he
perceived as a vestigial organization from 1942 when the
staff reflected the informal nature of the JCS. “Had I
allowed my interservice and inter-allied staff to be similarly
organized in the theaters I commanded during World War
II,” he explained, “the delays and resulting indecisiveness
would have been unacceptable to my superiors.” The new
system would center on an integrated operations division
with joint directorates designed to make it easier for the
Joint Staff, as it assumed the duties heretofore performed
by the service staffs, to work with similar structures in the
unified commands.
In considering the reorganization proposal, the Armed
Service committees in both Houses agreed with the
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necessity to organize the operational commands into “truly
unified” military structures tailored for a rapidly changing
world. But they expressed concerns about the methods to
achieve that objective, particularly concerning the request
to grant the Secretary of Defense greater authority to
determine the service roles and missions. In a similar
manner, both committees were concerned about any
increase in the authority of the Chairman and the size of the
Joint Staff, and were generally not persuaded by
administration arguments that delegation of service duties
to the vice chiefs would not sever the ties of the chiefs to
their individual services. Nor were the committees fully
convinced that the words “separately administered,” as
currently applied to the military departments, posed a
threat to the Secretary, or for that matter, that there was
any challenge that could mitigate his authority over the
CINCs. Even the popular General Omar Bradley could not
escape unscathed at one point in his continued insistence
that the Defense Secretary did not have adequate authority.
”Can you suggest to the committee," the exasperated House
chairman asked, “any English word that carries more
authority than ‘direction, authority and control’?”64
The House and Senate committee hearings on various
modifications of the proposed legislation lasted from May to
July. Eisenhower was extremely active throughout the
period, meeting with key legislative leaders and writing
influential persons to marshal pressure on Congress. “So
strong were my convictions on the need for this reform. . . .”65
The result was a compromise bill that clearly favored the
administration. The legislation granted the President’s
request for authority concerning service combatant
functions, but also provided that Congress would have 70
days to reject by simple majority any transfer or abolition of
such functions. Eisenhower considered that the latter
provision “made a small hole in the doughnut,” since in an
emergency he was also authorized to transfer major
combatant functions without consulting Congress.66
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There was a similar pattern of compromise with the
authorization of the Chairman to vote in the JCS and to
manage the Joint Staff. The Chairman was permitted to
select that staff, but only “in consultation” with the JCS,
and to manage it, but only “on behalf” of that collaborative
body. Moreover, the legislation specifically authorized the
Chiefs to retain their right to assign duties to the Joint Staff.
And there was no way for the President to gloss over what he
termed “legalized insubordination” in the final legislation
that authorized the service secretaries and the military
chiefs to go directly to Congress with “any recommendations
relating to the Department of Defense that they might deem
proper.” Still, Eisenhower consoled himself with President
Ulysses S. Grant’s reaction to similar circumstances: “I
cannot make the Comptroller General change his mind, but
I can get a new Comptroller General.”67
Balanced against these compromises were the
authorizations for the Chairman to vote in JCS
deliberations; for the service chiefs to delegate service
duties to their Vice Chiefs; and for the Joint Staff to increase
its size to 400 officers. Moreover, in terms of the military
departments, the words “separately administered” were
replaced with the specification that each department would
be “separately organized” under its secretary with all
services functioning under the “direction, authority and
control of the Secretary of Defense.” More important for
Eisenhower, the 1958 law authorized him, acting through
the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the JCS, to
establish unified commands, to assign their missions, and to
determine their force structure. In turn, the CINCs of those
commands were made responsible to the President and the
Secretary of Defense for implementing assigned missions.
To this end, the law delegated the CINCs full “operational
command” over assigned forces that could only be
transferred with presidential approval. At the same time,
the responsibility for the administration, training and
support of these component forces was maintained in the
respective military departments. Finally, by separate
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executive action, the Secretary of Defense discontinued the
system of executive agents for the unified commands.
Henceforth, the chain of command was to begin with the
President and run through the Secretary of Defense to the
CINCs.
The Evolutionary Process.
When he signed the Defense Reorganization Bill into law
on August 6, 1958, Eisenhower praised it as a remarkable
achievement. His positive reaction was understandable
since the new legislation represented a major move from the
coordinate philosophy that had triumphed in 1947 toward
his ideal of centralized civilian authority. That authority
extended on the one hand in a direct operational line to the
CINCs and on the other, in an administrative and support
line to those commanders through the military
departments. In theory, those two lines would be brought
together for the Secretary within the JCS advisory system.
The effort would be led by the Chairman, gradually
approaching the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces status
outlined so long ago in Eisenhower’s interpretation of the
Collins Plan. Under this system, the service chiefs would
bring their superior expertise on service force capabilities
and programs to the joint arena, and at the same time would
emerge from the JCS deliberations with a broader
perspective on national defense that would be used as they
exercised their individual service responsibilities.
Moreover, the new law granted more sweeping authority to
the CINCs than Eisenhower had exercised over all the
American forces assigned to OVERLORD. “In my own
experience in the European theater,” he acknowledged,
I had found little difficulty with a loose theater organization
partly because of the spirit of cooperation existing in wartime
and partly because I was the administrative commander of by
far the largest single component force in Europe, the United
States Army, which included the Air Force.68
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The changes, however, were deceptive. To begin with,
the military departments and services exercised residual de
facto power and influence out of all proportion to their new
statutorily assigned duties. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense was still not organized for full and effective
integration of service capabilities into the forces required
for the missions of the Unified Commands. Nor were the
Joint Chiefs, the principal staff contact for the CINCs, able
to make meaningful programmatic inputs. As a
consequence, the unified commanders had to plan for their
missions with resources provided by the services through a
process defended by the services. The result was that the
CINCs had limited power to influence the capability of
assigned forces, leaving the services and thus the
components with the primary influence on both the
structure and the readiness of the forces for which the
CINCs were responsible. This continued strength and
independence of the component commands would in many
aspects insure that despite Eisenhower’s termination of the
executive agent arrangement, the practice would persist
outside the formal DoD directive.
This failure to adequately implement Eisenhower’s
concept of unified command resulted over the next several
decades in operational deficiencies that became
increasingly evident during the Vietnam War, the seizure of
the Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, and the
incursion into Grenada. The 1983 Grenada operation, in
particular, caused Congress to focus its efforts on ensuring
that the CINCs had sufficient authority both to maintain
unity of command during operations and to prepare
effectively for assigned missions. To that end, it would also
be necessary to make the Chairman of the JCS responsible
for developing joint doctrine and joint training policies.
That same year, former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger summarized the problem before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services.
In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of
“unity of command” is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is
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formerly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is
endorsed if and only if it applies at the service level. The
inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the
ultimate ambiguity of command.69

These types of continuing problems leading up to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 were something Eisenhower
would have understood from his 17-year involvement with
the problems of unity of command at the national and
theater levels. At the August 1958 signing of the
Reorganization Act, he reminded his associates “that the
law was just another step toward what the majority of
experienced military men knew was necessary.”70 But
Eisenhower’s underlying philosophy was expressed in his
1949 testimony concerning the first changes to the National
Security Act.
We are expecting perfection too quickly. It is just exactly,
gentlemen, as when we were waging a great war in Europe. . . .
We get a set-back, deliberately risked to get ahead with this
war. . . . These set-backs are an inescapable part of all group
activity. . . .71
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CHAPTER 4
THE DoD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986:
IMPROVING THE DEPARTMENT
THROUGH CENTRALIZATION AND
INTEGRATION
Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Reorganizing the military establishment of the United
States has been a subject of considerable congressional
interest throughout much of this century. As early as 1921,
Congress began considering proposals to combine or unify
the military departments under a single executive agency.
Between 1921 and 1945, for example, Congress considered
some 50 proposals to reorganize the U.S. armed forces. Due
largely to opposition from the Departments of War and
Navy, however, none of these initiatives resulted in
legislation.1
The experiences of World War II made it clear that, for
the U.S. armed forces, future warfare would increasingly be
characterized by unified operations,2 and that a centrally
coordinated process for providing U.S. military capabilities
was needed. In a message to Congress (December 1945),
President Harry S. Truman stated that “There is enough
evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the
need for a unified department.” He urged Congress to “. . .
adopt legislation combining the War and Navy departments
into one single Department of National Defense.” 3
President Truman’s message led to the National Security
Act (NSA) of 1947 which created the “National Military
Establishment” and initiated a trend toward unification of
the U.S. armed forces that would continue throughout the
remainder of the century.4
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The type of unification advanced by legislation and
considered in this chapter has not eliminated the separate
services or merged the military departments into one.5 As
used herein, unification refers to the centralized direction of
the U.S. armed forces and the concomitant subordination of
the military departments and services to a centralized
control structure. This contrasts with a separatist approach
by which each military department would be a relatively
autonomous organizationcoordinating, and perhaps
synchronizing, its activities with the other departments,
but retaining essential decisionmaking autonomy in most
areas.
The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning
of a process of unification which continues today. Congress
contributed to the evolutionary process by passing the 1949
and 1958 amendments. In 1986, Congress passed seminal
legislation that significantly reorganized the Department of
Defense (DoD), moving it further toward a unified
structure. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), Congress sought to
strengthen civilian control of DoD, improve military advice
to civilian leadership, clarify the authority and
responsibilities of the combatant commanders, improve
strategy formulation and contingency planning, and
provide for more efficient use of defense resources. Over a
decade old, the Act has been substantially implemented in
most respects. The GNA is the most comprehensive defense
reorganization package enacted since the 1947 National
Security Act. Designed to accelerate the unification of the
U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering the manner in
which they were raised, trained, commanded, and
employed, the GNA has affected virtually all major
elements of DoD. Many consider the GNA instrumental in
the success of U.S. forces during OPERATION DESERT
STORM. Some believe that the question confronting DoD
now is what initiatives are required to progress the
department beyond the framework established by GNA?
Still others believe that the process and pattern of reform
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which led to passage of the Act should be replicated to
achieve a commensurate degree of unification among the
various national agencies involved in formulating and
implementing national security strategy. The purpose of
this chapter is to analyze the GNA in order to provide a
historical context for the contemporary debate about what
steps should be taken to improve further the functioning of
the DoD within the overarching national security structure.
UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND CONCERNS
How best to balance the unified and separatist
approaches to DoD organization has been a challenge that
has confronted Congress over the past half-century. Since
1947, Congress has gravitated slowly toward the unification
pole of these contrasting views of armed forces organization,
but the attraction of the separatist philosophy remains
significant. Since the end of World War II, almost every
Secretary of Defense has supported increased
centralization of authority. The military departments, on
the other hand, have generally attempted to retain their
autonomy.
In attempts to craft the most effective balance between
these opposing forces, Congress has recognized that
increased unification of the U.S. armed forces erodes
congressional control over the military. Consequently,
Congress has sought to limit this erosion by not
over-centralizing authority within the executive branch.6
The interaction of these dynamics has resulted in an
evolutionary unification process that continues as
implementation of the GNA nears completion.
The National Security Act of 1947 was the first, albeit
relatively ineffective, piece of unification legislation.
Although the act created the position of Secretary of
Defense, it gave the Secretary no real authority over the
secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Congress
perceived both the benefits and the dangers associated with
unification, and decided not to enact more radical
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legislation for fear of yielding much of its control over the
military to the executive branch.7 By 1949, however, the
executive branch was pressing for legislation to achieve
greater unification. Commenting on the National Security
Act, President Truman, in a March 1949 message to
Congress, stated:
This act has provided a practical and workable basis for
beginning the unification of the military services and for
coordinating military policy with foreign and economic policy . . .
The past 18 months have dispelled any doubt that unification of
the armed forces can yield great advantages to the nation . . .
[but] the act fails to provide for a fully responsible official with
authority adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the
president and the Congress can hold accountable.8

The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act
represented an important, but limited, step in further
unifying the U.S. military establishment. Congress
established DoD as an executive department and made the
Secretary of Defense responsible for its general direction.
Congress also redesignated the executive departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force as military departments,
which reduced them in stature, but the legislation also
instructed that they continue to be “separately
administered.”9
The congressional intent stated in Section 2 of the
Amendment was:
. . . to provide three military departments, separately
administered, . . . to provide for their authoritative
coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the
Secretary of Defense but not to merge them . . . and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces
but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed
forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to
be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or
Joint Staff) [emphasis in original].10

An important feature of the 1949 Amendment was that,
while clearly avoiding the actual merging of the military
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departments and the creation of a “single Chief of Staff,” the
amendment provided for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was given legal
identity by the 1947 NSA, with a mandate to serve as the
principal military advisory agency to the President, NSC,
and the Secretary of Defense.11 The 1949 amendment to the
NSA created the position of CJCS, but significantly
circumscribed his authority. He was not to exercise
command over the military services nor the Joint Chiefs,
and, in fact, he was not even a voting member of the JCS.12
With the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act,
Congress took a further step toward unifying the armed
forces but stopped short of merging the military
departments. Not surprisingly, unification pressures
continued. By 1958, the benefits of unified strategic
direction of the armed forces were more apparent, but
Congress still feared the creation of too much centralized
authority over the military. With the DoD Reorganization
Act of 1958, which amended the NSA, Congress nonetheless
gave the Secretary of Defense real authority over the U.S.
military establishment, including the power to reorganize
DoD. The amendment modified the requirement that the
military departments be “separately administered” to say
that they must be “separately organized.”13 The 1958 Act,
further subordinated the military departments to the central
authority of the Secretary of Defense, established the chain of
command from the President, through the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified and
specified commands, and provided for the central direction
and control of research and development.14

During the next 25 years, there was little congressional
action to unify the U.S. armed forces, but the Secretary of
Defense used his increased authority to take limited steps
toward further unification.15 In the early 1980s, however,
several events helped shape a congressional consensus that
DoD required significant reform.
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THE ROAD TO REFORM
The Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt.
On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, seizing 53 American hostages. The
attack on the embassy should not have come as a complete
surprise. Almost 9 months earlier, a similar incident
occurred but was resolved diplomatically.16 Although a
contingency plan for the evacuation of U.S. personnel
existed,17 it is unclear if the JCS, in response to the first
attack on the embassy, advised the Secretary of Defense or
the President that the contingency plan should be made
ready for potential execution. In any event, over 5 months
elapsed after the second seizure and the taking of American
hostages before the United States mounted a military
response.
The U.S. national leadership was confronted with a
situation for which it seemed unprepared. Direct White
House supervision, excessive devotion to secrecy and
compartmentalization, and a general circumvention of the
established crisis action planning process characterized
operational planning for the rescue mission.18 The plan that
resulted was “joint”19 in that it provided for forces from all
services but, at the same time, it was not a unified operation
in that it did not provide for unified command, unified
action, or joint training of the forces.20 Acting on the advice
of the JCS that the high-risk mission had a better than
average chance of succeeding, President Jimmy Carter
directed that the operation be executed.21
OPERATION EAGLE CLAW, designed to quickly and
dramatically rescue the hostages, ended in catastrophe.
American planning, equipment, tactics, and leadership
proved inadequate.22 Eight people on the mission were
killed, expensive U.S. equipment and classified information
were abandoned, and not a single hostage was rescued.23
The entire world wondered if the United States had indeed
become a military “paper tiger.”
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In the months following the failed rescue attempt, a
stunned American public endured the daily media
reminders of the continued plight of the hostages and
America’s inability to do anything about it.24 It is not
surprising that the Iran hostage rescue experience aroused
congressional suspicions about the way in which the U.S.
armed forces were commanded, organized, trained, and
employed. 2 5 Those suspicions were confirmed by
subsequent events.
Beirut.
During the fall of 1983, congressional concern over the
command, organization, and employment of U.S. armed
forces again peaked following another military disaster.
The previous year, some 1,200 U.S. Marines joined French
and Italian contingents in a multinational force. Their
mission was to preserve peace in and around Beirut,
Lebanon, facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and
authority of Lebanon’s government, and help bring peace to
the war-torn country. The Marines occupied positions in the
vicinity of Beirut International Airport (BIA).
In April 1983, a massive explosion destroyed the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens and over 40
others. Fighting between indigenous factions intensified
throughout the spring and summer. From March through
October 1983, the Marines suffered a number of casualties
(4 dead and 15 wounded) from the various factions involved
in Lebanon’s civil war.26 Events culminated on October 23,
1983, when a suicide bomber attacked the Marines’
headquarters building, killing 241 U.S. military personnel
and wounding over 100 others. 27 Shortly thereafter,
President Reagan withdrew the remaining U.S. forces.28
Congressional reaction was swift. A delegation from the
Investigations Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Armed Services arrived in
Beirut by December 12, 1983. Their report to the Committee
Chairman (December 19, 1983) criticized several military
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aspects of the incident. Transcending the tactical level, the
more notable criticisms included an ambiguous chain of
command, lack of proper oversight by higher levels of
command, lack of adequate intelligence support, reporting
by military sources of incomplete or inaccurate
information,29 the failure of civilian leadership to heed the
advice of senior military leaders concerning the overall risks
of the operation, and the inability of the military to
anticipate and protect against such an attack.30
With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue attempt
still vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested that the
deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces that contributed to the
debacle in Iran had not been corrected, but somehow had
worsened. Those sentiments began to prevail, and even a
successful military operation would not arrest the
congressional movement toward sweeping reform of DoD.
Grenada.
President Ronald Reagan came into office with the task
of restoring U.S. prestige, in part by improving the
credibility of its military capabilities. The U.S. experience in
Lebanon did not further that objective. Some believed,
however, that the successful use of military force, for a just
cause, could restore the confidence of the American people
in their military and government.31 Cuban activities on the
island of Grenada necessitated a military operation that
was large enough to be credible, but not so large as to
present significant risk of a substantial number of U.S.
casualties.32
On October 25, 1983, 2 days after the Beirut bombing,
the invasion of Grenada, OPERATION URGENT FURY,
began.33 The mission was to secure and evacuate about
1,000 U.S. citizens, defeat the Grenadian and Cuban forces
present, and stabilize the situation so that a democratic
government could be restored.34
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Taken as a whole, OPERATION URGENT FURY was a
success; the students were freed unharmed, the government
of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was ousted, Cuban troops
were removed, and democracy was restored. Still, critics
reported many problems with the operation.35 These
included a lack of accurate, up to date maps, imperfect
intelligence support, and U.S. casualties resulting from
accidents and fratricide.36 There were interoperability
problems among the services, particularly in the area of
communications.37 And although some forces acted bravely,
U.S. Army units reportedly performed sluggishly, used
inappropriate tactics, and suffered from breakdowns in
discipline.38 While the validity of such claims has been
debated, the fact remains that the overall success of the
operation failed to preclude congressional criticism, and the
Reagan administration again found itself on the
defensive.39
Congressional Reaction.
The military setbacks of the late 1970s and early 1980s
provided the historical context that shaped the widespread
congressional perception in 1983 that the U.S. military was
in need of reform. As early as June of that year, members of
Congress were calling for changes within DoD. Senators
John Tower and Henry (Scoop) Jackson, then Chairman
and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Committee on
Armed services, respectively, directed the committee staff
to conduct a study of the organization and decisionmaking
procedures of DoD. For the next 18 months, the study took
the form of hearings, interviews, and research. In January
1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed
that a more formal and vigorous study be undertaken.40
The Locher Report.
The resulting staff study yielded a report entitled
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, informally
known as the Locher Report (October 1985, Study Director:
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James R. Locher). The report indicated the consensus that
was building in Congress that DoD required reorganization.
The essence of the report was reflected in the testimony of
former Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger:
. . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain
less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our
forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of
imagination now unduly constrained by the existing
arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United
States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the
effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of
military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources
provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense
posture available to the nation.41

The report addressed a wide range of issues affecting the
performance of the DoD, including its four major
organizational elements: the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(OJCS), the unified and specified combatant commands,
and the military departments. The report also addressed
two key decisionmaking processes: the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the
acquisition process.42 Additionally, congressional review
and oversight of defense policies and programs and civilian
control of the military received scrutiny.
The report went beyond the mere cataloging of
deficiencies and issues. It offered numerous
recommendations for overhauling DoD, its decisionmaking
processes, and its organization. The more significant
recommendations included:

•

establishing three new Under Secretary of Defense
positions—for nuclear deterrence, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) defense, and regional
defense and force projection;

•

creating the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Strategic Planning);
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•

disestablishing the JCS and replacing it with a Joint
Military Advisory Council consisting of a chairman
and a four-star officer from each service who is on his
last tour of duty;

•

authorizing the chairman of the Joint Military
Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own
right and designating him as the principal military
advisor to the Secretary of Defense;

•

authorizing the chairman of the Joint Military
Advisory Council to develop and administer a
personnel management system for officers assigned
to joint duty;

•

removing the service component commanders within
the unified combatant commands from the
operational chain of command; and

•

fully integrating the Secretariats’ and the service
headquarters’ staffs.

Although Congress did not directly act on any of the
report’s fairly radical recommendations, the report
effectively illuminated numerous deficiencies within DoD.43
Moreover, the report affirmed the congressional perception
of the need for change within DoD and helped shape the
debates that would occur over the next year.
Presidential Reaction.
In June 1985, out of concern that Congress, if left to its
own devices, might impose ill-advised, or at least unwanted
changes upon DoD, President Reagan established the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, informally
known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman,
David Packard). Establishing the commission also served to
stanch any public perception that the executive branch was
not willing or able to reform one of its departments. The
President charged the commission to:
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. . . conduct a defense management study of important
dimension, including: the budget process, the procurement
system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and
operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command
systems, the military departments, and Congress.44

In February 1986, the commission provided the
President with an interim report containing several
recommendations. The President officially endorsed the
preliminary recommendations in April 1986, and
designated many for “quick and decisive implementation.”45
The commission published its findings in June 1986. They
were generally consistent with the conclusions of the Locher
Report released some 8 months earlier.46 However, the
commission’s key recommendations were considerably less
radical:

•

defense planning should begin with a comprehensive
statement of national security objectives and
priorities;

•

the president should issue provisional 5-year budget
levels to the Secretary of Defense;

•

the CJCS should prepare a military strategy and
options for operational concepts;

•

the CJCS, with the advice of the JCS and the
combatant commanders, should prepare broad
military options, framing explicit trade-offs among
the armed forces, and submit recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense;

•

the CJCS, with the assistance of the JCS and the
Director of Central Intelligence, should provide net
assessments of U.S. and allied armed forces relative
to those of potential adversaries. The assessments
should be used to evaluate risks inherent in the
options developed;
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•

the president should select a particular option and
specify an associated budget level upon which DoD
would base its 5-year defense plan and 2-year budget;

•

the CJCS should be designated as the principal
uniformed military advisor to the president, the NSC,
and the Secretary of Defense, representing his own
views as well as those of the corporate JCS;

•

the Joint Staff and the OJCS should be placed under
the exclusive direction of the chairman;

•

the Secretary of Defense should direct that commands
to and reports from the unified and specified
commands be channeled through the chairman;

•

the position of vice chairman of the JCS should be
created;

•

broader authority should be assigned to the unified
commanders to structure subordinate commands,
joint task forces, and support activities;

•

the Unified Command Plan should be revised;

•

the Secretary of Defense should be provided with the
flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of
command to deployed contingency forces; and

•

the Secretary of Defense should establish a single
unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea
transportation.47

During early spring 1986, while both houses of Congress
considered defense reform bills, influential congressmen
such as Senator Barry Goldwater conferred with members
of the Packard Commission. As a result of these discussions,
Congress began to embrace the Packard Commission’s
recommendations over the more revolutionary changes
recommended in the Locher Report.48
77

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions continued
regarding the need to reorganize DoD. On one side of the
debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that reform was
necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of Defense
and the services.49 Interestingly, the president sided with
Congress.50 With the executive branch seemingly divided
over the issue of defense reorganization and against the
background of the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut
bombing, and the incursion into Grenada, Senators Barry
Goldwater and Sam Nunn and Representative Bill Nichols
were able to build exceptionally strong bipartisan support
for reform.
During the spring and summer, each house passed its
version of the reform bill by an overwhelming majority.51
With the Congress united in support of defense
reorganization, the joint conference to resolve
inter-committee issues went quickly and smoothly.52 The
conference report was published on September 12, 1986,
and this substantial piece of legislation sailed through the
Senate and the House of Representatives on September 16
and 17, respectively. By October 1, 1986, the GNA was law.
Congressional Intent.
Traditional congressional concern over the migration of
control of the military from the legislative to the executive
branch has, in some respects, retarded the evolution toward
unification. Congress recognizes the value of separately
organized military departments competing to meet the
requirements of the combatant CINCs by offering
alternative program recommendations. Congress also
worries that too much centralization of authority might
inhibit its discretionary authority over defense matters. At
the same time, however, Congress recognizes the need for
more unified direction of the U.S. armed forces. The
provisions of the 1986 GNA reflect these countervailing
concerns.
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The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced
congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified
direction of, and action by, the U.S. armed forces. Congress
believed the problems derived from dysfunctional
relationships among the Secretary of Defense, service
secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and service components,
and the service chiefs. In passing the GNA, Congress
intended:
1. to reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority
within the Department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the
resident, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;
3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders the
unified and specified combatant commands for the
accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands is fully
commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders
for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their
commands;
5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy
and to contingency planning;
6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7. to improve joint officer management policies; and
8. to otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military
operations and improve the management and
administration of DoD.53
Each provision of the Act addressed one or more of these
elements of congressional intent. An in-depth analysis of
every provision of the Act is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, an assessment of the more significant provisions
provides a sufficient basis for determining the extent to
which the Act has served its purpose. A summary of the
Act’s major provisions follows.
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Strengthening Civilian Authority.
Congress formulated several provisions of the Act to
strengthen directly the authority of the Secretary of
Defense. The two most significant provisions increased the
secretary’s influence over program planning conducted by
DoD components and the contingency planning conducted
by the CINCs. Other provisions indirectly enhanced the
secretary’s control. The more significant of these relate to
improving the advice the secretary receives from the
uniformed military, thus enhancing his ability to command.
Defense Planning Guidance.
First, to increase the secretary’s authority and control
over programs developed by DoD components, the Act
provided that
the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to
the heads of Department of Defense components written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of the program
recommendations and budget proposals of their respective
components. Such guidance shall include guidance on—
a. national security objectives and policies;
b. the priorities of military missions; and
c. the resource levels projected to be available for the period of
time for which such recommendations and proposals are to
be effective.54

The authority provided by this section clearly
empowered the secretary to establish the criteria upon
which the military departments and other DoD components
must base their programs.55 The secretary uses the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG), a classified document, as his tool
for providing the program planning guidance required by
the Act.
The DPG initiates the first phase of the DoD PPBS.56
The PPBS is the biennial process by which DoD plans for the
force capabilities that will be needed from 2 to 8 years in the
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future. It facilitates the development of programs to attain
those capabilities and translates those programs into
budget submissions. By asserting himself at an early stage
in the program planning process, the secretary has
enhanced his influence over the programs which are
ultimately submitted for approval.
Contingency Planning Guidance.
The GNA also increased the Secretary of Defense’s
authority and responsibility in the area of contingency
planning.57 The Act provides that
the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the president
and after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, shall provide annually to the Chairman written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of contingency
plans.58

The tool used by the secretary to implement this provision of
the Act is the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).
The CPG is a concise, classified document that the
secretary uses to inform the chairman of general and
specific strategic areas of concern to the civilian leadership,
for which contingency planning should be conducted. The
chairman then uses this guidance to fulfill his responsibility
to “[provide] for the preparation and review of contingency
plans . . .,” also as required by the GNA.59 The CPG also
informs the chairman of the general requirements of the
secretary, or his representatives, to review contingency
plans during their development as well as upon completion.
This element of the GNA has been implemented quite
effectively.60
Through the CPG, the Secretary of Defense has inserted
himself, and his selected representatives, squarely into the
contingency planning process. He has done so in a manner
that gives primacy to the policies of civilian leadership,
appropriately defers the actual development of contingency
plans to the uniformed military leadership, and, by
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involving himself early, maintains effective civilian control
throughout the planning process. This is precisely what
Congress intended in the GNA.61
Improving Military Advice.
Several significant provisions of the GNA sought to
improve the military advice given to the president, the
Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. The sponsors of the Act
believed the JCS was incapable of providing concise, timely,
and useful advice to the National Command Authorities
(NCA).62 Testifying before the Senate Armed services
Committee, former Secretary of Defense James R.
Schlesinger bore out this conclusion:
The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not preclude the
best military advice, provides a substantial, though not
insurmountable, barrier to such advice . . . [T]he
recommendations . . . must pass through a screen designed to
protect the institutional interest of each . . . service. . . . [N]o
service ox may be gored. . . .
The unavoidable outcome is . . . log-rolling, back-scratching,
marriage agreements, and the like. . . . The proffered advice is
generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always
disregarded.63

Not only did the JCS system inhibit innovative thought, it
also was not an efficient decisionmaking system. For
example, General David Jones, a former CJCS, described to
Congress how the JCS had spent an entire afternoon
arguing over which service should provide the attache to the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo.64
To eliminate these shortcomings, Congress assigned
increased responsibility to the CJCS. In the GNA, it
transferred the duties and functions previously the
responsibility of the corporate JCS to the chairman,
designated the chairman as the “head” of the JCS and the
principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC, and directly
subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman.65 The Act
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further provided that the chairman, subject to the direction
of the president, may participate in NSC meetings.66
Additionally, the Act permitted the Secretary of Defense to
assign overall supervision of certain defense agencies and
field activities to the chairman.67 The Act also created the
position of the vice chairman of the JCS to assist the
chairman in discharging his new duties.68
However, Congress tempered the measures taken to
increase the chairman’s authority with others that
circumscribed it. Notably, the Act vested the chairman with
no command authority. The chain of command prescribed
by the Act runs from the president, to the Secretary of
Defense, to the CINCs.69 Also, the other members of the JCS
retained their responsibilities as military advisors to the
NCA and NSC. The Act provided further that, should a
member of the JCS disagree with the advice the chairman
intended to give to the NCA or the NSC, the member may
submit his dissenting view, which the chairman must offer
at the same time he presents his own.70 The Act also
provided that each member of the JCS, after informing the
Secretary of Defense, may make independent
recommendations to Congress.71 Finally, the Act provided
that the chairman shall, as he considers appropriate,
consult the other members of the JCS and convene regular
meetings. 72 While the Act enlarged the chairman’s
responsibilities and authority, it clearly did not intend for
him to become too powerful, nor for the JCS to become an
inert organization.
The lessons of the Persian Gulf War provide evidence
that the GNA strengthened civilian control over the armed
forces.73 In the official DoD report on the war, the Secretary
of Defense noted that the conflict was the first test of the Act
in a major war. He complimented the chairman, the vice
chairman, and the other members of the JCS for the
“excellent military advice” they provided. He reported that
the Act’s strengthening of the position of the chairman
enabled the chairman to bring to bear his strategic insight
and exceptional leadership to ensure the CINC was
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provided with all he needed to successfully prosecute the
war.74
Expanding the Authority and Responsibility of the
CINCs.
In addition to improving civilian control of the armed
forces, the GNA also provided more authority to the CINCs.
This was done in order to reduce further the influence of
service parochialism and better focus DoD strategic
planning on the needs of the unified and specified
combatant commanders. 75 Congress crafted several
provisions of the Act with this goal in mind. The Act
reemphasized and clarified the responsibilities of the
CINCs for accomplishing assigned missions as well as for
ensuring their commands’ preparedness to do so.76 It also
described, in detail, command authority, specifying that a
CINC has authority to:

•

direct subordinate commands in all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics;

•

prescribe the chain of command to the commands and
forces within the command;

•

organize the command and forces within the
command;

•

employ forces within the command as he considers
necessary to accomplish the command’s missions;

•

assign command functions to subordinate
commanders;

•

coordinate and approve administrative support, and
disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command;

•

select and suspend subordinate commanders and
staff officers; and
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•

convene courts martial.77

The Act also provided that the Secretary of Defense shall
periodically review the authority of the CINCs and ensure
that their authority is commensurate with their
responsibilities. The Act gave the CINCs the responsibility
to report promptly to the secretary any instances in which
they feel their authority to be inadequate.78 Additionally,
Congress considered terms like “full operational command,”
traditionally used to describe the authority of the CINCs, to
be inappropriate for describing their new authority.79 The
Act gave rise to a new term, “combatant command,” that
DoD has formally adopted.80
The Act further reinforced the CINCs’ authority by
directing the secretaries of the military departments to
assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the CINCs,81
except for those forces needed to carry out the twelve service
functions.82 Although the Act specified a single, clear chain
of command from the president to the Secretary of Defense
to the CINCs, 8 3 it notably did not provide for an
administrative chain of command from the president to the
Secretary of Defense to the military departments. Thus,
while the Act allowed each military department to retain
unspecified authority and control over a portion of their
forces, the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were placed under
the authority of the CINCs.
Recognizing the geographic dispersion of the CINCs and
the broad spans of control inherent in the offices of the
president and the Secretary of Defense, Congress included
provisions in the Act that allow the chairman to assist the
NCA in overseeing the CINCs. Specifically, the president
may direct that all communications between himself or the
secretary and the CINCs go through the chairman. The
president may also direct that the chairman assist him in
the performance of his command functions. The Secretary of
Defense may assign the chairman responsibilities for
assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; however,
such assignment confers no command authority.84
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Although the chairman is vested with no command
authority, his role in making the chain of command function
effectively is pivotal. In addition to making him the
principal military advisor to the NCA, the Act designated
him as the spokesman for the CINCs, especially for the
requirements of their commands, and made him responsible
for informing other elements of DoD of the CINCs’
requirements. This provision of the Act not only increased
the chairman’s real authority, but also enhanced the ability
of the CINCs’ to influence the NCA.85
Another provision of the Act indirectly, but
substantially, increased the authority of the CINCs. It made
the secretaries of the military departments responsible for
“fulfill[ing] (to the maximum extent practicable) the current
and future operational requirements of the [CINCs]. . . .”86
In short, the CINCs were made responsible for identifying
requirements for military capabilities, the chairman was
made responsible for synthesizing the requirements, and
the services were tasked to fulfill the requirements. Thus,
the services were not to interpret, on their own, the CINCs’
requirements and base service programs on the capabilities
the services determined to be most important to the CINCs.
Via the GNA, Congress sought to clearly establish the
primacy of the CINCs over the service Chiefs with respect to
the determination of required military capabilities.
Improving Strategy Formulation and Contingency
Planning.
Through the GNA, Congress also sought to improve
strategy formulation at both the NCA and CJCS levels. At
the NCA level, the Act required the president to “transmit to
Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national
security strategy of the United States.”87 The national
security strategy report is to be submitted at the same time
the president’s budget is submitted. It is to contain,
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. . . the national security strategy of the United States
[including] a comprehensive description and discussion of
the following:
1. The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the
United States that are vital to the national security of the
United States.
2. The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and
national defense capabilities of the United States necessary
to deter aggression and to the national security strategy of
the United States.
3. The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the
political, economic, military, and other elements of the
national power of the United States to protect or promote
the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred
to in paragraph (1).
4. The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States
to carry out the national security strategy of the United
States, including an evaluation of the balance among the
elements of the national power of the United States to
support the implementation of the national security
strategy.
5. Such other information as may be necessary to help
inform Congress on matters relating to the national
security strategy of the United States.88
In adopting the language of this section of the Act,
Congress intended for the president to describe
comprehensively the short and long-term national security
strategies and to provide assessments of the risks
associated with implementing the strategies. Congress
could use the national security strategy reports to make
better informed decisions regarding funding to support the
various elements of national power.
Congress recognized the need to address the specifics of
strategy at the military strategic planning level as well. The
GNA assigned the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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specific strategic and contingency planning responsibilities.
With respect to strategic planning, he is to assist the NCA in
providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces and
is to prepare strategic plans which conform to resource
guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense.89
To assist the NCA in providing strategic direction, the
chairman prepares a national military strategy. 90
Additionally, the chairman provides for the preparation and
review of contingency plans which conform to NCA policy
guidance. 91 The chairman uses his Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to translate the policies set forth
in the secretary’s Contingency Planning Guidance into
specific planning tasks for the CINCs. In response to the
JSCP, the CINCs develop operation plans and submit them
to the chairman for approval.92
In addition to providing for the preparation and review
of contingency plans, the chairman is also required by the
GNA to prepare strategic plans.93 A strategic plan, global in
scope, is meant to guide the development and integration of
the regional and functional plans developed by the separate
CINCs.94 While the current planning processes enable the
CINCs to develop sound regional plans, the chairman, due
to his global responsibilities and perspective, is best
situated to reconcile, rationalize, and orchestrate the
CINCs’ plans. The chairman’s efforts in this regard must be
more than merely compiling the CINCs’ plans.95 He is
expected to proactively set forth, in a global context, the
priority of the specific objectives for the planning period, the
national strategic concepts for attaining the objectives, the
national resources that will be applied, and guidance about
how their application will be tailored to best serve the
established priorities. By performing this strategy
formulation role, the chairman can ensure that contingency
planning better adheres to policy guidance and is in a better
position to provide strategic advice to the NCA.
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Providing for More Efficient Use of Defense
Resources.
To complement the chairman’s increased strategic
planning responsibilities, Congress designed several
provisions of the GNA to enable the chairman to promote
the efficient use of defense resources. When combined, these
provisions describe an integrated process for determining
required military capabilities and ensuring their efficient
provision. The process focuses on the identification,
synthesis, and satisfaction of requirements identified by the
CINCs. The chairman’s role in the process is to solicit the
CINCs’ requirements, provide national level analyses of
these requirements, assess the extent to which the proposed
programs of the services efficiently satisfy the CINCs’
requirements, and advise the NCA accordingly. Tools which
the chairman can use to fulfill these responsibilities include
the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, the chairman’s authority
to evaluate the preparedness of the combatant commands,96
and the chairman’s Current Readiness System.
Three additional provisions of the Act also enable the
chairman to facilitate the efficient use of defense resources:
his responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint
employment of the armed forces, his triennial responsibility
to appraise the roles and functions assigned to the services,
and his biennial responsibility to review the missions,
responsibilities, and force structure of the combatant
commands.97
Improving Joint Officer Management.
One of the more significant provisions of the GNA
addressed
policies, procedures, and practices for the effective
management of officers of the . . . active duty list who are
particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters . . . .98
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These officers were to become skilled in “the integrated
employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to national military strategy, strategic planning
and contingency planning, and command and control of
combat operations under unified command.”99 Through
joint officer management measures, Congress intended to
improve the quality of the Joint Staff as well as the quality
of the CINCs’ staffs.
To facilitate the development of “Joint Specialty
Officers” (JSOs), Congress prescribed minimum
requirements for the number of joint duty positions that
must be filled by qualified JSOs, their education and tour of
duty length, and promotion requirements for officers who
have served or are serving in joint assignments.
Implementation of these provisions has presented a
daunting challenge to DoD.100
Title IV’s salient provisions include a requirement for
the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of the joint duty
positions within DoD and to ensure that at least half are
filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. Furthermore, he is to
designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignment
positions that could be held only by fully qualified JSOs.101
Title IV of the GNA also provides that an officer may not be
selected as a JSO until he/she attends a joint professional
military education school and, subsequently, completes a
full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.102
Title IV also requires the Secretary of Defense to
establish a “Capstone Course” for newly appointed general
and flag officers that prepares them to work with the other
services. The Act requires each officer selected for
promotion to one-star rank to attend this course, unless:
The officer’s immediately preceding assignment was joint;
there are no joint requirements for his/her field of expertise;
or it would otherwise be in the best interest of the officer’s
service that he/she not attend.103
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CONCLUSIONS
Since passage of the NSA in 1947, Congress has sought
progressively to unify effort within DoD, improve the
quality and fidelity of the military advice provided to the
national command authorities and the NSC, and
strengthen civilian control over the U.S. Armed forces. The
last significant congressional action to these ends was
passage of the 1986 GNA. DoD’s implementation of the
GNA has contributed to the evolution toward unified armed
forces. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the chairman
and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, and the services are arriving at a
balanced relationship in which civilian authority is
supreme.
The DoD has substantially implemented the Act and
now is in a position to progress beyond its provisions. But
DoD’s continued evolution depends on the institutional
progress of other agencies of the government involved in
national security strategy formulation and
implementation. The most important question for the
future is how a unified Department of Defense can achieve
synergy with the other agencies of national government
that also “provide for the common defense and promote the
general welfare.” Perhaps an approach analogous to the
passage of the GNA is appropriate.
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CHAPTER 5
INSTITUTIONALIZING DEFENSE REFORM:
THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
IN THE ROOT, MCNAMARA, AND COHEN
ERAS
Joseph R. Cerami
In November 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
released a “Defense Reform Initiative Report.” He
announced several areas for public management reform in
the Department of Defense (DoD), in support of ongoing
executive branch reinvention programs. This chapter looks
at the Root reforms of the early 20th century and the
McNamara reforms of the 1960s, and then offers some
comments about the prospects for success for the ongoing
1997 Defense Reform Initiative. The theoretical literature
on reinvention and transformation will also be used to
analyze and evaluate Secretary Cohen’s reform efforts, and
to address several key questions relating to defense reform:
What is the role of senior leadership today? What
combination of knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience
are required for senior leaders in DoD? Are the
environmental conditions within DoD right for reform?
What will be the catalyst for change in our current era of
globalization? Are current business models useful guides to
defense reform? Can executive-legislative conflict be turned
into cooperation and compromise in order to improve
defense management?
The Root Reforms.
Several themes stand out in the history of military
reform in the United States. These include executive
leadership, budget control and integration, executive101

legislative-bureaucratic conflict, “scientific and
business-like” public management, and civil-military
relations.1 Studies of Progressive Era reform efforts
highlight the internal struggles for executive control
between the civilian Secretary and the Army
general-in-chief. These civil-military struggles were
complicated by the autonomy of the Army bureaus, such as
the ordnance and commissary organizations, that allied
themselves with congressional committee members. The
decentralized bureau system was flawed from a managerial
efficiency and effectiveness perspective—but powerful
politically. The catalyst for change was failure, especially in
Army logistics and administration, during the Spanish
American War.2 Initiating change required a dedicated
group of individuals, typically described as
Neo-Hamiltonians. 3 The most influential of these
Progressive reformers, was Elihu Root, who was named
Secretary of War in 1898. While not a military expert, Root
had demonstrated impressive skills as a public manager
while serving as governor for the territories of Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. Root also had exceptional skills as a
lawyer and negotiator. Significantly, Root had experience in
“dealing with legislative committees and drafting
legislation” 4 and spent several years shepherding his
reforms through Congress and the legislative process.5
Secretary Root sought to improve the Army’s internal
structure, including strengthening the top leadership and
modernizing the staff and planning functions. His ideas on
military organization were taken from the writings of
Emory Upton and the Prussian general staff system.6 Root
was able to implement his administrative and
organizational reforms by personally drafting the
legislation that made reform possible. Elting Morison
described his 1903 General Staff bill as
the most enlightened piece of legislation dealing with military
organization ever passed in this country . . . [which] was almost
exclusively the work of Elihu Root.7
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Most importantly, the legislation codified the American
tradition of civilian supremacy of the military, which
remains a foundation of the American system of
government. 8 In effect, Root based his reforms on a
broad-based synthesis of Progressive Era government
reform theory, Taylor’s scientific management, Upton’s
military writings, the Prussian general staff model, and
traditional American democratic values.
Even a very brief survey of Root’s record as Secretary of
War is sufficient to demonstrate the scope and significance
of the military reforms that he was able to accomplish. It is
also sufficient to generate three important questions: Is the
Prussian General Staff model still a useful point of
reference for DoD reform? Are any of the conditions that
made it possible for Root to accomplish his reforms in the
early twentieth century in place today? Is Root the
appropriate model for a modern Secretary of Defense
engaged in reform and innovation?
The McNamara Reforms.
The era of the McNamara DoD reforms also stands out
as a significant period of change in defense management. By
the time that Robert McNamara came to the Office of
Secretary of Defense, the post World War II growth of
government agencies had created significant pressure for
the creation of a new system to rationally allocate federal
resources. Furthermore, information technology and
computers had significantly enhanced the government’s
capability for quantitative data analysis. These are some of
the factors that convinced McNamara that it was both
necessary and possible to introduce a new
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) within
the Department of Defense.
The political conditions also seemed to be in place by the
time that the Kennedy administration took office in 1961.
The National Security Act of 1947 had placed the Army,
Navy, and Air Force within a new National Military
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Establishment (NME) under the titular control of a new
Secretary of Defense.9 Unfortunately, the NME system
precipitated intense rivalry between the services that took
time and effort to overcome. Congress enacted additional
legislation a decade later to try to resolve some of the initial
difficulties in establishing the new defense organization.
The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 clarified the Secretary
of Defense’s authority over the services in the areas of
budgeting, force structure, and research and
development. 1 0 R e f o r m t o i n t e g r a t e p l a n n i n g ,
programming, and budgeting was now possible.
Armed with this new legislative authority, it remained
for McNamara and his staff to implement Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) reforms in
DoD. Their goal was to develop a process to coordinate
strategy and plans, force requirements and programs, and
resources and budgets. The intent was to centralize
decisionmaking and design explicit criteria for major
systems acquisitions.11 In keeping with the PPB concept,
they sought an analytical approach to assessing costs and
needs and developing alternatives to present to the
Secretary of Defense. They would develop multiyear
programs through the Five-Year Defense Plans. In their
view, an analytical, largely civilian staff would be free of the
influence of military parochialism and thus be independent
both intellectually and careerwise.12
Prior to PPB, under performance budgeting approaches,
budgets and military strategy were not related. McNamara
set out to fix the problems of the existing system, which to
that point had simply set DoD ceilings for each of the armed
services.13 PPB was designed to reverse the traditional
informational and decision flows within DoD. In the past,
estimates were sent upward in the organization to gain
approval in light of existing resources. By contrast, as Allen
Schick has observed, PPB established a “top policy”
approach in which the “critical decisional process—that of
deciding on purposes and plans—has a downward and
disaggregative flow.”14 Schick also correctly predicted that
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this would in turn require the centralization of policy
making, and subsequent DoD reforms did aim to centralize
key budgeting and planning functions.
DoD operations research analysts Alain Enthoven and
Wayne Smith have provided an insiders’ history of the
McNamara PPB reforms. In their book How Much Is
Enough?, Enthoven and Smith chronicle the roles that they
played in support of McNamara’s efforts to shape the
defense program in a centralized, top down fashion.15 The
authors proposed that their systems analysis organization,
working directly for the Secretary of Defense, would provide
the analytical staff that would make the relevant data
available for making major program and spending decisions
within DoD. 1 6 Enthoven and Smith’s focus was on
developing a sophisticated approach to budgetary
integration that went well beyond the simple control or
bookkeeping function. In the Whiz Kids’ view, the process
would optimize the national interest and minimize the
tradition of service budget compromises. To their credit,
their vision for linking planning, programming, and
budgeting is still in effect today within the Defense
Department.17
Enthoven and Smith also write about the myriad
problems that the McNamara team faced, and the many
mistakes that they made, starting in 1961.18 In summary,
they argue that: There was no centralized leadership over
the services; no centralized planning; no coordination of
research and development programs; no quantitative data
analysis; no analysis staff in DoD; and no adequate cost
accounting standards.
The Failings of PPB.
It is significant to point out that President Lyndon
Johnson’s attempt to extend the PPB system in all federal
agencies failed. Hal Rainey notes that Johnson’s efforts
failed to meet the conditions for successful organizational
change. That is, the initiative lacked “sustained support
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from higher levels, participative planning, and flexible
implementation.”19 Rainey adds that “the reason for the
failure of PPBS was not necessarily that it was a bad idea. It
was a well-intentioned innovation advocated by many
experts in public administration.”20
Schick echoes Rainey’s assessment in a 1973 article in
Public Administration Review. He takes note of the 1971
Office of Management and Budget memorandum that led to
the “Demise of Federal PPB.”21 He writes of the primary
purpose of PPB to recast the budgetary role in the
bureaucracy, that is, to transform the budget into an
instrument for deciding the purposes and programs of
government. Cost-effectiveness and analysis were to serve
as change agents. Schick concludes that PPB failed because
it could not penetrate budget routines. Trying to force the
DoD system on other government agencies, without
integrating planning and analysis at the top of the agencies,
led to failure.
Schick, Rainey, and Henry Mintzberg, all agree that
PPB was introduced across the board without adequate
preparation within the organizations.22 The implementing
directives were insensitive to bureaucratic traditions,
institutional loyalty, and personal relationships. The
reforms also suffered from inadequate support, leadership,
and resources. A third problem area was in the realm of
policy analysis itself. Good analysts and data were in short
supply.
Schick also borrows from political scientists Charles
Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky to point out deeper
problems. In their assessment, Lindblom and Wildavsky
claim that PPB attempted to ride roughshod over American
political values. 2 3 They highlight the bargainingincremental, “muddling through,” model in American
public administration.24 In effect, budgets traditionally
have been instruments of conflict suppression. PPB served
to escalate conflict. After all, PPB sought to develop
consistent program objectives, build an understanding of
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program purposes, terminate low-yield programs, expand a
range of program alternatives, and unveil the costs and
benefits of all federal programs. All of these initiatives took
the comfort level out of the traditional incremental
approach and fueled the fires of bureaucratic and
interservice competition.
Another part of the problem with PPB was in the
education and background of its pioneers. They were first
and foremost economists and systems analysts. “They knew
little about public administration or about the tardiness of
budgeting for the vast changes they undertook.”25 This lack
of knowledge of public administration in general, and the
fields of public management, organization theory and
development, all help to account for the ham-handed,
top-down manner by which McNamara’s innovations were
implemented within the bureaucracy. McNamara’s
problems would have been even more serious if he had
attempted to make changes across the cabinet and diverse
agencies rather than within DoD.26
Another problematic aspect of PPB relates to the role of
Congress.
PPB was conceived almost exclusively from an executive
perspective, as if Congress does not exist and that all it takes
to make a budget is to review agency requests within an
administrative setting. Moreover, PPB was engineered in a
way that enabled the Bureau of the Budget to bypass
Congress. The appropriation accounts were not restructured
nor were significant alterations made in the budget
submissions to Congress. The special PPB plans and analyses
were destined for executive use and were not incorporated into
the flow of data to Congress.27

These problems were further compounded by the executive
branch’s reluctance to show its program analysis to
Congress because of traditional fears of legislative
micromanagement.
The struggle between the White House and Congress
continues today in the Gore reinvention efforts. A recent
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article highlights the conflict between Gore’s executive
branch “Performance-Based Organization” initiatives and
Congress’s “Government Performance and Results Act of
1993.” The author writes that “The NPR (National
Performance Review) is an instrument in the larger
struggle between the Clinton administration and some
elements in Congress over the role and organization of the
federal government.”28
Comparing Root and McNamara.
A comparison of the Root and McNamara reform efforts
leads to several insights, which are relevant to the post-Cold
War situation. Root called for reform within the overarching
context of the Progressive Era. In that period, public
administrators searched for principles of scientific
management to find ways to improve government
effectiveness and efficiency. Root remained within the
mainstream of institutional reformers in the
Neo-Hamiltonian mold. The German general staff system
provided the benchmark for comparison. Root’s ideas, as
guided by the emerging public management theory, were for
centralization and streamlining under the executive
branch. James Hewes, in From Root to McNamara writes
that:
The principal issue in the development of the organization and
administration of the War Department/Department of the
Army from 1900 to 1963 was executive control . . . . Tight control
had existed . . . within the headquarters of each of a series of
autonomous bureaus, which largely governed themselves under
the detailed scrutiny of Congress. The question was whether
tight authority should be imposed on the bureaus at the level of
the Secretary of War.29

The McNamara era was an extension of executive
control by further centralizing defense management under
the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the armed
services. McNamara’s guiding theory was not derived from
public administration, nor was he an experienced
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government manager like Root. His emphasis on systems
analysis and economics was derived directly from his
education in a management school and executive level
experience in the hierarchical world of the automobile
industry. McNamara’s corporate experience did not prepare
him adequately for the inside game of Washington politics.
There is no evidence that he approached Root’s ability to
work through Congress to institute reforms. While Root
achieved a legislative mandate for his management
innovations, McNamara’s reforms were done internally,
largely within the executive branch, and often in the face of
a hostile Congress.
Clearly, during their tenure, McNamara’s analysts saw
Congress as the enemy. Enthoven and Smith, in their
chapter on “Unfinished Business” call for more balanced
and informed congressional debate and involvement in
military issues.30Their writing is filled with anecdotes
pointing to an “unholy” alliance between Congress and
senior military officers. Their discussion does not reflect
Root’s sophisticated political approach. As Secretary of War
he faced similar congressional opposition. But Root, unlike
McNamara, was able to work out a successful legislative
strategy to neutralize his political and military opponents
and legitimize his reform effort. Both men wanted to
achieve similar goals, but Root’s understanding of political
realities caused him to build an alliance with Congress, not
criticize them openly for their lack of information and
balance.
DoD Reform in the Cohen Era: Transformation and
Reinvention.
The tendency to regard Congress as the enemy and to
view government as another form of business organization
continues to this day. During the 1990s, calls for DoD reform
rely heavily on the latest business practices. The literature
in public management and change includes ideas regarding
transformation and reinvention. Rainey summarizes the
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literature and identifies a number of conditions for effective
transformation. These include creating conditions in four
major areas: (1) need; (2) leadership; (3) participation; and
(4) implementation.31 Rainey notes that there must be a
widespread belief in the need for change. This belief must be
coupled with clear, sustained leadership and support from
top executives. At the same time, there must be broad
participation throughout the organization in diagnosing
problems and planning change. Also, there must be flexible,
incremental implementation with experimentation,
feedback, and adaptation. All must build on prior success to
institutionalize change.
Within the business management community, Kotter is
viewed as an expert on transformation, leadership, and
change. In a 1995 article, he lists the following “Eight Steps
to Transforming Your Organization.”32
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: Examining
market and competitive realities. Identifying and
discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities.
2. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition:
Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change
effort. Encouraging the group to work together as a team.
3. Creating a Vision: Creating a vision to help direct
the change effort. Developing strategies for achieving that
vision.
4. Communicating the Vision: Using every vehicle
possible to communicate the new vision and strategies.
Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding
coalition.
5. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: Getting
rid of obstacles to change. Changing systems or structures
that seriously undermine the vision. Encouraging risk
taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions.
6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins:
Planning for visible performance improvements. Creating
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those improvements. Recognizing and rewarding
employees involved in the improvements.
7. Consolidating Improvements and Producing
Still More Change: Using increased credibility to change
systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit the vision.
Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can
implement the vision. Reinvigorating the process with new
projects, themes, and change agents.
8. Institutionalizing New Approaches: Articulating
the connections between the new behaviors and corporate
success. Developing the means to ensure leadership
development and success.
Public management reforms regarding transformation
are linked to the literature on reinvention. “The Gore Report
on Reinventing Government” is in step with the 1990s
notions of organizational change and reform. The document
is filled with references to fostering “historic change—in the
way government works.”33 The NPR includes a list of
principles for reform:34
We will invent a government that puts people first, by:

•

Cutting unnecessary spending

•

Serving its customers

•

Empowering its employees

•

Helping communities solve their own problems

•

Fostering excellence

Here’s how. We will:

•

Create a clear sense of mission

•

Steer more, row less

•

Delegate authority and responsibility
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•

Replace regulation with incentives

•

Develop budgets based on outcomes

•

Expose federal operations to competition

•

Search for market, not administrative, solutions

•

Measure our success by customer satisfaction

The NPR is thus filled with management concepts
similar to those in the reinvention and transformation
literature. In keeping with the principles of transformation,
the NPR includes the stages of agenda setting and
implementation. Agenda setting occurred during Gore’s
initial 6-month review of the federal government, citing his
leadership in an effort that included teams of federal
employees.35 Specific reform programs, “success stories,”
are highlighted throughout the report.
The NPR has its share of critics in the writings of public
administration scholars and others.36 In its defense, the
report points out that it is aimed at improving how
government works, and not what it does.37 So it is open to
the charge that it is primarily concerned with improving the
effectiveness and efficiencies of government. It can also be
criticized for focusing on cutback management. In fact,
Chapter 4 is entitled “Cutting Back to Basics” and calls for
cutting programs, eliminating duplication, collecting more,
and reengineering to cut costs. However, that represents
only part of the total package. To evaluate the NPR in light
of the transformation literature, we can compare how Gore’s
proposals fit within Rainey’s condition and Kotter’s
transformation model.
The NPR’s opening paragraph makes a case for the
widespread belief in the need for change:
Public confidence in the federal government has never been
lower. The average American believes we waste 48 cents of
every tax dollar. Five of every six want “fundamental change” in
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Washington. Only 20 percent of Americans trust the federal
government to do the right thing most of the time—down from
76 percent 30 years ago.38

Throughout the introductory chapter the report establishes
the widespread perception of the need for government
change. It cites polls of the American people, and criticism
from federal workers, state and local politicians and
administrators, and Congress. The fact that the Vice
President has his name on the report and the President is
quoted throughout lends credibility to Rainey’s second
condition, that is, that clear and sustained leadership of the
government’s top executives is fundamental. The final
condition, of flexible and incremental implementation, is
also validated. The Preface of the NPR calls for creating
Reinvention Teams and Laboratories, which serve to
institutionalize new approaches.39
The rhetoric in the report is meant to signal a clear sense
of urgency. The report notes that the
movement to reinvent government . . . is driven . . . by absolute
necessity. . . . Government is broken, and it is time to fix it.40

Gore repeatedly cites the impatience of taxpayers as a
rationale for making reinvention urgent. The report also
addresses the importance of a guiding coalition. It mentions
the broad support for bureaucratic reform in Congress and
all levels of government. The NPR vision includes
developing a government that works better and costs less
through revolutionary change. This is captured in President
Clinton’s citation in the Introduction:
Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less
expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our
national bureaucracy away from complacency and
entitlement toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to
redesign, to reinvent, and to reinvigorate the entire national
government.41
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This goal has been reinforced through the Vice President’s
personal commitment and travel to build support for
reinventing government. Another key transformation
principle is empowerment, which is covered in two
dimensions. First, Chapter 3 of the report emphasizes
empowering federal employees to get results through
decentralizing the bureaucracy, developing an
entrepreneurial spirit, and cutting “red-tape.” A second
dimension calls for empowering state and local
governments.42
To illustrate the idea of creating short-term wins, the
NPR cites several examples. These include one success
story from the DoD:
The military: the most conservative, hierarchical and
traditional branch of the government and the bureaucracy least
likely to behave like a cutting-edge private company, right?
Wrong. One of Washington’s most promising reinvention stories
comes from the Air Combat Command.43

The report also conforms to the transformation model in
seeking instruments that can consolidate improvements. It
notes the significance of the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and highlights its requirement for
agencies’ 5-year strategic plans and performance
budgeting.44 Performance budgeting is being extended
throughout federal agencies. Thus, through legislation, and
its efforts to build support within the cabinet, the NPR seeks
to institutionalize the reinvention initiatives. The strategic
plans and prodding of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) all contribute to a long-term process in keeping with
transformation principles. The NPR notes that
transforming major corporations can take 6 to 8 years, and
it is reasonable to expect that the federal government will
take longer.45
Appendix A of the NPR lists more specific “major
recommendations, by agency.”46 For DoD, it lists two
significant areas and 12 others for improvements. The two
areas of significance include early Clinton Administration
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strategy and force structure requirements—the Bottom-Up
Review (BUR)—and acquisition reform. Of the 12
recommendations, most fall in the category of efficiency and
effectiveness enhancements, such as more privatization,
productivity enhancements, incentives, organizational
restructuring, etc. It is interesting to note that nine of the
fourteen items are listed as “cbe” (cannot be estimated due
to data limitation or uncertainties about implementation
time lines) for changes in spending and receipts.47
There is little to note regarding significant changes to
the basic PPBS processes of the McNamara era. The BUR
set the military force structure in 1993 with its requirement
for conducting two major theater wars modeled after the
Persian Gulf War scenario. This has remained relatively
unchanged during the Clinton Administration. Acquisition
reform remains a perennial reform issue for DoD, with
continual calls for eliminating $600 toilet seats, bolts,
hammers, etc., as well as reducing the perceived waste,
fraud, and abuse of defense contractors and pork-barrel
politics.
All in all, the 1993 NPR does follow the principles of
transformational management when it discusses change in
the management practices of the federal government.
However, when it comes to the specifics of the Defense
Department program, the Gore Report called for relatively
little new in transforming DoD in terms of the key aspects of
planning, programming, budgeting, or execution. The NPR
was not the final word for 1990s DoD reform, however.
Defense Reform Initiatives.
William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense for the
second Clinton Administration has made reinvention one of
his major areas of emphasis. Both his November 1997
“Defense Reform Initiative” and the 1998 “Annual Report to
the President and Congress” returned to the idea of
reforming defense management. For the federal
government in the Clinton Administration, the Gore Report
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set the agenda, and Cohen signed on to the reinvention
concept. In Cohen’s opening paragraph in the Defense
Reform Initiative he writes:
Having inherited the defense structure that won the Cold War
and Desert Storm, the Clinton Administration intends to leave
as its legacy a defense strategy, a military, and a Defense
Department that have been transformed to meet the new
challenges of a new century.48

In the same vein, the final section of the introduction is
titled “Transforming Our Military.”49 This section stresses
using advanced information and other new technologies to
transform warfighting and develop new ways of organizing
and employing military forces. To carry out the new defense
strategy and operational concepts, Cohen calls for
“fundamental reform in how the Defense Department
c o n d u c t s b u s i n e s s . ” 5 0 DoD has jumped on the
transformation bandwagon and the Secretary’s
introduction is filled with ideas similar to Kotter and Gore.
Cohen uses the metaphor of DoD going on a diet. In his view,
DoD put on “excess pounds, built up during the long winter
of the Cold War.”51 He suggests that: “Losing weight
successfully requires not a one-time diet, but a permanent
change in lifestyle.”
The final section of this chapter will look in more depth
at what the permanent lifestyle change entails. Clearly,
Cohen stresses the theme of more business-like public
management. Again, his introduction highlights this point:
DoD has labored under support systems and business practices
that are at least a generation out of step with modern corporate
America. DoD support systems and practices that were once
state-of-the-art are now antiquated compared with the systems
and practices in place in the corporate world, while other
systems were developed in their own defense-unique culture
and have never corresponded with the best business practices of
the private sector. This cannot and will not continue. This
Defense Reform Initiative reflects the insights of numerous
business leaders who have restructured and downsized their
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corporations and not only survived but thrived in a rapidly
changing marketplace.

Taken within the context of the innovation and
transformation literature, the Cohen initiatives are focused
narrowly. Mostly the reforms center on what are called in
Chapter 1: Best Business Practices. Chapter 1 calls for a
“Revolution in the Business Affairs of the Department of
Defense [which] includes adopting and adapting the best
business practices of the private sector to the business of
defense.”52 Included in Best Business Practices are paper
free logistics and acquisition systems; using purchase cards;
electronic catalogues; reengineering the systems used for
shipping household goods; etc. These electronic, Internet,
and paper free practices for administration, finance, and
logistics no doubt make sense in the information age. These
proposals seem worthwhile for improving how DoD does its
support business. They are not geared to transforming the
nature of what DoD does with respect to either roles and
missions or strategy, force structure or budgetary
requirements.
The same is true of Chapter 2: Changing the
Organization. Again, there is no attempt to address or
reform what DoD does. Instead the chapter focuses on
organizational changes that fall squarely into the category
of cutback management. While some of these reforms may
be overdue for trimming the aforementioned Cold War fat,
there is no accompanying analysis linking organizational
cuts to changes in DoD functions, roles or missions. The
chapter generally points out
three central principles guiding the changes: Department
headquarters should be flexible enough to deal with future
challenges; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should
focus on corporate-level tasks; and operational management
tasks should be pushed to the lowest appropriate level. As a
result, all headquarters structures should be thinned,
flattened, and streamlined. . . .53

117

The highlights of the reorganization stress the level of cuts
expected:

•

OSD reduced 33 percent from FY 1996 over the next
18 months;

•

Defense Agencies personnel reduced 21 percent over
five years;

•

Personnel in DoD Field Activities reduced 36 percent
over 2 years;

•

Joint Staff personnel reduced 29 percent by FY 2003;

•

All other headquarters reduced 10 percent by FY
2003;

•

Headquarters of Combatant Commands reduced 7
percent by FY 2003;

•

Reduce Presidentially Appointed, Senate-confirmed
OSD positions by 9 percent;

•

Eliminate the entire category of Defense Support
Activities;

•

Reduce number of non-intelligence Defense Agencies
by 8 percent;

•

Reduce the number of DoD Field Activities by 22
percent.

Overall, these cuts are expected to result in a total 33
percent reduction in OSD personnel.54 As opposed to the
transformational notion of flexible, incremental
implementation, Cohen has opted to “jump-start the reform
process.”55 This is to be aided by a set of principles, an
agenda of organizational changes in a series of initiatives.
The guiding philosophy is that DoD will be positioned to face
future challenges by empowering subordinate activities,
weeding out redundancy, and strengthening OSD to
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prepare for the longer-term for strategy, program, and
financial planning.
Another transformation principle addressed in the
report is that of institutionalizing the new approach. Cohen
proposes a Defense Management Council (hereafter, DMC)
at the undersecretary (vice chiefs of service staff) level.56
The DMC will work for the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
be responsible for reform initiation, implementation, and
oversight. The DMC is thus expected to promote integration
and general savings and improve performance throughout
DoD in the years ahead. Yet the DMC remains at the top of
the centralized DoD pyramid. There are no proposals for
decentralization, or involving all layers of the organization,
as the New Public Management favors.
The report also targets the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(hereafter, JCS) organization. Under the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act the position of the Chairman and the
JCS staff were strengthened at the expense of the
individual armed services. While applauding the soundness
of the legislation, the JCS and the subordinate regional
Combatant Commands are also marked for reductions.57
Another business-like practice Cohen highlights is
privatization or contracting out. Chapter 3 focuses on
“Streamlining Through Competition.” Here he proposes
relying on the “competitive powers of the marketplace to
help us become more efficient.”58 The Initiative emphasizes
its roots in OMB Circular A-76 from the Eisenhower
Administration. The circular, proposed in 1955, published
in 1966, updated in 1979 and 1983, and revised in 1996 sets
the rules for public-private competitions. Cohen cites A-76
cost comparisons from 1978-1994, which resulted in more
that 2,000 competitions, with an average annual savings of
$1,478 million, and a 31 percent savings overall.59 The
potential of future cost savings sets an example for the
positive possibilities of these competitions and reinforces
the transformation notion for “creating” short-term wins.
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A final initiative in Cohen’s report calls for two
additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closings
(BRAC). Chapter 4 points to “Eliminating Unneeded
Infrastructure” and compares the relative drawdown of the
defense budget (-40 percent), military personnel (-36
percent), and domestic base structure (-21 percent). Cohen
calls for two additional rounds of BRAC in 2001 and 2005 to
correct this imbalance.60 In fact, in Bill S.1814, “Defense
Reform Act of 1998,” the Senate has written one section
regarding “Congressional Disapproval” of base closures or
realignment (without meeting several onerous
conditions).61 The politics of defense reform, while an
executive branch initiative, must include congressional
backing and account for conditions of divided government as
well as traditional, executive-legislative branch tensions.
The 1998 Secretary of Defense’s “Annual Report to the
President and the Congress” echoes the Defense Reform
Initiative’s calls for reform. It includes four major
principles: reengineer, consolidate, compete, and eliminate.
In a section titled, Strategic Planning: DoD, the Report
notes six critical corporate-level goals consistent with the
Government Performance and Results Act:62

•

Goal 1. Shape the international environment through
DoD engagement programs and activities.

•

Goal 2. Shape the international environment and
respond to the full spectrum of crises by providing
appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces.

•

Goal 3. Prepare now for an uncertain future by
pursuing a focused modernization effort that
maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key
warfighting capabilities.

•

Goal 4. Prepare now for an uncertain future by
exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs to
transform U.S. forces for the future.
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•

Goal 5. Maintain highly ready joint forces to perform
the full spectrum of military activities.

•

Goal 6. Fundamentally reengineer the Department
and achieve a 21st century infrastructure by reducing
costs wh ile mai ntai ni ng r equi r ed mi l i tar y
capabilities across all DoD mission areas.

A skeptic might say that in addition to a Defense
Department that is reengineered to work better and cost
less, the report urges the organization to do more.
Simultaneously, the Department is expected to maintain
current capabilities, while shaping the international
environment and preparing for the uncertain future.
Whether it can perform those diverse tasks as well as
reform its management structure remains an open
question.
Conclusions: Kotter’s Cautions and Advice on
Leading Transformations.
Kotter’s research provides several lessons on why many
of the more than 100 transformation efforts failed. His most
general lesson is that the change process goes through a
series of phases and takes a considerable period of time. He
cautions against skipping steps. A second general lesson is
that a critical error can have a devastating impact. One
could argue that Cohen’s initiatives to “jump start”
transformation may signal a lack of patience for the long
haul. The much criticized Clinton Administration’s
amendment to the earlier BRAC legislation, to maintain
existing depots in the electorially important states of Texas
and California, may represent critical errors.63 Kotter cites
eight major errors that can cause transformation to
fail.64Ongoing DoD reform shows evidence of each, but
long-term cures may be possible for the future health of
DoD.
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Error #1: Not Establishing a Great Enough Sense of
Urgency.
According to Kotter, this step is essential to motivate the
organization to change. It requires a “hard look” at the
organization’s competitive situation, market position,
technological trends and financial performance. In 1997,
the Congress called on DoD to conduct a Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) with a follow-on “outside” review by
an expert National Defense Panel (NDP).
The error: the QDR focused on reinforcing the call for a
Revolution in Business Practices. Otherwise, in terms of
force structure, missions, budgets, and weapons
acquisitions it remained well within the parameters of the
status quo. In relative terms the NDP report, titled
“Transforming Defense,” is more change-oriented and
transformational. The NDP criticized DoD for maintaining
the strategic requirement for conducting two major regional
contingencies.65 The panel proposed shifting resources into
experimentation, research, and development of new
technologies. It also called for developing new operational
concepts, relooking missions (especially peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations), and canceling major weapons
system acquisition plans. In keeping with the earlier
discussion on the problems of PPBS, the panel also
recommended that DoD “rethink the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to make it
less burdensome and more receptive to innovation and
change.”66
DoD’s conservative approach on current strategy, force
structure, and weapons requirements may not establish the
needed sense of urgency. At the same time the pointed cuts
in the Defense organizations will also hurt the motivation to
transform. Setting future goals to the year 2003 for sizeable
personnel and organizational cuts gives the appearance of
cutback management as opposed to transformation.
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A cure: Kotter recommends hiring and promoting “real”
leaders into senior-level jobs. Certainly it will require
exceptional executive leadership to manage transformation
and day-to-day work simultaneously. Naturally a high
priority for the Secretary of Defense will be to hire both
senior civilian and military leaders who are
ambidextrous—who will help guide a long-term
transformation, while managing short-term operational
and administrative responsibilities.
Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful Enough Guiding
Coalition.
Kotter notes that an effective guiding team must have
strong line leadership. That is why the Secretary himself
must spearhead the reform movement. The lesson is that
the Secretary must be directly involved in leading the
reform movement internally, along with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Defense Management Council,
and other key stakeholders. External coalitions will be most
important. The Secretary should seek to maintain key allies
in the White House, while building bridges to Congress.
A cure: the Secretary should look to the Progressive Era,
Root Reforms for a model of congressional relations, and
avoid McNamara’s sole reliance on presidential support.
Given the current public lack of interest in defense issues,
the Secretary will be forced to work inside the Washington
beltway to build a powerful coalition inside the Pentagon,
the White House, and Congress. DoD reports should
continue to show how initiatives are in synch with the
Government Performance and Results Act.
Error #3: Lacking a Vision.
The DoD vision must avoid becoming shop-worn and
maintain a clear direction for reform. If the Secretary
continues a conservative approach, then the reform efforts
could get lost in the myriad of daily details in the conduct of
the business of defense.
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A cure: the vision should be refreshed periodically
through high-level meetings of civilian and military defense
officials. Periodic updates of the vision will help to keep
transformation on the agenda. The NDP’s more aggressive
proposals for transforming defense in a context wider than
the QDR should be evaluated. More forward looking
changes regarding transformation and experimentation
will help sustain the momentum for reform.
Error #4: Undercommunicating the Vision by a
Factor of Ten.
Kotter writes “Without credible communication, and a
lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never
captured.”67 As noted in the previous section, periodically
updating the vision, through a process that includes many
members of the organization, at all levels, can help the
communication process. Kotter notes also that this is
“particularly challenging if the short-term sacrifices include
job losses.”68
A cure: to help Kotter suggests including new growth
possibilities and fair treatment during downsizing. Given
trends towards globalization, new threats, and new
technologies there should be many ways to refocus, if not
grow portions of the defense organization. Providing
incentives to shift agency assets and individuals into new
security areas should help to reinforce the transformation
vision. To emphasize fair treatment during organizational
and personnel downsizing, resources will have to be
allocated to provide education, transition, and severance
packages to individuals forced to leave government service.
Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to the New
Vision.
Removing obstacles to transformation in DoD, such as
bureaucratic inertia, service parochialism, and
conservative culture is sure to be a significant problem.
Rainey notes that one of the benefits of Gore’s NPR is that it
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“revealed many of the obstacles to reform.”69 In the case of
DoD these obstacles will be further complicated due to the
anxieties future downsizing will create.
A cure: Kotter suggests examining the organizational
structure itself, along with the personnel selection
compensation and appraisal systems. No doubt it will
require a holistic evaluation of the total management
system to remove obstacles. The Defense Management
Council’s charter gives it oversight responsibilities. The
Secretary should have them directly address the problem of
“obstacles” by analyzing potential threats to transformation
and developing solutions to overcome them. Given the
assumptions and planning for downsizing, traditional
interservice rivalries, and organizational complexity, it is
safe to assume that managing obstacles to transformation
should be a full-time concern of the DMC.
Error #6: Not Systematically Planning for and
Creating Short-Term Wins.
Kotter calls for actively creating short-term wins within
12 to 24 months. Gore’s innovation awards program
(Hammer Awards) represents one method for doing this.
Other visible symbols and incentives should be created. The
Senate Armed Services Committee has used legislation and
oversight to redirect one of the Combatant Commands to
spearhead joint service experimentation. 7 0 These
congressional initiatives are in keeping with the stated DoD
goals and the NDP’s call for “A Transformation Strategy.”71
A cure: The Secretary should find ways to emphasize his
support of these congressional initiatives and incentives.
Supporting transformation will also help to build the
coalition on Capitol Hill and among those influential
members of the defense community that are encouraging
experimentation with new technologies, organizational
structures, and weapons systems. For instance, the
Secretary can help insure that the new experimentation
roles and missions are fully supported. He can set personnel
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policies to insure that the best and brightest of each of the
military services are selected to serve in the
experimentation headquarters. He can create positions for
senior executive service members to go directly from DoD to
the Command to maintain his personal influence. He can
insist that the leaders of the organization be taken care of by
their services, with key follow-on assignments and
promotions. Through personnel and budgetary incentives,
along with active personal involvement, the Secretary of
Defense can create a success in one key area of
transformation.
Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon.
Kotter researched transformation efforts over
seven-year periods.72 He noted that the amount of change
peaked at around five years, or 36 months after the first set
of visible wins. Thus, he encourages leaders to use
short-term wins to tackle larger problems.
A cure: In DoD for example, creating the successes in the
experimentation command could be used in the manner
Kotter suggests. Conducted correctly, the experiments
should lead to proposals for systemic and structural
changes in military force structures and equipment
requirements. Implementing those changes may require
major changes to the services in terms of resources,
organizations, personnel, equipment and doctrine.
Potentially, these will require subsequent changes to the
services priorities regarding budgets, force structures,
training, and weapons systems acquisitions. Simply setting
up the experimentation command, without preparing for
the major battles ahead will be shortsighted. The DoD
leadership will have to link experimentation to
implementation and move the goal posts well beyond
complying with the expected legislative initiatives.
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Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes in the
Corporation’s Culture.
Kotter points to two factors that are particularly
important in “institutionalizing change in corporate
culture” or seeping change into the “bloodstream of the
corporate body.”73 The first factor is actually showing the
improved performance resulting from new approaches,
behaviors, and attitudes. The second factor is making sure
that the next generation of top management personifies the
new approach. Again, it is important to recall the
importance of the leadership of Elihu Root during the
earlier reform period. While he had enemies within the War
Department and Congress, he was able to work skillfully
and patiently to implement the needed reforms.
A cure: Perhaps the wisest advice to the Secretary would
be to study Root’s example. The lessons are there for
highlighting necessary executive leadership skills to reform
those areas of DoD management that are suited to scientific
and business-like practices. At the same time, to avoid
obstacles to past transformation attempts, the politics of
recruiting and sustaining a viable coalition for change must
include building strong civil-military relations among
political, military, and agency leaders.
Anchoring the transformation initiatives in the cultures
of the Department of Defense, as well as the services, will
require as much executive leadership as will finding the
right organizational structures and processes. The
Secretary of Defense should look closely at the National
Defense Panel recommendations for broadening the scope of
initiatives, to include reforming the PPBS process. The
historic conditions, in part shaped by Gore’s NPR, as well as
changes in the international security environment, seem
right for reform. If DoD truly intends to be entrepreneurial
in its approach to public management, then the Secretary
will have to employ a full range of individual skills to build a
political coalition that will transform the Department of
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Defense on a scale that rivals the lasting reforms of Elihu
Root.
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CHAPTER 6
TIME FOR A REVOLUTION:
THE TRANSITION FROM NATIONAL
DEFENSE
TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Grant T. Hammond
Introduction: On Evolution and Revolution.
Though there are many definitions of the terms, The
Oxford English Dictionary in one of its entries defines
evolution as “the process of evolving, developing or working
out in detail what is implicitly or potentially contained in an
idea or principle.” It defines revolution, the way it is used
here, as “an instance of great change or alteration in affairs
or in some particular thing.”1 This chapter contends that
mere evolution will no longer suffice in the organization and
process of providing for the common defense. Revolution is
required.
This is true for several reasons.
1. There was less guidance and structural imperative in
the U.S. Constitution for dealing with foreign and defense
policy than with most other tasks of government.
2. The transformations that have occurred domestically
and internationally have presented us with a
fundamentally different strategic, political, economic, and
technological environment.
3. The role that the United States plays in the world
today is vastly different from that presumed to be the case
by the founders of the Republic or by the developers of the
post World War II U.S. security apparatus.

133

4. That security system is so fundamentally flawed that
the United States can no longer afford patchwork fixes and
must radically transform it in order to meet its obligations
at home and abroad.
5. What the United States does cannot be radically
transformed without serious reconsideration of why it does
it, and without fundamental reorganization of the
structures which the government relies upon to provide for
the common defense.
6. What is now required is a realization that, by default
more than design, the task of providing for the common
defense has been redefined. The task is no longer one of
providing for national defense but rather a larger and far
more complex task of providing for and sustaining
international security.
Doing so requires not evolution, but revolution. The
longer the United States waits, the more difficult the tasks
will become and the less likely its success. Not making
major transformations invites not only national defeat of
U.S. policies, however well intentioned, but also a
fundamental disruption of the international system.
The reason why these contentions are true are presented
below. Declaring itself “the world’s last remaining
superpower” and repeating the phrase in hopes that it can
prolong the supposed circumstance that it implies is an
insufficient policy prescription for the future. The
inescapable reality of these contentions is that the politics of
bureaucratic process, partisan politics and intra-service
rivalries must somehow be transcended if the United States
is to do what needs to be done. It is not just a matter of
military force structure and capabilities at the moment. It is
much more a matter of strategic thinking and
reorganization, in order to provide for the common defense
that is, or should be, under review. It has been over a decade
since the end of the Cold War and the end of the Gulf War.
The United States is still unsure of its role and its strategy.
This chapter argues that we need a revolution in national
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security affairs, describes what such a revolution would
entail, and then sketches in broad strokes what the
post-revolutionary regime might look like. It is purposely
broad and provocative, in order to stimulate discussion on
the issues involved. It calls for creative adaptation to both a
world and a domestic political context that, in many ways,
have already passed us by.
The Environment—International.
This is not our forefathers’ world. Instead of a world
dominated by several great Empires (British, French,
Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, Dutch, and
Spanish), we now contend with a world that has roughly 200
states and is globally interconnected. What is more, there
are approximately 800 international governmental
organizations (IGOs), which were virtually nonexistent in
the 18th century. In addition, there are nearly ten times
that number—nearly 8,000—international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). 2 W h e r e a s
isolationism in the strict sense was at least possible in the
18th century, we now live in a world where such a strategy is
virtually impossible—politically, economically, and even
culturally. The center of power in the 18th century was
unquestionably European. It is now located in North
America and, in many ways (population size, markets,
financial growth, and trade) in the Asia-Pacific region.
The international system has changed not only in size
and nature. It has also changed in more fundamental ways.
Increasingly, traditional conventional war is no longer a
paying proposition—even for the victor.3 As a result, while
still of great importance, political and military capabilities
are not as all consuming as they once were. Instead, what
might be called “technomic vitality,” the pace of
technological advances and economic health, determines
the pecking order in world affairs.4
The basic characteristics of the United States and its
relations with the rest of the world have also changed
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considerably. At the end of the 18th century, the United
States was a nation of newly independent colonies with few
major international commitments. It now finds itself in a
world with defense obligations to 47 countries and
personnel of the U.S. armed forces deployed to 144
countries.5 It has millions of our citizens who regularly
travel abroad and millions more who live and work abroad.
The Department of State estimates that there are over 3
million Americans living abroad—working for American
companies, foreign-owned subsidiaries or foreign
businesses, studying abroad or retired abroad.6 This was
unimaginable in 1787 and relatively rare even in 1947.
American economic ties are considerable, and not just in
terms of resources and markets for American business.
Something on the order of 1 in 6 Americans depends on
exports for his or her job. Foreign capital—in excess of $10
billion a month—is absolutely essential; to finance the
national debt, to fuel the stock market, and to keep
businesses expanding.7 As seen recently in Russia, East
Asia, and Latin America, the condition of foreign markets
and financial circumstances have an impact on U.S.
financial well being as well. Furthermore, as the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, and events in Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia
have revealed, there is a definite correlation between
economic well being, the maintenance of civil law and order,
and ethnic and factional hostilities. The United States may
indeed be the most powerful nation on earth. But this does
not mean that it is not vulnerable, and even fragile, under
certain circumstances.
There are perils in being the last remaining superpower
that the United States has not fully confronted. Most
important among these is the decision on just what the
American purpose in the world should be. Without some
sense of purpose it is difficult to know what to do or how to
proceed. The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of
DoD was greatly hampered in many ways, not the least of
which was the lack of a clear national consensus or directive
on just where the United States was headed and why.
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Deciding how best to go about getting there is a secondary
consideration.
This is not a novel problem for the republic. The United
States has never decided which dimension of its split
personality is to be paramount in its relations with the
world. On the one hand, for much of its history it has sought
to be aloof and isolationist, preferring to be the “shining city
on a hill”8 of Reagan rhetoric, for others to emulate. Serving
as a passive example while shunning the messy business of
actually making the world a better place has had great
appeal. On the other hand, more recently, the United States
has given way to a renewed fit of Wilsonian
interventionism. America now is apparently more willing, if
not exactly ready or able, to go off on crusades to remake the
world in its own image. “Engagement and Enlargement,”
was the first National Security Strategy of the Clinton
administration. The expansion of choice in all
aspects—democracy in politics, market economies in
economics, tolerance in religion, multi-culturalism in
society—is its mantra, however differentially applied.
The confusion and moral quandaries which are created
by this strategy are highlighted by numerous policy
dilemmas. These include: the tension between the
administration’s concern about human rights abuses and
its desire to grant most favored nation status for China; the
friction between political, military, and economic
considerations relating to India and Pakistan and nuclear
testing by these governments; and the contradictions
between the Department of State’s responsibility for
certifying countries on drugs and the administration’s
desire for trade and good neighborly relations with Mexico
and Colombia. In all of these cases, it is less the principles
than the exceptions that cause difficulties. And what right
do we have to hold others to “our” standards? The United
States may think this a matter of claiming the moral high
ground, but others may view our policies as blatant
discrimination and cultural imperialism. These are not easy
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questions to solve when implementing policy. Consistency
and constancy are both difficult.
The world in 1947, when the National Security Act was
passed, was a vastly different place than it is today. The
National Security establishment that it created was never
fully implemented. It was born of the experiences of the
coming of war in the late 1930s and the waging of World War
II. The United States was not yet fully frozen into a Cold
War with the Soviet Union. The world’s population was a
little over 2.5 billion, far less than half what it is today.
Decolonization was in its early stages, and colonial empires
still colored the maps of the world. There were 53 members
of the United Nations, only about a fourth of what it is today.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not
exist, nor did supersonic aircraft, intercontinental missiles
or precision guided munitions. Computers were rare,
“software” was not a word, the internet was non-existent,
and “hardware” meant a hammer and nails. Global
interdependence existed only in a negative way—the spread
of global conflict—and was neither a positive economic nor
informational reality.
The biggest problem facing the world in the years
following World War II was recovery from that global
disaster—economically, politically, socially, and
psychologically. There were still millions of refugees to be
repatriated, Britain was still under food rationing, and civil
war raged in China. The international drug trade was not a
major problem, nor was illegal immigration. World trade
and finance were relatively anemic. In the United States,
segregation was still law. Such ubiquitous features of
everyday life as cell phones and television, CNN and
satellites were nonexistent, not to mention genetic
engineering and space exploration. The United States had
an atomic monopoly, nearly 50 percent of the planetary
Gross National Product (GNP), and a merchant marine. The
single biggest change in the last 50 years has been the
relative decline of the lead of the United States in so many
political, military, social, and economic indicators vis-à-vis
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the rest of the world. The international arena has changed
so greatly, quantitatively and qualitatively, that it is
virtually unrecognizable in many ways. Given that degree
of change, why shouldn’t our national security organization
also undergo fundamental change as well?
The Environment—Domestic.
The Constitution of the United States of America calls
upon both the executive and legislative branches of
government to “provide for the common Defense,” albeit in
different ways.9 The “common Defense” was defense of the
nation and of the noble experiment in “American
exceptionalism” that had to be preserved and nurtured.
Granted, the authors of the Constitution never envisioned
the sort of growth in the defense establishment that has
occurred since the founding of the republic. Nor could the
founding fathers have seen that two principles to which
they were firmly committed—relative isolationism in world
politics and the absence of a large standing military
force—would be so thoroughly displaced by what they
sought to avoid.
The Constitution has served us extremely well in most
areas of concern for the state. Where it falls short is in the
areas of foreign affairs and military preparedness.10 This is
no fault of the drafters of the document for the world in
which they lived and the principles that guided their
thinking have been changed virtually beyond recognition.
There are no other areas where the shortfall in guidance has
been so great. Thus, there is little in the way of
Constitutional prescription to govern how we organize to
provide for the common defense or the manner in which we
pursue that goal.
Furthermore, providing for the common defense is big
business and big politics. DoD is the largest single fungible
element in the annual budget. It represents, through
basing, procurement and hiring in both the civilian and
military sectors, a roughly $300 billion enterprise which
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affects every state and Congressional district in the nation.
It provides ample opportunity for not only checks and
balances but vicious intra-governmental, inter-service and
partisan rivalries of monumental proportions. The services
are charged with having to train, organize, and equip. The
regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) are the ones who
deploy and employ military force, but they have relatively
little say in the budgetary process. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense and numerous other offices in the
Pentagon massage the service requests. The President must
include the defense budget in his annual budget request
from the executive branch. But it is the members of
Congress who must decide on funding, priorities,
amendments, and such. They do so based largely on their
understanding of the interests of their states and districts
rather than on the needs of the nation or the international
community. The opportunities for conflict are legion.
The era in which the National Security Act of 1947 was
passed was characterized as one of bi-partisanship in
foreign and defense policy following World War II. It had
nowhere near the impact on the economy that it now does.
The politics of defense have also changed considerably over
the last five decades. Since 1947, the pendulum of political
power has swung to the “Imperial Presidency” of the Nixon
era, then to what could be characterized as an “Imperial
Congress” during the Clinton era. Given these shifts, it is
amazing that the defense budget makes as much sense as it
does.
That said, there has been no dearth of studies,
recommendations, reviews, and reform initiatives
addressing these concerns. The most recent efforts,
beginning with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, are well known.
In the post-Cold War/post-Gulf War era, defense reform
efforts have become a virtual national pastime for retired
officers and politicians, members of the defense
intelligentsia, Congress and the Executive Branch. There
have been, in rather rapid succession, the Base Force (BF),
the Bottom Up Review (BUR), CORM, the Quadrennial
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Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense Panel (NDP)
and the Commission on National Security for the 21st
Century as well as several rounds of Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) studies. Curiously, the QDR is coterminous
with presidential elections, which magnifies rather than
mitigates partisan political influence. There is great
argument about more rounds in the BRAC process, with the
military seeking to cut needless infrastructure and
Congressmen reluctant to have their districts lose federal
money or jobs.
The process of assessing the shortfalls of the defense
establishment, the calls for a variety of reforms, the need to
reorganize the defense department or national security
organization as a whole have been a long-standing feature
of the American defense establishment. There have been
concerns expressed about the lack of truly strategic long
range planning; the failure of the budgeting, procurement
and accounting systems; the need for a new command and
force structures; and the necessity for reorganization of the
machinery providing for national security and the defense
industry which supplies it.11 The Reports and Commissions,
their titles and chairmen, and the debates they have
inspired have been continuing features of both executive
and congressional concern for over 50 years. Some of these
have been acted upon but most have not. To them must be
added the scores of journalistic reports, academic books,
congressional hearings, and efforts at reform which have
been a steady drum beat in our national life.12 Indeed, there
have been charges of fraud, waste and abuse, corruption, or
merely poor organization and institutionalized
inefficiencies since the country was founded.13 Nearly all
have concluded that there are serious flaws in the way in
which we organize to provide for the common defense. Yet
relatively little has been done to address the major
criticisms of these myriad reports, studies, and charges.
Why? More appropriately, why not?
The answers, as with most explanations, are at once
simple and complex. Recently, on the simple side of the
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ledger, is the historical reality that the United States has
lived for over half a century with a set of compromises in the
organization of our national defense establishment that
were built into the National Security Act of 1947. As Robert
Art has explained it, the United States “created a defense
organization that has a host of organizational inefficiencies
built into it. Unification of the armed forces was purchased
at the price of permitting duplication and overlap in
function.”14
Four characteristics capture the manner in which the United
States has organized its defense establishment since 1947.
First, the defense establishment remains a system of half
measures, falling somewhere between a truly integrated, highly
centralized system on the one hand and a loosely coordinated,
committee-run structure on the other. Second, the
organizational changes that have been made since 1947 have
been modest on the military side but radical on the civilian side.
Third, through the three major reorganizations since 1945 (in
1947, 1949, and 1958), the services have managed to retain
considerable autonomy to develop war plans and to allocate
resources in a manner that each judges best suited to its own
interests, without due regards for what the other services need
or are doing, much less what the overall national defense
requires. Fourth, since the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act,
when the Secretary of Defense was given considerable powers to
assert real operating control over the entire defense
establishment, a fundamental imbalance has persisted between
the centralizing powers of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the coordinating powers of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.15

Despite the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986
(after these remarks appeared in print) the same charges
are largely true today.
The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986
did have a big impact on the U.S. military. Among other
things, it made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the
principal military advisor to the President, thus creating a
competition with the Secretary of Defense. It increased the
strength of the regional CINCs, but did not give them real
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power in the budgeting process. It also further emasculated
the civilian service secretaries. While the military continues
to repeat the mantra of jointness, and J-7 writes joint
doctrine for nearly every task one might be asked to
perform, the realities are far less than the appearance
would suggest. A cynic would say Goldwater-Nichols is the
way to guarantee that all the services participate in every
major use of military force. A booster would say that wars of
the future are likely to be both joint and combined and
jointness is only rational and prudent. Both would be
correct. Indeed, many of the problems with today’s
American defense establishment are similar to those that
were identified by James Fallows in his 1980 book National
Defense—a book that was written prior to the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act.
The Perils of Being the Last Remaining
Superpower.
However much we may like the sound of it and however
soothing it may be to bask, albeit temporarily, in the glow of
being the self-proclaimed last remaining superpower, this
reality is fraught with difficulties and burdened with some
rather substantial obligations and responsibilities. Is the
United States up to the task? Just how should it go about
doing it? Some would like it to retain this mantel
permanently and to actively promote a “Pax Americana” for
the next century, while others think the moment has
passed. Some would like to make William Wohlforth’s
“Unipolar World” a manifest reality of some duration while
others seek a more limited role for the United States, such
as that favored by Robert Art and others who see “Selective
Engagement” as the answer.16 In between are other
prescriptions for and images of America which range from
being lonely to being a bully.17 Some see the United States
as ready but reluctant. Others see it as not unwilling but
unable to exert leadership in the world. There is some truth
in most of these views.
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Regardless of one’s views on America’s proper role in the
world, there is another issue. The test of national security
used to be the ability and willingness of the nation to act
unilaterally, to include the use of force if deemed necessary,
in defense of the nation’s interests. However, both the
National Security Strategy of the United States and the
National Military Strategy assume that when force is used
by the United States in the future, it will be as part of a
coalition, either permanent or ad hoc. Americans want
others to assist them in their international actions. The
United States needs others to permit (via U.N. Resolutions),
pay for (through NATO burden sharing; Saudi or Japanese
cash payments), and participate (regional states in the area
of intervention, if not the U.N.) in the application of
American military power abroad. But international action
by committee is often slow, cumbersome, belated, and
ineffectual.
The other options are “selective engagement” based on
principles and precepts which can be stated in advance and
generally adhered to in policy execution. However, all this
takes place in a circumstance where the American public
may not perceive or care about international security. Since
others will be paying for the investments that the United
States makes in the world—in physical, financial, and
human terms—some Americans believe that they need not
be overly concerned. But, it would be helpful if there were a
consensus on why a specific action is important, and some
general agreement on how best to go about it. Such a
consensus would be easier to develop if it could be guided by
another “Long Telegram,” the equivalent of the “Mr. X”
article for the current era. The problem is that without an
all-consuming peer competitor on which to focus, it is highly
unlikely that such a document will be created and accepted.
There are risks and opportunity costs associated with
the adoption of any of the proffered strategies for the long
haul. They need to be debated thoroughly and weighed
carefully. The opportunity costs revolve around the misuse
of our current strategic situation. It is a relatively benign
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period, in terms of threats to the United States, which gives
us the time to catch our breath and decide how best to
contend with the future without having to worry about a
serious, immediate threat to the nation. America has the
luxury of not having to fight a war of necessity and being
able to decide upon wars of choice. As George Bush observed
after the Gulf War, America finds itself for the third time in
a century in a position of being able to help shape the
security regime for the future. It is an opportunity that
should not be squandered and one that may not occur again,
at least for some time.
On the other hand, it is a situation that is also full of
danger. In promoting engagement and a philosophy of
choice, the United States stands, if not guilty by intent,
closely associated with the charge of cultural imperialism.
Worse, in the eyes of many, America is the bully on the
playground of international relations. It can afford neither
the labels nor the reality if it hopes to have a benign and
peaceful impact on the world. Yet both its short-term
rhetoric and its actions seem to get in the way of America’s
long-term goals and preferences. The United States stands
accused in some quarters of seeking world domination, by
default if not by design. It is seen as the engine responsible
for the homogenization and Americanization of the globe in
nearly every aspect; from finance to movies, food to religion,
clothing to music.
Americans also suffer from a feeling of perpetual guilt
regardless of our actions. We feel damned if we do and
damned if we don’t intervene. The nonlogical but compelling
emotional rationalizations of “if not here, where?” and “if
not now, when?” are difficult to refute and tug at the
heartstrings of American sensibilities that abhor famine,
the slaughter of innocent civilians, genocide, etc. What we
think of as assistance is usually intended to be short term,
for humanitarian reasons and well-intentioned on our part.
The fact that others may see such efforts as part of a “Pox
Americana” rather than a “Pax Americana,” is difficult for
many Americans to understand. To many in the rest of the
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world, particularly the Islamic world, it is increasingly a
matter of “The West Against the Rest.”18 The fact that this is
not our intention is essentially irrelevant.
Americans must confront the fact that despite good
intentions, there are many problems in the world that the
United States just cannot solve. The current experience in
Kosovo is a case in point. An air campaign to punish Serbian
President Slobidan Milosevic for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
is not likely to solve the problem for Albanian refugees
fleeing the area. In the name of democracy and
self-determination, principles Americans hold dear, the
United States and its NATO allies may well be writing the
requiem for a “new world order” in the wars of succession
and secession in Yugoslavia. The fact that this is an
unintended consequence may be of little solace to all
concerned.
The System is Broken.
is

As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, “national security”
a collective term encompassing both national defense and
foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition
provided by: a) a military or defense advantage over a foreign
nation or group of nations, or b) a favorable foreign relations
position, or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting
hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or
covert.19

This is a matter for national decision. But increasingly,
during and particularly after the Cold War, the United
States is more concerned about creating a global
environment in which it can survive and prosper and in
which the ideals of the American political system can
flourish. Doing so constitutes an effort to shape not merely
national security but an international security
environment. That is both a larger, and more problematic,
agenda.
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The scope, scale, and magnitude of the problems
confronting the United States are much larger than they
used to be. So, too, is the supposed “system” of government
that has grown out of all proportion to what was initially
envisioned in 1947. DoD has 36 separate organizations in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, it has 17
Defense agencies, 10 field activities, 10 laboratories, and 9
unified and combatant commands. DoD is divided into three
service secretaries and departments, each with their own
sizeable staffs; four services, each with a Reserve
component and two with Guard components; as well the
Inspector General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and an
eight-division Joint Staff. The Army has 113 separate
installations, the Air Force has 93, the Navy has 74, and the
Marines has 19, both at home and abroad. Instead of an
Office of the Secretary of Defense with a staff of 100, as
established by the 1947 National Security Act, there are
now hundreds of staff officers working for the secretary, and
thousands in the service and joint staffs in the Pentagon.20
Add to this the executive and congressional players in
the national security process, and the picture becomes even
more complicated. There are over 50 congressional
committees and subcommittees that have something to do
with national security. The White House has the National
Security Council, the National Economic Council, the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the
U.S. Special Trade Representative. Then there are the
specialized agencies in the executive branch, such as the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National
Reconnaissance Organization, as well as a whole series of
shops in cabinet departments as diverse as Commerce,
Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury. To this list, one can add
numerous shops in the Department of State—35 separate
ones—as well as a number of related agencies such as the
U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International
Development.
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Two things emerge from this cursory overview of the
players in the national security bureaucracy. First, because
of the large number of separate components involved in
information gathering, analysis, decisionmaking, and
dissemination, getting a timely response from this array of
governmental organizations is difficult if not impossible.
Second, the notion that quick, effective, and efficient
coordination can occur routinely may be fiction. Merely
checking with principals—let alone deputies, related
agencies, and intelligence sources— becomes a time
consuming process.
Coordination supposedly occurs through the
interagency process, which is surveyed by Gabriel Marcella
in this volume. The interagency process coordinates among
U.S. Government agencies, and occasionally International
Governmental Organizations or Non-Governmental
Organizations, to craft policy initiatives and responses to
events as they unfold. It usually involves the delegation of a
lead agency responsible for determining the agenda,
extracting agreement, and implementing decisions. The
phrase imparts a notion of a well-oiled policy machine. It is
largely a myth. Neither adaptation nor control is possible
given the crazy quilt of organizations and players in the
national security arena. The sheer difficulty of holding a
meeting, even a conference call, is daunting. The “system”
that we now have is too large, unwieldy, and complex to
respond effectively or initiate the changes that are required.
Both the purpose and the process are in need of attention.
We need to start over.
America’s Role in the World.
Virtually every aspect of our role in the world has
changed. The chart below summarizes the transition—in
both definition and focus—in the role of the United States in
the world and the changing requirements for the common
defense.
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Former Focus

Current/Future Focus

National Defense

International Security

Unilateral Action

Coalition Diplomacy

Threat Based Policy

Objective Based Policy

Control

Adaptation

Capabilities

Intentions

Domestic Politics
the Key

International Politics
the Key

Force Application

Statecraft and Negotiation

War Preparation

Peace Preservation

Win by Out-producing Foe

Win by Outwitting Foe

I will survey each of these changes before proceeding to the
next set of issues. What is the cumulative impact of these
trends?
The fundamental transformation relates to the need to
move from a system which provides for national defense to
one which provides for international security. This latter
task is larger in context, continuous in attention, and more
complex in execution, particularly for a multi-cultural
democratic republic such as the United States. Providing for
the common defense used to be defined as protecting the
nation from attack by other states. War would be declared
when the nation was threatened, the citizenry and the
economy would be mobilized, and Americans would sally
forth beyond their ocean moats to give battle. Now the
problem is more complex. The United States must shape an
international environment conducive to the survival and
prosperity of American values, institutions, citizens, and
assets. The assumption of the National Security Strategy
and the National Military Strategy of the United States is
that the
The United States will employ force only as a part of a
coalition. Since the Gulf War, the United States has needed
149

others to permit, pay for, and participate in the application
of American military force. That is a fundamental
transformation. Similarly, throughout the Cold War, the
United States focused on the identification of threats from
the Communist world and the formulation of contingency
plans to counteract these threats.
At present, by contrast, it is increasingly obvious that we
cannot control all of the possible threats to the United
States. The array of hypothetical threats is limited only by
the imaginations of contractors and members of the armed
services, and, in any event, America does not possess the
will or the resources to counteract them all. What the
United States can, and should, control, however, are the
objectives we wish to accomplish in the world. Knowing
what we wish to accomplish must necessarily precede the
effort to do so.
The United States has always been more focused on
capabilities than intentions. For much of the Cold War, the
United States measured threats by the capabilities others
possessed because it could. This gave logic to budgetary
requests—the USSR has this, so the United States needs
that. It was a costly and inefficient way to attempt to insure
readiness for war. At present, it is increasingly important to
pay attention to the intentions of others—of both allies and
adversaries—as well as to their capabilities. Assessing
intentions as well as capabilities may produce interesting
opportunities as well as threats, and requires an
investment in human intelligence (HUMINT) as well as
overhead imagery. The United States has tended to place
far more assets in the latter than in the former. It tried for
much of the Cold War to control the pace, nature, intensity,
scope, and outcome of the competition with others. But in a
chaotic, nonlinear, unknown and largely unknowable global
environment, seeking to control events may be a fool’s
errand and may be part of the problem, not part of the
solution. Most organisms and organizations that have
survived and prospered have been those that were able to
adapt well and quickly to changing circumstances.
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Improvisation and “work-arounds” are a hallmark of the
American military. Why not train and educate an adaptable
force rather than seeking to control what cannot be
controlled?
For most of its history, the United States has been able to
afford the luxury of doing much as it pleased and following
its domestic agenda which has been the driver in American
decisionmaking. It has not had to worry greatly about
others and the general international climate. Increasingly,
however, we are linked and interdependent with
international forces, actors, and events. Pretending we can
ignore or override them is both wrong and dangerous.
Furthermore, contending in the international arena during
our mostly isolationist past was seen as the application of
the ultimate sanction of superior force. After the aberration
of war was finished, we would return home to peace. But
increasingly, the application of force doesn’t pay, even for
the victor. Statecraft, diplomacy, and negotiation are far
better means of conflict resolution, and less costly. But
others are far better at this and its tangential
skills—language fluency, long-term views, pragmatic
dealings—than Americans, who have disinvested in the
capacity to conduct routine skillful diplomacy on many
fronts.
The ultimate threat and final arbiter in international
relations has been the act of war. As Charles Tilly has
commented, “States make war, and wars make states.”21
But the stakes and costs have escalated beyond the capacity
of most states to absorb them. Increasingly, it is peace
preservation, not war waging, that is the problem for the
international system. How can the United States allow
transformation of the international system by force of arms,
and thereby legitimize the use of force, while at the same
time trying to preserve the status quo and promote only
peaceful change? It is not strong states with aggressive
designs on neighbors, totalitarianisms from both the left
and the right, that threaten the international system today.
Rather, it is the weakness of states and their disintegration
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that rocks the international system. But war, when it has
come for the United States, has generally been good
business. America won by outproducing the adversary. The
German Panzer tanks were unquestionably better than the
American Sherman tanks in World War II. The Germans
produced a total of roughly 21,500 of the former in 7 years
while the United States built over 40,000 of the latter in 4
years. Moreover, the United States built nearly as many
tanks in a month—over 2,000—as the Germans did in some
years.22 Given the high cost of war material, the United
States may not be able to afford the luxury of an
economically profligate solution to its problems.
Increasingly, America needs to be able to outwit our
enemies, not merely out-produce them. This is particularly
true in an era in which social security has defeated national
security as the primary concern of the body politic.
These general trends are supplemented by yet another
set of trends which also have significant implications for
America’s ability to provide for the common defense. These
are as follows.
Former Focus

Current/Future Focus

Politico-Military
Emphasis

Economic-SocialPsychological Emphasis

Regional

Global

Military Jointness

Civilian & CivilMilitary Jointness

Technology

Strategy

Competition

Cooperation

Military Intelligence

Cultural
Anthropology/Ethnology

The Services

The CINCs

Department of Defense

The U.S. Government

Right Place

Right Time
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The collective imperative of these transformations is
revolutionary change in the way the United States
organizes to provide for international security as well as
national defense.
It is no longer mainly about political and military
problems and solutions. These are increasingly irrelevant to
many global problems. It is often the other elements of
national power—ones in which the United States has
disinvested, relatively speaking—that are more pertinent.
A better understanding of the realities that underlie both
international problems (Somalia, the Balkans) and their
ultimate solutions would go a long way towards making
U.S. actions more appropriate and effective. For example,
while containment led the United States to pursue a virtual
“pactomania” approach to global problems—through
regional military arrangements in the 1950s—these are not
necessarily the most appropriately sized entities to deal
with current and future problems. Most transnational
problems involve regions that are smaller than states but
involve many of them, or larger than states and thus not
susceptible to national solutions. Increasingly, other
issues—the availability of fresh water, global warming,
pollution—are global in their consequence and hence, their
solution. The political-military alignments of the Cold War
are insufficient to the tasks at hand. A global data
gathering, assessment, and dissemination process is
required, along with a global vision to address these issues.
Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the U.S.
military has been driven toward the realization of
“jointness.” As discussed by Douglas Lovelace in this
volume, jointness is the increasing integration of the Armed
Services, and the quest for common solutions to military
problems that confront all of the services. It is meant as a
direct challenge to the traditional parochial approach that
the Services have brought to debates about national
security. While much progress has been made with the
development of joint doctrine, there is still more lip service
than reality associated with this concept. Furthermore,
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there is little jointness among the active duty forces and the
reserve and national guard components, and even less
among the military and their civilian counterpart agencies
and institutions. There is also no equivalent effort at
jointness among the civilian government agencies, to align
functions, integrate effort, and eliminate duplication. Most
regrettable of all, there is a growing gap between the
military and civilian society where neither understands the
other as they should.
Traditionally, and increasingly, given the commitment
to Joint Vision 2010 and its follow-on documents,23 the
United States has placed its faith in science, engineering,
and technology to achieve and sustain a qualitative edge
over current or future adversaries. While this is a
reasonable choice, it masks the reality that not all problems
are technological nor have technological solutions.
Understanding the strategic environment, and knowing if,
when, how, why, and where to employ technological means,
is a far more difficult challenge than the mere acquisition of
the technology, however sophisticated it might be.
Developing the strategy that underlies the selection and
employment of technology is the more important part of the
problem. Americans tend to be captivated by things, and not
by their purpose. We tend to focus on the hardware at hand
rather than the second and third order consequences that
may flow from its application. Furthermore, an American
strategy may require more than intermittent competition
with adversaries. It may demand sustained competition
and cooperation with allies and adversaries alike,
something that Americans are not comfortable doing and
with which we have little experience. Because of our
capitalist system, and the American emphasis on individual
effort, competition seems the norm to Americans. There is
less of an understanding of the necessity to cooperate as well
as compete with both adversaries and allies. The yin and
yang of the international system over the long haul require
both capacities.
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The United States has invested massive amounts of
time, money, and effort in military intelligence using
national technical means to identify threats to the nation. It
has invested less in thinking about just who our potential
adversaries might be and what makes them tick. Overhead
imagery, multi-spectral imaging, and electronic data
capture and assessment may not reveal what needs to be
known about what another society, polity, or economy really
values or how and why it functions as it does.
Unfortunately, the United States has spent far less time,
money, and effort trying to understand the perceptions,
languages, and values of those who share the planet with us
than many of them have invested in trying to understand
us. Knowing these things—about friend, foe, and bystander
alike—will be increasingly important in our interdependent
world. Cultural anthropology and ethnology are as
important, if not more important, than military intelligence
in understanding others and our relations with them.
America’s military requirements have traditionally
been interpreted through the eyes of the major service
components who train, organize, and equip the U.S.
military in DoD. There are three departments, four services,
four Reserve, and two Guard systems, which we attempt to
integrate with the armed forces of other nations in joint and
combined operations as necessary. But it is the regional and
unified CINCs that deploy and employ forces, not the
services. The services have the primary control of the
budget, despite some CINC inputs to the Joint Resource
Operations Command (JROC). The CINCs have forces
“chopped” to them when action is required, but this is a
complicated and cumbersome system. More power should
devolve to the CINCs, as a logical extension of
Goldwater-Nichols. But beyond that, both national defense
and international security demand the effective use of more
than the assets of DoD. For more than half a century, DoD
has functioned as the major guarantor of national security.
But it is too big in size and too narrow in focus to compete
effectively in today’s world. The policymaking process
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requires data fusion and information integration from not
only DoD, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National
Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other
security agencies in the U.S. Government but also the
agencies and functions of other departments. These include
not only State, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, but also
Agriculture, Transportation, and Education as well as
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others, to be
integrated into a U.S. Government—wide focus on
international security. The international aspects of many of
these agencies are under-funded and understaffed at
precisely the time of greatest need for specialized
information and competencies.
Lastly, and most generally but importantly, the United
States may be focused on the wrong part of many of the
problems it faces. In the past, winning wars and preventing
a fait accompli against our allies and policies required that
the United States be in the right place to thwart an
adversary’s plans. But the United States has withdrawn
from much of the world. It does not have nearly as many
bases abroad nor as many people stationed permanently
overseas as it used to have. The real BRAC process actually
occurred overseas—with 65 percent of U.S. bases in Europe
and 24 percent of those in the Far East being closed.
Increasingly the speed, range, and accuracy of weapons, and
improvements in communications, surveillance, and
transportation mean that time and timing are critical.
Doing things at the right time is as important, or more
important, than doing them in the right place. Establishing
or preventing a fait accompli is time dependent as well as
place dependent. Global reach is necessary, but if it cannot
be achieved at the right time, it may be worthless. This
places a premium on rapid, adaptive ObservationOrientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loops and decision
processes, something that is increasingly difficult for the
U.S. Government to accomplish.
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The cumulative impact of the issues raised above has
been largely ignored. It is time to address the collective
implications and act accordingly. Failure to do so will
contribute to the ebb of American power and prestige and
the erosion of America’s capability to act. It is not American
capabilities that may be called into question as much as
American intent. Thinking through what we wish to
accomplish and why, and how this may or may not unfold,
are critical tasks. The United States may be as much in need
of an entrance strategy as an exit strategy when it prepares
for the next Gulf War or Kosovo operation. If the United
States does not know what it seeks to accomplish, as well as
why and how, then perhaps its intervention will be stillborn
from the outset.
War may be too important to be left to the generals, but
peace is too important to be left only to the politicians. This
is true because, increasingly, peacetime preparedness is the
key to victory in war. There are also an increasing number of
“less than war” applications of military force occurring
during ostensible periods of peace. The real struggle may be
the peacetime competitions that war only validates. If the
United States hopes to compete and cooperate successfully
in this century to help manage a relatively peaceful
international security system, it needs to pay more than lip
service to the imperatives of the National Military Strategy
of shape, respond, and prepare now. It needs to devise a
strategy that is principled, affordable, and adaptive for the
long haul. Such an effort is not, and should not be,
dependent on having a peer competitor to plan against.
Rather it requires vision, commitment, and leadership that
is positive, sustainable, and inclusive.
It also requires an organization designed to accomplish
the task. The national security machinery of over 50 years
ago is part of the problem, not part of the solution. It is time
not just for a conceptual revolution to understand better
what it is we are about, but also for an organizational
revolution to accomplish what we seek to do. This is a
problem of political leadership for the president, political
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courage for Congress, and political change for the country. A
failure to address these problems—and soon—will lead to
both our demise as a nation and the failure of the effort to
establish a modicum of international security in the world
in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 7
NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS:
FORWARD INTO THE 21st CENTURY
Gabriel Marcella
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of
others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes
from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will
infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities
and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks
through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and
irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys
and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of
war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these
three arts are the paladins of statecraft.1
Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

The Interagency Process and Purposeful
Adaptation.
The comments of Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr.
speak to the skillful use of influence and power to promote
the national interests in a competitive world. It is a tall
order even for the United States, the only fully equipped,
globally deployed, interagency superpower. America is the
indispensable anchor of international order and the
increasingly globalized economic system. Nothing quite like
it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers as Rome,
Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France achieved
extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutional and
cultural influence, and longevity, but they never achieved
the full articulation of America’s global reach.
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Today the United States forward deploys some 250
diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consulates,
and specialized organizations. It possesses a unified
military command system that covers all regions of the
world and even outer space. It is the leader of an
interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes
peace, open trade, the principles of democracy, human
rights, and protection of the environment. American
capital, technology, and culture influence the globe.
American power and influence is pervasive and
multidimensional. All the instruments of national power
are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of
bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness,
remains. Presidents and their national security staffs strive
to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success, through
the use of the “interagency process.”
The interagency decisionmaking process is uniquely
American in character, size, and complexity. Given ever
expanding responsibilities and declining resources in
dollars and manpower, it is imperative that national
security professionals master it in order to work effectively
within it. The complex challenges to national security in the
21st century will require intelligent integration of resources
and unity of effort within the government.
The United States first faced the challenge of strategic
integration within an embryonic interagency process
during World War II. Mobilizing the nation and the
government for war and winning the peace highlighted the
importance of resources and budgets, of integrating
diplomacy with military power, gathering and analyzing
enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting joint and
combined military operations, managing coalition
strategies and balancing competing regional priorities.
From the war and the onset of the Cold War emerged a
number of institutional innovations, including: The
structure of the modern Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Air Force, a centralized
intelligence system and unified military command system,
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the predecessor of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (Point Four), North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other alliances, and the United
States Information Agency.
There is probably no period in American history like the
late 1940s and early 1950s that is so formative of the kind of
national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls
“purposeful adaptation.” He defines it as “the need to
develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensitive to
national needs and aspirations and to the realities of a
changing world environment.” 2 The evolution of the
interagency process parallels America’s purposeful
adaptation to the changing global realities of the last five
decades. But it has not been an orderly evolution, in part
because of serious structural and cultural impediments,
such as poor institutional memory.3 Prominent historical
markers along this path include such documents as NSC 68,
the intellectual framework for the containment strategy
against the Soviet Union, and the Weinberger Doctrine,
which articulated criteria for the use of military power that
dramatically influenced the shape of American strategy in
the 1980s and 1990s.
In 1945, American statesmen faced three challenges:
forging a system of collective security, promoting
decolonization, and building a stable international financial
order. These, and 4 decades of intense threat from the other
superpower, had a decisive impact on the interagency
process. With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical
conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda is captured
by free trade, democratization, subnational ethnic and
religious conflicts, failing states, humanitarian
contingencies, ecological deterioration, terrorism,
international organized crime, drug trafficking, and the
proliferation of the technology of weapons of mass
destruction. At the dawn of a new era, is the policymaking
system which was developed and refined for the strategic
imperatives of the Cold War adequate to meet a very
different set of challenges?
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The National Security Council: Coordination vs.
Policymaking.
To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and
decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities of the
emerging superpower, the National Security Act (NSA) of
1947 created the National Security Council (NSC). Its
mandate was:
. . . to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national
security so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.
. . . other functions the President may direct for the purpose of
more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the
departments and agencies of the Government relating to the
nations security. . .
. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of the United States. . .
. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with
the national security . . .

The statutory members are the president, the vice
president, secretaries of State and Defense. All others
present are advisors: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Director Central Intelligence, and cabinet members. The
Council need not convene formally to function. Indeed, by
late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met formally only once:
March 2, 1993. There are alternatives to formal meetings,
such as the “ABC” luncheons of Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Sandy Berger, and Secretary of Defense
William Cohen, and the deputies breakfasts and lunches.
The “NSC system” of policy coordination and integration
operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs directs the staff. The emergence of
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the modern “operational presidency,”4 brought to the NSC
greater authority over the development and
implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center
that competes for jurisdiction with the Departments of
State and Defense.
The NSC staff, known as the Executive Secretariat, has
varied in size and function. In 1999 the staff comprised
about 208 (of which 101 were policy personnel and 107
administrative and support personnel) professionals
covering regional and functional responsibilities. Staffers
are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence
community, the civil service, the military services (12 in
policy positions in September 1999), academia, and the
private sector. The staffing procedures are personalized by
the president’s style and comfort level. The structure of the
staff, its internal and external functioning, and the degree
of centralized control of policy varies. Presidents Jimmy
Carter and William Clinton have favored a very centralized
system, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush less so.
The first two Presidential Decision Directives of the Clinton
administration, dated January 20, 1993, set forth the
structure and function of the NSC staff and groups that
report to it, as depicted below:
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The day-to-day policy coordination and integration is done
by the NSC Staff, divided into functional and geographic
directorates:

National Security Council Staff.
The Principals Committee members are the cabinet
level representatives who comprise the senior forum for
national security issues. The Deputies Committee includes
assistant secretary level officials who monitor the work of
the interagency policy formulation and articulation process,
do crisis management, and, when necessary, push
unresolved issues to the Principals for resolution.
Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul
of the process. They may be ad hoc, standing, regional, or
functional. They function at a number of levels, meet
regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy
responses, and build consensus across the government for
unified action. The fluid nature of the process means that
IWGs do not always have to come to decisions. The system
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prefers that issues be decided at the lowest level possible. If
issues are not resolved there, they are elevated to the next
level and, when appropriate, to the Deputies Committee.
Who chairs the different IWGs and committees can vary
between the NSC director and a senior State Department
official.
Policy is often made in different and subtle ways.
Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza Falling: The Nicaraguan
Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusses how
the answer to an important letter can help set policy. Hence
the importance of interagency coordination and the
importance of being the one (bureau, office, agency) that
drafts it.
. . . policy flows as much from work on specific items—like the
letter from Perez [to Carter]—as it does from the large, formal
interagency “policy reviews” that result in presidential
pronouncements.5

Each action is precedent for future actions. Speeches, press
conferences, VIP visits, and presidential travels are also
important. Lake elaborates:
Policy is made on the fly; it emerges from the pattern of specific
decisions. Its wisdom is decided by whether you have some
vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along.6

The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination
and integration of foreign policy and national security
matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:
1. provides information and policy advice to the
president;
2. manages the policy coordination process;
3. monitors implementation of presidential policy
decisions;
4. manages the interdepartmental dimensions of crises;
5. articulates the president’s policies;
169

6. undertakes long term strategic planning;
7. conducts liaison with congress and foreign governments; and,
8. coordinates summit meetings and national security
related trips.
There is a natural tension between the policy
coordination function of the NSC and policymaking. Jimmy
Carter’s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC,
Robert Pastor, argues that:
. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from the
former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s control of
implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious
about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to be
concerned that State either might not implement the
president’s decisions or might do so in a way that would make
decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.7

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body but, in fact,
it oscillates between the poles—taking policy control over
some issues while allowing the State or Defense to be the
lead agency on most national security and foreign policy
issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis of
1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy control from
State. Similarly, policies toward Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95
were handled directly out of the White House because of the
deeply rooted domestic dimension of these issues. The
Oliver North Iran-Contra caper created an autonomous
operational entity within the NSC staff. But this was an
aberration that does not invalidate the general rule. The
salient point is that proximity to the president gives the
NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency process.
Such clout must be used sparingly lest it cause resentment
and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom and skills
available elsewhere in the executive departments.
By late 1999, the Clinton administration had
established other formal bodies under the umbrella of the
NSC:
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1. Executive Committees, established by PDD 56 for
complex humanitarian contingencies;
2. Peacekeeping Core Group, established by PDD 25;
3. Counter-terrorism Security Group, established by
PDD 42, amended by PDD 62;
4. Special Coordination Group, established by PDD 42
for international crime;
5. Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group,
established by PDD 62; and,
6. Critical Infrastructure Coordinating Group,
established by PDD 62.
These groups have reached across the network of
executive departments.
Towards a Theory of the Interagency Process: How
Does the President Mobilize the Government?
The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving
human beings and complex organizations with different
cultures, different outlooks on what’s good for the national
interest and the best policy to pursue—all driven by the
compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is
political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is
power—personal, institutional, or party. The “power game”
involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of
policy prerogatives, the hammering out of compromises,
and the normal human and institutional propensity to
resist change.8 Regardless of the style of the president and
the structures developed for the management of national
security policy, the NSC-dominated interagency process
performs the same basic functions: identifies policy issues
and questions, formulates options, raises issues to the
appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions where
appropriate, and oversees the implementation of decisions
throughout the executive departments.

171

It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated levels:
conceptualization,
articulation,
budgeting,
implementation, and post-implementation analysis and
feedback. Conceptualization involves the complex
intellectual task of policy development, such as a
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). Articulation is the
public declaration of policy by the president or his
subordinates. This is critical in a democracy in order to
engage public support. Budgeting involves testimony before
Congress to justify policy goals and to request funding.
Implementation is the programmed application of resources
in the field in order to achieve the policy objectives.
Post-implementation analysis and feedback is the
continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to
make appropriate adjustments.
The ideal system would have perfect goal setting,
complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive analysis
and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy
and its rationale, effective execution, thorough and
continuous assessment of the effects, perfect learning from
experience and the ability to recall relevant experience and
information.

Source: John P. Lovell, The Challenge of American Foreign Policy:
Purpose and Adaptation, p. 26.
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Such perfection is impossible. The reality is:

POLICY IN PRACTICE
TASK

CAPABILITY

Goal Setting

National interests are object of
competing claims; goals
established through political
struggle

Intelligence

Always incomplete, susceptible
to overload, delays and
distortions caused by biases
and abiguity in interpretation

Option Formulation

Limited search for options,
comparisons made in general
terms
according
to
predispositions rather than
cost-benefit analysis

Plans, Programs, Decisions

Choices made in accordance
with prevailing mind sets, often
influenced by groupthink and
political considerations

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradictions
and confusion, self-serving
concern for personal image and
feeding the appetite of the
media

Execution

Breakdowns in communication,
fuzzy lines of authority,
organizational parochialism,
bureaucratic politics, delays

Monitoring and Appraisal

Information gaps, vague
standards, regidities in
adaption, feedback failures

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, selective
learning and application of
9
lessons
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Effective policy requires vision, control, resources, and a
system of accountability. The most compelling challenge for
the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents
don’t have the time and expertise to oversee policymaking in
detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they delegate
responsibility. But “nobody is in charge” is an often-heard
criticism of the interagency process. By delegating
responsibility, control becomes more diffused, and the
policy effort is diluted. Moreover, the quest for resources
brings in another stakeholder, Congress, which has the
constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initiatives
and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defense. At
this point, a literal Pandora’s box of players and
expectations are opened. The numerous congressional
committees and their staffs have enormous impact on
national security and foreign policy.
The president begins to mobilize his government
immediately upon election. A transition team works closely
with the outgoing administration for the purpose of
continuity. The incoming president begins nominating his
cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate. Some
6,000 presidential level appointees will fill the subcabinet
positions, staff the White House and the NSC, take up
ambassadorships (serving ambassadors traditionally
submit their resignation when the occupant of the White
House changes), and move into second, third, and fourth
level positions in the executive departments. The purpose of
these nominations is to gain control and establish
accountability to the president and his agenda. In his first
administration, Clinton faced problems associated with
never finishing the staffing of his government.
Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of new
talent, at times inexperienced and equipped with new
predispositions about national security, at the top echelons
of American government every time the part that controls
the White House changes. Continuity of government resides
in the non-partisan professionals of the federal civil service,
the diplomatic service, the military, and the intelligence
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community. The transition to a new administration is a
period of great anticipation about the direction of policy.
Consequently, the entire interagency produces transition
papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and to also
protect the institutional interests of the various
departments from unfriendly encroachment.
The first months of a new administration are a period of
learning. Newly appointed people must familiarize
themselves with the structure and process of policymaking.
This necessity invariably leads to a trial-and-error
atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle,
think tanks and the foreign policy and defense communities
write papers recommending specific policies. These help to
inform the new administration about the central
commitments of U.S. policy and provide opportunities for
departments and agencies to define institutional turf and
stake a claim to resources. The administration itself will
also mandate policy reviews (Presidential Review
Directives) that eventually produce new guidance for policy.
Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines are
other ways in which the incoming administration
establishes its identity. The State of the Union message is
one of the preeminent sources of presidential activism that
engages the interagency. The congressionally-mandated
National Security Strategy (NSS) document, which bears
the president’s signature and is supposed to be produced
annually, is also eagerly awaited (though not with equal
intensity across departments) as an indicator of an
administration’s direction in national security and foreign
policy. The NSS is eagerly awaited for another reason as
well. It is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” by the
American government to changing global realities and
responsibilities. It expresses strategic vision—what the
United States will stand for in the world, what the
administration’s priorities are, and how the diplomatic,
economic, and military instruments of national power will
be arrayed.
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Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also
serves to provide direction to the interagency system to
understand the president’s agenda and priorities and
develops a common language that gives coherence to policy.
It is also more than a strategic document. It is political,
because it is designed to enhance presidential authority in
order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to
document as well as drive policy initiatives, especially in
election years.
The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The
Bush administration expanded it by including more
regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, and
transnational issues and the environment. The Clinton
document of 1994 proposed “engagement and enlargement,”
promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security
through strength. The 1995 version added criteria for
judging when and how military forces would be used. By
1997, the integrating concepts of “shape,” “prepare,” and
“respond” came into prominence. To the core objectives of
enhancing security and promoting prosperity and
democracy were added fighting terrorism, international
crime and drug trafficking, and managing the international
financial crisis. Homeland defense against the threat of
mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed
the agenda in 1997.
Another instrument used by the Clinton team is the
aforementioned Presidential Decision Directive process.
Previous administrations have titled these documents
differently, such as Bush’s National Security Decision
Directive. The two Clinton administrations produced 71
PDDs by February 2000 (Bush, 79 National Security
Directives; Reagan, 325 National Security Decision
Memoranda; Carter, 63 presidential Directives;
Nixon-Ford, 348 National Security Decision Memoranda;
and Kennedy-Johnson, 372 National Security Action
Memoranda). Each administration attempts to use these
documents to put its own stamp on national security and
foreign policy, though there is great continuity with
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previous administrations. Thus, whereas Reagan
emphasized restoring the preeminence of American
military power and rolling back the “evil empire,” Clinton
focused on open trade, democratization, conflict resolution,
humanitarian assistance, fighting drug trafficking and
consumption, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation.
PDDs are macro-level documents, normally classified,
that take much deliberate planning to develop. They result
from intensive interaction among the agencies. The process
begins with a Presidential Review Directive, which tasks
the relevant agencies to develop a new policy based on broad
guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14 for
counternarcotics, the “Andean Strategy” of November 1993,
emphasized greater balance between supply and demand
strategies. PDD 25, “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral
Peace Operations” (May 1994), set down an elaborate set of
guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations. It
became so effective that the United Nations adopted it for
planning its own peace operations, an excellent example of
the international transfer of American purposeful
adaptation.
An instructive example of the Clinton administration’s
application of one of its Directives is PDD 21 which took
effect on December 27, 1993. This document emphasized
democracy promotion and free trade in Latin America. It
was addressed to more than twenty departments and
agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, United States Trade
Representative, Representative of the United States to the
United Nations, Chief of Staff to the president, Assistant to
the president for National Security Affairs, Director of
Central Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Economic
Advisors, Assistant to the president for National Economic
Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator
of the Agency for International Development, Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Administrator of
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the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of the
United States Information Agency.
The point of listing departments and agencies is to
identify the interagency stakeholders relating to one
regional policy. Inevitably, the size of the stake will vary
greatly among regions and issues. The stakeholders are
related by functional interdependence; they have
different resources, personnel, and expertise that must be
integrated in order for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule
of the interagency that no national security or
international affairs issue can be resolved by one
agency alone. For example, the Department of Defense
needs the diplomatic process that the Department of State
masters in order to deploy forces abroad, build coalitions,
negotiate solutions to conflicts, conduct noncombatant
evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in difficult
circumstances abroad, and administer security assistance.
The Department of State in turn depends on the logistical
capabilities of Defense to deploy personnel and materials
abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support
military-to-military contacts, and give substance to
alliances and defense relationships. The Office of National
Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet position, must rely on a
range of agencies to reduce the supply abroad and
consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require
intelligence input to make sound decisions.
Ideally in response to the promulgation of a PDD, all
agencies will energize their staffs and develop the elements
that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and
seldom creates optimum results, in part because of
competing priorities of policymakers, limited time,
constrained resources, and congressional input. For
example, with respect to U.S. Latin American policy, the
Haiti crisis of 1992-1994 and congressional passage of the
North America Free Trade Act consumed most of the kinetic
energy of the Clinton Administration’s NSC staff and the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of
State during 1993-94.
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In theory, once the policy elements are put together and
costs are calculated, they are submitted to Congress for
approval and funding, without which policy is merely a
collection of words of expressions of hope. The reality,
however, is that a PDD is not a permanent guide to the
actions of agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. It can be
overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, and by
the departure of senior officials who had the stakes, the
personal relationships, the know how, and the institutional
memory to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, Navy
Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy and
Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one cannot be sure
about whether a PDD from a previous administration is still
in force because for security reasons no consolidated list of
these documents is maintained. Moreover, PDDs and other
presidential documents are removed to presidential
libraries and archives when a new president takes over. A
senior Defense Department official states that PDDs are
rarely referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken
by events soon after publication, and are rarely updated. In
this respect the interagency evaluation of PDD 56’s
effectiveness, published in May 1997, is instructive: “PDD
56 no longer has senior level ownership. The Assistant
Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC
officials who initiated the document have moved on to new
positions.”10
PDD 56: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?
PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on
Managing Complex Contingency Operations, is perhaps the
mother of all modern PDDs. It is useful to examine PDD 56
as an example of an interagency product and as a tool
intended to influence the very process itself. PDDs normally
deal with the external world of foreign policy and national
security. PDD 56 is radically different, for it goes beyond
that and attempts to generate a cultural revolution in the
way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes to deal
with these issues. It is a superb example of codifying lessons
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of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by American
civilian and military officials in the aftermath of
problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), Somalia
(1992-1994), and Haiti (1994-1995).11 The intent was to
institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and
planning tools to achieve U.S. Government unity of effort in
complex contingency operations. It tried to institutionalize
five mechanisms and planning tools:
1. An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies
Committee (Assistant Secretaries),
2. An integrated, interagency Political-Military
Implementation Plan,
3. Interagency Rehearsal,
4. Interagency After-Action Review,
5. Training.
The philosophy behind the document is that interagency
planning can make or break an operation. Moreover, early
involvement in planning can accelerate contributions from
civilian agencies that are normally culturally impeded from
strategic and operational planning.12 PDD 56 was applied
extensively and adapted to new contingencies, such as
Eastern Slavonia (1995-1998), Bosnia from 1995,
Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea
conflict since 1998, and the Kosovo contingency of 1998-99.
The March 1999 review commented:
PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package of
complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuance in
1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three major
issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.

It recommended:
1. greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56,
2. more flexible and less detailed political-military
planning, and
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3. dedicated training resources and greater outreach.
Imbedded in the three recommendations are the
recurring problems of the interagency: the need for decisive
authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting approaches
and institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus
military) with respect to planning, and the lack of incentives
across the government to create professionals expert in
interagency work. PDD 56 is a noble effort to promote
greater effectiveness. It may yet bear fruit, if its philosophy
of integrated planning and outreach to the interagency
takes root. It is encouraging that, in late 1999, the PDD 56
planning requirement became an annex to contingency
plans.
The Operational Level of the Interagency Process:
Ambassador, Country Team and Regional Military
Commanders.
Up to this point this chapter has discussed the national
strategic level of the interagency process, that is, what
occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process
spans three levels: the national strategic, the operational,
and the tactical. In the field, policy is implemented by
ambassadors and their country teams, often working with
the regional unified commanders. The embassy country
team is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency
system, with which it is in constant communication. At the
country team, the rubber literally meets the road of
interagency implementation. Ambassadors and
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) rely on each other to promote
policies that will enhance American interests in a country
and region. CINCs have large staffs and awesome resources
compared to the small staffs and resources of ambassadors.
Moreover, their functions are different. The ambassador
cultivates ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications
through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she promotes
understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes American
culture and business, and is responsible for American
citizens in that country. The ambassador is the personal
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emissary of the president, who writes the ambassador’s
formal letter of instruction.
The letter charges the ambassador,
to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and
supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of country),
except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military
commander . . . .

There is enough ambiguity in the mandate to require both
ambassador and CINC to use common sense and, in a
non-bureaucratic way, work out issues of command and
control over U.S. military personnel in the country. In effect
control is shared, with the ambassador having policy control
and the CINC having control over day-to-day operations. It
is essential that both work closely together to ensure that
military operations meet the objectives of U.S. policy.
This is particularly the case in military operations other
than war. Before and during noncombatant evacuations,
peace operations, exercises, disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance, such cooperation will be
imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy,
force, and preparation required. A successful U.S. policy
effort requires a carefully calibrated combination of
diplomatic and military pressure, with economic
inducements added. The security assistance officer at the
embassy (usually the commander of the Military Advisory
Group) can facilitate communication and help to bridge the
policy and operational distance between the ambassador
and the CINC. So can State’s Political Advisor to the CINC,
a senior ranking foreign service officer whose function is to
provide the diplomatic and foreign policy perspective on
military operations. 13 The personal and professional
relationship between the Political Advisor and the CINC is
the key to success.
The CINC represents the coercive capacity of American
power through a chain of command that goes to the
president. He and his sizable staff command the operational
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tempo, deployments, readiness, exercises, and training of
divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings—resources,
language, and culture that are the opposite of the art of
diplomacy. CINCs also have a regional perspective,
strategies, and programs while ambassadors are focused on
advancing the interests of the United States in one country.
Since all military activities have diplomatic impact, it is
necessary that the CINC work harmoniously with the
ambassador in order to achieve common purpose.
Ambassador and CINC interests intersect at the Military
Advisory Group (MAAG, also called Military Liaison Office,
Office of Defense Coordination) level. The commander of the
MAAG works for both the ambassador and the CINC.
In the spectrum from peace to crisis to war, the
ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the lower end
of the spectrum. As the situation moves toward war, the
CINC assumes greater authority and influence. Haiti 1994
is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador
to CINC takes place. The American ambassador in
Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of U.S. policy
until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces
arrived in September of that year. Once the military phase
was completed, policy control reverted to Swing, thus
restoring the normal pattern of military subordination to
civilian authority. In the gray area of military operations
other than war, or in what is called an “immature” military
theater such as Latin America, disputes can arise between
ambassadors and CINCs about jurisdiction over U.S.
military personnel in the country. The most illustrative was
in 1994 between CINC of the U.S. Southern Command
General Barry McCaffrey, and U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia
Charles R. Bowers and Colombia Morris D. Busby. The
dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the
Secretaries of State and Defense. 14 This situation
demonstrates very clearly that ambassadors and CINCs
must work closely together to coordinate U.S. military
activities.
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The Continuing Problems of the Interagency
Process.
The tensions generated by cultural differences and
jealousy over turf will always be part of the interagency
process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate
the national security system, though there are other
cultures and even subcultures. The former uses words to
solve problems while the latter uses force. Cultural
differences are large but communicating across them is
possible.15 Table 1 compares the cultures of military officers
and diplomats.
The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking is
lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge.
As long as personalities are involved who work well together
and have leadership support in the NSC, interagency efforts
will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable. The
world situation does not wait for the proper alignment of the
planets in Washington. There is too much diffusion of policy
control. This is why it is time to implement an NSC-centric
national security system, with appropriate adjustments
that align budget authority with policy responsibility. This
system would consolidate in the NSC the functions now
performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State and the
strategic planning functions done at Defense. Such
reorganization recognizes the reality that the White House
is where an integrated approach to national security
planning must take place.
Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The
Department of State, which has the responsibility to
conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Indeed, the
military has more money to conduct diplomacy. The State
Department’s diplomats may have the best words in town,
in terms of speaking and writing skills, and superb
knowledge of foreign countries and foreign affairs, but it is a
very small organization that has been getting smaller
budget allocations from Congress in recent years. The corps
of foreign service officers equates in number to about an
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Military Officers
Mission: prepare for and fight war
Training is a major activity, important
for units and individuals
Extensive training for episodic,
undesired events
Uncomfortable with ambiguity

Foreign Service Officers
Mission: conduct diplomacy
Training is not a significant activity,
not important either for units or
individuals
Little formal training, learning by
experience in doing desired activities
(negotiating, reporting)

Plans and planning--both general and
detailed--are important core activities

Comfortable with ambiguity
Plan in general terms to achieve
objectives but value flexibility and
innovation

Doctrine: important

Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign
policy
Focused on discrete events and
activities with plans, objectives,
courses of action, endstates
Infrequent real-world contact with
opponents or partners in active war
fighting
Officer corps commands significant
numbers of NCOs and enlisted
personnel
NCOs and enlisted personnel perform
many core functions (war fighting)
Leadership: career professional
military officers (with the military
services and in operations)
All aspects of peace operations,
including civilian/diplomatic,
becoming more important
Writing and written word less
important, physical actions more
important
Teamwork and management skills are
rewarded, interpersonal skills
important internally
Accustomed to applying large
resources, manpower, equipment, and
money to achieve goals

Focused on all aspects of foreign policy
Focused on on-going processes without
expectation of an “endstate”
Day-to-day real-world contact with
partners and opponents in active
diplomacy
Officers supervise only other officers in
core (political and economic) activities
Only officers engage in core activity
(diplomacy)
Leadership: a mix of politicians,
academics, policy wonks, and career
Foreign Service professionals at
headquarters and in field
All aspects of peace operations,
including military, becoming more
important
Writing and written word very
important. Used extensively in conduct
of diplomacy
Individual achievement and innovative
ideas rewarded, interpersonal skills
important externally
Accustomed to applying meager
resources to achieve goals

Adapted from Robert Johnson, Foreign Service Officer, “Teaching Notes,” Department of
National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College.

Comparing Military Officers and Foreign
Service Officers.
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Army brigade (a typical brigade is about 3,600). The
Department of State’s technology is primitive and
professional development of the kind that the military does
is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a
strong domestic constituency of support.
The resource barons, those with people, money,
technical expertise, and equipment reside in the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the military services.
Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is
constantly being asked to provide resources for
nation-building purposes in such places as Haiti and
Panama. It is tempting to reach out to DoD because it is the
only institution with an expeditionary capability and
fungible resources and expertise. It can get there quickly,
show the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stabilize a
situation, and create an environment secure enough for
other agencies to operate. Other baronies exist, of course,
including the Agency for International Development, the
intelligence community, the Departments of Justice and
Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of
the U.S. Government do not promote professionalization and reward service in interagency jobs. What
is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian and
military cadres that are experts in interagency policy
coordination, integration, and operations. Some of this
already takes place. Military officers are assigned to various
departments (for example, 35 officers from all services work
in the regional and functional bureaus of the Department of
State). Likewise, diplomats are allocated to military and
civilian agencies, such as Political Advisors at the regional
unified commands, the Special Operations Command, to
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, various key
positions in the Pentagon, and the war colleges. These
programs must be expanded. There ought to be incentives
for national security professionalism, as there are for
service and joint activities. For civilians, including
employees of the Department of State, something akin to
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the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act for jointness in the military
is needed. Promotions should be based not only on
performance at Foggy Bottom and in embassies abroad, but
on mandatory interagency tours as well. Similarly,
professional development incentives should apply to civil
servants who work in the national security arena.
Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require
significant changes in personnel systems and career
tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997,
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century, recommended creating “an interagency cadre of
professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose
purpose would be to staff key positions in the national
security structures.”16 The Report also recommended a
national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, military,
and foreign students. The Defense Leadership and
Management Program of the Department of Defense, a
Master’s level initiative in national security studies for
civilian personnel, is an important step in this direction.
Implications for the Military Professional.
The changing strategic environment has critical
implications for career military professionals. The nature of
future warfare is likely to be more military operations other
than war, requiring more mobile, flexible, and light forces.
Future war will also require a more intellectual military
officer, one who understands the imperative of having to
work with the panoply of civilian agencies, non-government
organizations, the national and international media, and
with foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of strategy
that American forces will rarely fight alone again; they will
do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity
of the people, the armed forces, and the government now
encompasses the global community. The implications are
clear; the military officer will have to develop greater
diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understanding of

187

international affairs, greater facility in foreign languages,
and more than a passing acquaintance with economics.
Tomorrow’s warrior will likely work with civilian
counterparts across a spectrum of activities short of war.
These include: strategic planning and budgeting,
humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counter
narcotics, counter terrorism, security assistance,
environmental security, human rights, democratization,
civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war
planning and termination strategy, command and control of
forces, continuity of government, post-conflict
reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management,
overseas basing, alliances, non-combatant evacuations, and
homeland defense.
The future officer will also need greater appreciation of
the institutional diversity and complexity of government,
because of the need to advise a diversity of civilians on the
utility of military power in complex contingencies that are
neither peace nor war, as Americans are accustomed to
think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem with
civilian agencies and non-government organizations
unaccustomed to command systems and deliberate
planning, and who often do not understand the limits of
military power.17 Lastly, instruction on the interagency
system and process should be mandatory for civilians and
military alike. It must have a sound theoretical foundation
in national security decisionmaking, strategic planning,
and organizational behavior, expanded by sophisticated
case studies of relevant historical experiences.
What attributes should the military officer bring? Above
all, the ability to think in terms of all the instruments of
national power and respect for the functions and cultures of
diverse departments and agencies. Communication skills
are paramount. The effective interagency player will have
to write and speak well. He or she will be bilingual, able to
function in military as well as civilian English.
Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of interagency
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communication. The military briefing, though an excellent
vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of information in
formatted style, is not acceptable. One must be less
conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the
representative around a table. A person of lower rank may
be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience,
endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity will help. The
ability to “stay in your box” and articulate the perspective of
your department will be respected. The capacity to
anticipate issues, to consider the second and third order
effects from the national level down to the country team and
theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency
requires diplomatic and negotiating skills, the ability to
network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic
politics and language.18
The most evolved democracy in the world has the most
cumbersome national security decisionmaking process in
the world. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers
imposed for democratic accountability. But some of the
inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with
its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused resources,
and the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy from
war and military power. Major structural changes must be
made in the interagency system in order to harness
intelligently human talent and resources. It is time to move
away from a system designed for the problems of 1947
toward one that is appropriate to the challenges of the next
century.
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U.S. Departments and Agencies Involved in
Foreign Affairs
White House
National Security Council
Office of the Special Trade Representative
Office of National Drug Control Policy
National Economic Council
Department of Defense
Office of Secretary of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines
On-Site Inspective Agency
Department of Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
United States Customs Service
Secret Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Department of Agriculture
Foreign Agricultural Service
Department of Commerce
Foreign Commercial Service
Travel and Tourism Administration
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency
National Marine Fisheries Service
International Trade Admininistration
Trade Commision
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Border Patrol
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Marshals Service
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
National Central Bureau--International
Criminal Police Organization
Department of Transportation
Coast Guard
Federal Aviation Administration
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Department of Energy
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
Department of Labor
Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs
Department of State
U.S. Foreign Service
United States Information Agency
Agency for International Development
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Department of Health & Human Services
Social Security Administration
Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Department of the Interior
Assistant Secretary for Territorial & Intl Affairs
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Independent Agencies
Central Intelligence Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Export Import Bank
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
National Science Foundation
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Panama Canal Commission
Peace Corps
U.S. Postal Service
Congress
General Accounting Office
(Those with personnel stationed overseas are indicated in bold. These
personnel are stationed at U.S. embassies, consulates, missions, U.S.
military headquarters, U.S. military bases, multilateral organizations
and deployed in peacekeeping and other roles.)
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CHAPTER 8
IMPROVING NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISIONMAKING
Constantine Menges
As we look at the issue of improving national security
decisionmaking, it is important to take a moment to
recognize that overall, since the end of World War II, the
United States has been extremely successful in its national
security policy. The most important example of that success
is the fact that the Soviet Union, despite its enormous
military strength, its range of instruments and its cunning,
was in fact contained and deterred from launching either a
nuclear or a conventional war and that, in time, the Soviet
Union unraveled peacefully. Another example of America’s
enormous success has been the democratic reconstruction
after World War II of Germany, Italy, Austria, and Japan.
This was an exceptional act of statesmanship on the part of
the United States which made it possible for the men and
women in those countries to establish stable democratic
political systems. In fact, the history of the last 50 years
illustrates clearly a fundamental axiom of international
politics, which is that the political character of governments
is most important in determining the foreign policy of
states.
Turning to the topic—improving national security
decisionmakingI shall provide a few perspectives, offer a
few examples of problems that have arisen over the last
decades, briefly analyze the reasons for these problems, and
conclude with some suggestions for improving the
decisionmaking process.
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Perspectives.
My former colleague, Dr. Carnes Lord, has written an
excellent book on this issue, and I agree with him that the
president is at the center of decisionmaking. The president
has not only the right but also the duty to lead in national
security decisionmaking since the Constitution specifies
that it is his fundamental task to assure the “common
defense”. All of the executive branch directly work for the
president whom we elect. We understand that the president
has essentially four full time jobs: he is the symbolic leader
of our country, the leader for domestic policy, the leader for
national security policy, and the leader of his political party.
So presidents are always very, very busy and very
challenged to use their time and authority to greatest effect.
Furthermore, each member of the president’s cabinet is
also charged with a range of responsibilities that are
exceptionally demanding. First, he or she has to implement
the policies that have already been decided upon. Second,
each cabinet member has to manage his or her organization
while at the same time managing relations with Congress.
Third, those managing institutions involved in foreign
policy making have to develop relations with their
counterparts among our allies and in other key countries.
This does not leave a lot of time for the fourth task that is, in
a sense, written in invisible ink: to look to the future in
prudent anticipation of new problems, issues, and
opportunities.
It is also worth emphasizing that there is something
about all issues of national security decisionmaking that is
somewhat different from other domains of policy. The
difference is that conflicting views and judgments among
the president’s advisers are an intrinsic aspect of national
security decisionmaking. Different individuals, different
organizations are going to approach the same problem from
different perspectives. Often they will have different
understandings about the current facts and trends. But the
most important reason for conflict is that views about
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actions taken or not taken today, and about their effects in
the future, are always matters of judgment—there is
usually no way of proving the validity of one or another
policy choice in advance.
This does not mean that foreign policy judgments are
derived from guess work, or that the opinion of an individual
who has not thought deeply about a particular situation is
equal to the opinion of one who has spent his or her
professional career dealing with similar issues. But it does
mean that, in the end, conflict—both within and among the
participants—is intrinsic to national security
decisionmaking. Under these circumstances, the issue
always is: will the conflict be fair and open and honorable, or
will it be characterized by manipulation and deception,
perhaps including the manipulation of the president?
My 1988 book, Inside the National Security Council, was
written because, in my experience as a national security
advisor to the president, I witnessed important members of
the Executive branch who sought to substitute their foreign
policy views for the decisions made by the president and
who also sought to manipulate the decisions made by the
president. Perhaps this was also part of the reason why Dr.
Lord wrote his book. We both saw a great deal of deception
and manipulation, which only compounded the intrinsic
challenges to good decisionmaking.
National security issues can be divided into four types.
The first are issues relating to ongoing policy matters—the
annual budgets for defense, relations with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) governments, etc.
These are important issues, but they are regularized and in
a sense predictable. The second type are issues relating to
the use of force. Some well-known examples are: Berlin,
1948; Korea, 1950; Cuba, 1962; Iran, 1979; Panama, 1989;
Iraq, 1990; and Kosovo, 1999. I would suggest that, on
issues relating to the use of force, there is a regularized
process that more or less works when the issue gets to the
top and is acted upon. The third kind of issue relates to
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major policy shifts, where there is a reconsideration of
policies which have been established toward major
countries (Russia, China) or on major issues (national
missile defense). These are issues involving large
consequences, where there tends to be a policy that has been
settled and perpetuated year after year. Nonetheless, there
are times when there is a need to consider changing these
policies. The fourth type of issue involves emerging threats
or opportunities that may require a fundamental
reassessment of U.S. interests and goals.
Among the four types of issues listed above, issues
involving major policy shifts as well as issues involving
emerging threats or opportunities are the two areas where
change in the decisionmaking process is most needed. Some
examples will help to illustrate this view.
Examples.
The first example is from 1968 when I was at the RAND
Corporation. At that time, one could look at the long
established right wing dictatorships in Spain and Portugal
and say that the authoritarian rulers were likely to leave in
the next few years because of their advanced age. It was also
clear that when these leaders passed away there would be
an opportunity for democratically inclined individuals in
these countries to press for political democracy. At the same
time, however, there would also be an opportunity for the
clandestine but well-organized Communist parties in these
countries to move those countries into the Communist
sphere. It was also reasonable to expect that the Soviet
Union would try to make this happen.
My suggestion in 1968 was that in the few remaining
years before the crisis hit, the West should begin to identify,
analyze, and assess which groups and individuals favored
democracy, and then use appropriate means to encourage
and help them. There were institutions in Europe,
especially in Germany, that could have been helpful in
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doing this. Unfortunately, in Washington, DC, there was no
interest and no proactive strategy.
What happened? What happened is illustrated by the
revelation of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director William Colby, whom I respect very much. In his
memoirs, Colby notes that in 1974 the CIA closed its station
in Lisbon, Portugal to save two job slots because there was a
temporary government freeze or job reduction at the time.
Concurrently, the Soviet Union worked to radicalize a small
element of the Portuguese military which staged a coup in
1974. The Soviet Union conducted with skill a major covert
operation in support of the Portuguese Communist Party,
flying the Portuguese Communist Party leader back home
from Moscow. The result was that in a matter of months,
Portugal began to move rapidly into the Communist orbit. If
Portugal had become communist in 1974-1975, it is my
judgment that Spain, following Franco’s death in 1975,
could well have followed and NATO could have been faced
with two new Warsaw Pact members, with populations
totaling 35 million people, on its western border. Given
Soviet assertiveness in the 1970s, its military buildup, its
success in helping 11 new pro-Soviet regimes take power
(including Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua) such a
defeat in Western Europe could have had very negative
consequences. Fortunately, the situation was turned
around in time, but it took quite a bit of last-minute effort. If
it had not been turned around, it could have been an
extremely dangerous situation.
In the late 1970s, a destabilization process began in Iran.
In this case, there were essentially three competing groups.
A group of moderates who wanted constitutional
government, radical Islamic elements, and the Iranian
Communist Party and allied groups supported, as it had
been in 1944 and again in 1953, by the Soviet Union. For
many months in 1977 and 1978, I urged the Carter
administration to give serious attention to the events in
Iran and I proposed a strategy of political preventive action
designed to help the Iranian moderates in coalition with the
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military to move toward a constitutional transition,
perhaps under a constitutional monarchy as in Spain.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Government’s response to this
was—no time, no interest, and no action—until the final
weeks when it was too late. And here we are, more than 20
years later, with a regime in Iran that hopefully might
become more moderate, but one that remains a serious
threat to the United States and its allies and is seeking
weapons of mass destruction. I believe that this situation
could have been prevented if there had been timely action,
but none was taken.
Another example of missed opportunities has been
Russia since 1992. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s ascent to power, the
United States was presented with an enormous opportunity
to help encourage the building of genuinely democratic
parties, democratic labor unions, and democratic
institutional infrastructure that could have supported both
the democratic transition process and the efforts led by
Senators Samuel Nunn and Richard Lugar to radically
reduce the Russian nuclear threat. The remarkable thing
about the Russian case is that, in spite of the fact that
presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton publicly espoused
these goals, and in spite of the fact that the United States
invested more than 25 billion dollars in direct assistance to
the former Soviet Union, and more than 140 billion dollars
in overall assistance to the democracies, very little was done
to help build democratic political parties and trade unions.
In October 1992, the U.S. Congress enacted the Freedom
Support Act, proposed by President Bush, which provided
billions in assistance for post-Communist Russia. Taking
office in January 1993, these funds were available to
President Clinton, but he did not take hold of this issue and
really lead national policy, as President Harry S. Truman
had done with the Marshall Plan. There was a large but
ineffectual effort to help the Russian people succeed in their
aspirations for an effective democratic transition. This was
probably the highest national security priority of the United
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States during the 1990s in light of the fact that Russia, with
its remaining 6,000 operational strategic nuclear missiles
continues to pose such a potential military threat and
because the political character of the regime in Moscow
makes such an enormous difference for the world.
Another example that the national security
decisionmaking system is regrettably flawed in the domain
of anticipating events is the tragedy of former Yugoslavia
during the early 1990s. In the spring of 1991, right after the
end of the Gulf War, there was an attempt to inform the
Executive branch leadership that there was a high
probability of war in Yugoslavia, and that this might be the
time for preventive diplomacy. As we now know, preventive
diplomacy did not occur. In fact, the U.S. Secretary of State
flew to Yugoslavia the day before the war began—a little
late.
Likewise, in 1993 after 2 years of war and enormous
suffering, a plan was presented to two members of the
Clinton foreign policy cabinet, to help those in Serbia and
other parts of the former Yugoslavia who wanted
democracy: to help them to organize; to help them to set up
broadcasting facilities; to help them end the dictatorship of
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic through political
means by providing political assistance, as the United
States knows how to do and has done in the past. This was
not done in 1993 or for years thereafter. We know the
consequences have included much more suffering,
bloodshed, displacement of populations in this region and,
in 1999, the very real risk of a major confrontation with
Russia (and perhaps its “strategic partner” China) following
the NATO attacks against Serbian forces.
Last, a current example: starting in the fall of 1998, it
was suggested to senior officials in the Clinton
administration that Colonel Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, a
candidate for the presidency of that country, would in all
likelihood establish a radical military based dictatorship
that would be allied with the Castro regime, the communist
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guerillas in Colombia, and other anti-democratic groups in
Latin America. The strategic consequence for the United
States could be highly negative because Colonel Chavez
would control approximately two to three billion dollars
annually in oil revenues which would give him the ability to
finance his radical activities including destabilizing appeals
to elements of the military in other Latin American
countries and possible geopolitical cooperation with
anti-U.S. oil producers such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
This assessment was based upon the fact that Colonel
Chavez had been a leftist radical ever since his days as a
military academy student, had for years attempted to
organize a radical movement within the Venezuelan
military, had in 1992 allied with the small Castro-supported
Venezuelan armed Communist movements and elements of
the Venezuelan military to attempt a coup against a
democratically elected president, and had worked closely
with the Colombian Communist guerillas after he received
amnesty in 1995. The judgment, which was repeated to
senior U.S. government officials in February and March
1999 (a month before this analysis was presented) was that
as President of Venezuela, Chavez would use
pseudo-constitutional means and disguised coercion to
establish his de facto dictatorship but would seek to remain
on rhetorically good terms with the United States, continue
as a major foreign oil supplier to the United States, and
would not interfere with U.S. and other foreign business
operations in Venezuela. Essentially, Chavez would use the
Chinese approach of deriving economic benefits from the
United States and other democracies while pursuing those
internal and international policies he decided upon.
Given Venezuela’s 40 years as a political democracy and
the existence of two strong democratic political parties,
independent labor unions, media, and the institutions of
civil society, the proposal made to the U.S. Government was
that encouragement should be given to the democratic
parties of Venezuela—discredited by poor performance and
some corruption—to choose new leadership and unite to
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compete in the presidential election and thereafter use the
political and other institutions of Venezuela to restrain and
counter the authoritarian tendencies and actions of Colonel
Chavez. It was also proposed that under the terms of a
unanimous 1991 Organization of American States decision,
all member governments would work together to preserve
democracy if threatened from within by any member
country, and that the United States would work discreetly
to support a coalition of Latin American democracies to help
the democratic movement in Venezuela and closely monitor
the negative actions of Colonel Chavez. The U.S.
Government decided to take no action, and the coming
months and years will reveal how seriously this may
threaten U.S. national security interests.
Analysis.
What explains a frequent pattern where the national
security decisionmaking institutions, staffed by individuals
who are well meaning, experienced, and intelligent, do not
take the time to examine seriously emerging potential
future threats?
The following are four possible explanations. First is
what I call the paradox of foresight. This involves the irony
that, when a problem is still small enough to be dealt with
preventively it is usually too small to generate interest, let
alone consensus, at any level in the national
decisionmaking process. Second, there is the intrinsic
unprovability of judgments about future opportunities or
threats. The present is the present, but the future is
conjectural. Most people tend to view the future as a
continuation of the present, and discontinuities are always
seen as somewhat anomalous and unlikely. This is a natural
reflex, and usually correct.
Third, most emerging national security problems are
complex, multifaceted, and very political in nature. This
means that they do not fall easily within any one agency’s
jurisdiction. The Department of State always seeks to
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control all aspects of foreign policy, but in fact it prefers to
conduct diplomacy—that is, negotiate with governments.
The Department of Defense is very focused on its primary
functions of deterring serious threats, preparing to prevail
in nuclear and conventional wars, and managing current
deployments and ongoing operations. Defense tends not to
be looking for new problems and issues. The CIA, which has
the primary responsibility for looking ahead, is at times
limited by the “mindset” problem of prevailing consensus
thinking within the organization, as well as by its
reluctance to bring unproven and therefore low probability
contingencies to the attention of policymakers. As an
organization, it is also often reluctant to move toward new
tasks and responsibilities in direct political action, given the
problems that it confronts with congressional oversight and
public criticism when there are visible setbacks.
A fourth reality that undermines the ability of
decisionmakers to respond to new threats and opportunities
has to do with the indispensability of presidential
leadership in a situation when every president is faced with
immense demands on his attention and time.
Understandably, presidents are not looking for new
problems and issues. On the other hand, they do not want to
be surprised by events. President Jimmy Carter illustrated
this fact in a letter which he wrote to then CIA Director
Stansfield Turner (which, remarkably enough, was quoted
in the national media about an hour or two after it was sent).
To paraphrase, the handwritten note said: Dear Stan, I am
so disappointed that the CIA failed to alert me to the
problems in Iran and that now we face this enormous crisis.
When it comes to issues involving major policy shifts, all
of the problems that I have just mentioned apply, but they
are compounded by two other difficulties. The first is that
current policy obviously has its strong supporters both
within the government and outside the government.
Second, the risks of continuing a policy always seem to be
much less than the risks of changing it.
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Suggestions.
We now come to the question, how do we improve the
decisionmaking process? How do we move toward doing
better in the future? Let us start with the fact that, in the
post World War II era, the national security decisionmaking
process virtually always involves four organizations and
three different decisionmaking levels within the main
institutions. The National Security Council, Department of
State, Department of Defense, and the CIA are the four
principal organizations. The three decisionmaking levels
above the operational level are:
1. the interagency group at the assistant secretary level;
2. the undersecretary/deputy secretary level (often
called the senior interagency group); and
3. the National Security Council as the convening group
in which members of the cabinet and their key staff discuss
issues with the president.
If one studies all of the presidential administrations
since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947,
whatever the particular nomenclature, this is essentially
how things have worked. This system, in my view, is likely
to stay with us. The question then becomes—how does one
improve the system so that it performs more effectively?
My recommendation is that, to cope with emerging
potential threats and opportunities, the government should
establish a system of monthly interagency meetings at
which time would be set aside for discussion and analysis
relating to emerging threats and opportunities. This would
occur in two phases. First there would be an unclassified
discussion which would draw upon the skills and judgments
of experts who are not currently in the Executive branch but
who have concerns about specific major issues. This could
include individuals at universities, at the military analysis
and educational institutions, at the RAND Corporation,
Center for Naval Analysis, and so forth. There would need to
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be staff that winnows out suggestions, papers, published
articles and op-eds in order to have a reasonable range and
number of presentations, but the meeting should certainly
involve people who feel that current policy should be
changed.
Government participants would be the interagency
principals at both the assistant secretary and the
under/deputy secretary levels. They would listen to the
presentations, discuss them with the experts who have
presented, but not necessarily offer their views.
Immediately following (or perhaps a week or so later), there
should be a classified meeting of the principals at the
assistant and under/deputy secretary level to discuss the
issues raised by the outside experts and to decide whether
any of these issues should lead to new analytic work within
the government or whether any should be brought to the
president at a National Security Council meeting. This
approach allows the government to reconsider the existing
consensus views by drawing upon the enormous wealth of
talent that exists in the countryinformed experts who are
not busy with the day-to-day activities of government.
When it comes to major policy shift issues, such as U.S.
policy toward Russia, China, or national missile defense, I
would recommend that these issues be reviewed in the same
way, no less than once every 6 months. Once again, the
review process should start at the interagency level and
then move up to the National Security Council level. And
once again, the system should be designed so that experts
are brought in from the outside to provide different
perspectives in the unclassified meeting. This is one way in
which the policy leaders within the U.S. Government could
obtain a wide range of opinions and advice in order to test
and stretch their own thinking. At the same time, the
system needs to be flexible enough to allow individuals in
the government to consult candidly with each other about
whether they want to move a particular issue up to the
presidential level.
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A last point is that, when we think about the
decisionmaking process, the key organization serving the
president needs to be the National Security Council staff,
which acts as the president’s eyes and ears in the Executive
branch. It is the group of individuals who do not have
day-to-day program management responsibilities; instead
they work directly for the president who is accountable to
the American people for the results of national security
policy.
The National Security Council staff has four intrinsic
responsibilities. First, to assure that the president has full
information to make the key decisions that need to be made,
and that the policy debate is fair, with all relevant agencies
having a fair hearing before the president. Second, to
monitor the implementation of decisions made by the
president (which are usually written in the form of national
security decision directives). Third, to coordinate the
political, economic, military, and intelligence aspects of the
U.S. policy. And fourth to provide information that helps the
president of the United States deal effectively with
emerging threats and opportunities and make major policy
changes when they are needed. Therefore the National
Security Council staff should serve as the custodian of the
two-stage process that I have outlined.
In order for the NSC staff to perform these functions
effectively for the president, the senior staff members for
each part of the world and for each major functional area
should be individuals who are independent of the existing
executive agencies. A Foreign Service Officer or a military
or CIA officer on a 1-year or 2-year assignment can make an
important contribution to the National Security Council
(NSC) staff. But he or she is going to be tied, to some extent,
to the perspectives of his or her agency which also will
decide on their promotions and future assignments. I
believe that the pattern that has grown out of having mostly
Foreign Service Officers staff the key positions in the NSC
essentially gives the president two Departments of State.
One Department of State may have much to contribute, but
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two is one too many for any president. The issue of the
independence of the senior NSC officials is very important
because every president depends on these individuals to
keep him in charge of foreign policy.
These suggested changes would not place an
unreasonable burden on the national security institutions.
The open meetings I am suggesting would be of no more
than two hours duration, perhaps ten times each year. If
they helped to prevent one major crisis over a three-year
period, this would have been time well spent. Obviously,
doing this would require a National Security Council staff
that is fair-minded, brings issues forward, and reaches out
to people with different points of view. This innovation
might well significantly improve the national security
decisionmaking process in the domains of policy change and
prudent foresight.
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CHAPTER 9
SERVANTS, SUPPLICANTS, OR SABOTEURS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNIFORMED OFFICER
AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICA’S
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
John Hillen
Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of
civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search
for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching the
right answers to the operating issues of military policy.
Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of
civil-military relations squander their resources and run
uncalculated risks.
Samuel Huntington
The Soldier and the State

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s)
1999 war against Serbia over Kosovo has been analyzed in
many different contexts. Much has been made over the
conflict’s implications for NATO’s future, transatlantic
relations in general, humanitarian intervention policy,
Balkan stability, and many other areas. But the way in
which Kosovo illuminated the contemporary angst over
America’s civil-military relations is worth highlighting. In
the end, more questions were raised than answered about
the role of the uniformed officer in the nation’s strategic
affairs. Kosovo showed that America has not yet found the
post-Cold War civil-military boundaries between dissent vs.
disloyalty, political identity vs. politicization, and advice vs.
interference.
When viewing Kosovo through a civil-military prism, an
inescapable irony becomes clear. Although Kosovo was a
war waged by a governing elite whose formative political
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experience was protesting American involvement in
Vietnam, the strategy was eerily similar. Like Vietnam, the
United States decided to use coercive force in Kosovo to
induce a change in the behavior of one party to an internal
conflict. Like Vietnam, U.S. military power was applied
incrementally—gradually escalating as it became obvious
that preceding actions were failing. Like Vietnam, there
was considerable ambiguity over how the military
pressure—even if “effectively” applied—could lead to a
sustainable political solution. Like Vietnam, few were sure
what “effective” meant, or how it could be measured.1 Like
Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were fairly united in their
early opposition to the president’s strategy. It appears that,
at least in the early stages of both conflicts, the main
difference between these episodes was that only in Kosovo
did the Joint Chiefs immediately disassemble in public by
leaking their displeasure to the press.2
The lessons of Vietnam were very much in the minds of
America’s military leaders at the start of the Kosovo
Operation. Indeed, the single most influential book among
senior military leaders in this country over the past several
years has been H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon
Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Lies That Led to Vietnam. In the book, McMaster brings
to light the way in which the Joint Chiefs accepted the
strategy of graduated pressure in Vietnam even though
they felt, from the very beginning, that the effort was fatally
flawed. McMaster concludes that President Johnson got
exactly the advice he wanted because he made clear to the
chiefs that he would accept only military advice that
conformed with his political agenda. The chiefs complied.
Only months before the start of the Kosovo operation
McMaster briefed the Joint Chiefs and the Commander’s in
Chief of the military’s regional commands. These men had
all been junior officers during Vietnam. He told them,
In telling the story of how and why decisions were made in the
period 1963 to 1965 that slowly transformed our commitment
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[in Vietnam] from an advisory and support effort into an
American War, I found that the nature of the civil-military
relationship prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff from providing
their best military advice to the National Command
Authority. Indeed, an insidious relationship between the
nation’s top civilian and military officials rendered President
Lyndon Johnson’s Administration incapable of dealing
effectively with the complexity of the situation in Vietnam.3

It was with this denouement in mind that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff confronted Kosovo. For military planners, Kosovo
meant ambiguous, contradictory, and unattainable goals,
self-imposed constraints designed to fit political agendas,
and the incremental and indecisive application of force. The
conflict was waged in a way that was so fundamentally at
odds with contemporary military thinking that the
Pentagon was quite happy to have the press attach
responsibility directly to the Secretary of State—labeling it
“Madeleine’s War.” One can only speculate whether the
Joint Chiefs were keeping in mind the regrets of the
Vietnam era’s “five silent men” when they sent a clear public
message to the President in the first weeks of the campaign:
“If this fails, we are not going down with you.”
Was this the real civil-military lesson of Vietnam? That
the role of senior uniformed military officers is to give the
President their honest military advice, and upon it not
being taken, cover their reputations through the good
offices of the Washington Post? One would hope not. And yet
there is tremendous confusion among both
communities—political and military—about the
relationship between their respective leaders over matters
strategic. Much of the confusion stems from some recent
episodes that have pushed civil-military relations toward a
post-Cold War nadir. Observers are familiar with the
(sometimes thinly) veiled strain between an administration
whose political elite struggled to avoid service in Vietnam
and a military elite who fought there as junior officers.
Besides that, the relationship between Congress and the
senior military is particularly strained. The extraordinary
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timing of military actions against Iraq and
Sudan/Afghanistan in 1998 led many on the Hill to think
that the Joint Chiefs were complicit in “Wag the Dog”
strategies. Recent hearings have been marked by
acrimonious challenges to senior military leaders’
integrity.4 Many congressional leaders seem to privately
view the Joint Chiefs as obsequious executive branch
“yes-men” rather than objective leaders with the best
interests of the country and the entire government in mind.
To repair these views and bridge these gaps, the role of
the uniformed officer must be recast in the context of
America’s new civil-military environment. While Samuel
Huntington, S. E. Finer, Morris Janowitz, and others
provided early markers, today’s environment requires that
new thought be given to the same questions they sought to
answer in their time.5 The extraordinary changes in the
strategic environment and the domestic political scene have
rendered their classic works models rather than guides.
There is not the space here for a complete exposition of the
new civil-military environment and what is likely to shape
it over the next decades. It is helpful, however, to survey the
state of the debate about this environment and lay the
foundation for some recommendations about the role of the
uniformed officer in the future.
America’s Civil-Military Future: Crisis or
Transition?
Two schools of thought dominate the contemporary
debate over the civil-military present and future. One school
maintains that there is a crisis in civil-military relations.
There are four basic elements to this crisis.
The first sign of crisis is that the military is becoming
more outspoken on matters of strategy and policy—areas in
which the military is merely to advise civilian leaders before
executing their decisions.6 This school holds former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell in particular
disdain for his very public resistance to newly elected
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President Bill Clinton’s decisions regarding homosexuals
serving in the military and the possibility of an armed
intervention in Bosnia in 1993. Powell has since been
succeeded by a more pliant set of Chairmen appointed by
the Clinton administration, but adherents to this school of
thought still maintain that the problem has been
institutionalized. With the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the Chairman has received
a disproportionate amount of influence that could well lead
to challenges to civil authority.
The second element of crisis is the growing gap between
the military and civilian cultures in America.7 Those who
warn of this trend speak not only of a physical disconnect
between the military and society (due to a smaller
professional force serving an ever growing country) but of a
“nearly unbridgeable cultural divide.”8 The military and
society will not only have less contact with each other in the
future, they will develop diametrically opposing cultural
values. Adherents to these ideas maintain that this will lead
to an insular and resentful military that will hold a
deteriorating American society in contempt. Moreover, this
military will hold itself in too high a regard to be the humble
servant and protector of American society. These ideas have
captivated many public leaders. The Secretary of Defense,
among other top officials, has stated that “reconnecting the
military to society” is a top priority.
The third element is related to the first two in that a
separate crisis could develop from the growing divide
between military and civilian leadership. Increasingly, the
two communities are “raised” apart and do not share
formative experiences that might give them compatible
world views and values when they come to leadership
positions in their respective communities. Many observers
maintain that this is a long-term trend and not a
phenomenon particular to the Clinton Administration.
Finally, the fourth element of a continuing civil-military
crisis is the overt politicization of the uniformed military.
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Warnings here are painted against a somewhat idealized
backdrop of a professional military that was scrupulously
apolitical until the past 25 years. Adherents maintain that
since the 1970s, the uniformed military—especially the
officer corps—has become overwhelmingly and actively
Republican, conservative, and evangelically Christian.9 A
separate observation has been made about the politicization
of recently retired military officers whose endorsements are
sought by political leaders and who are then rewarded with
political spoils for their services.
As one might expect, there is a separate set of observers
(of whom I am one) who maintain that there is no
civil-military crisis. According to this group, what the
United States is experiencing is merely the pains of
transition due to changes in the political and strategic
landscape.
In response to the first “charge” of unreasonable military
dissent from civilian dictates, I would answer that
professional dissent is required at times, while disloyalty in
the execution of civilian orders can never be tolerated.
Despite the warnings of the crisis school of thought, there
has been no evidence of the latter—even in its smallest
form. In fact, the greater danger to the civil-military balance
comes from the opposite, when senior military leaders feel
obliged to be policy lap-dogs for civilian officials, or when
they work their dissent through disingenuous channels of
bureaucratic obfuscation and under-cutting. As McMaster
warned about Vietnam, the suppression of honest dissent
can accumulate with nefarious effect. In the best recent
defense of an active “voice” for senior military leaders, Sam
Sarkesian wrote,
Disagreements that arise among the military, the president,
and members of Congress should not be stifled, as was the case
during the Vietnam War, but should be aired honestly without
prejudice to the military’s obedience to, and implementation of,
civilian directives. Nor should the armed forces wait until a
debate occurs before presenting its perspective and objections to
a given policy line. Military professionals ought to be as free to
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make known their technical judgments as engineers,
scientists, or doctors without conjuring fears that they are
trying to escape civilian control. The alternative, after all, is to
perpetuate the timidity, extreme defensiveness, and fear of
criticism from the public and Congress that seems to pervade
the military today.10

Promoting such a role for the uniformed military will
undoubtedly cause friction—something that the senior
political and military officials seem determined to avoid in
the politically correct and thoroughly “spun” world in which
they operate. This sort of friction, however, is natural and
healthy in a democracy. Moreover, it is part and parcel of
America’s civil-military history—a successful tale in
general but one not without the friction that accompanies
constructive political engagement on the part of the
military. As General Matthew Ridgway warned in his
memoirs,
Civilian authorities must scrupulously respect the integrity,
the intellectual honesty, of its officer corps. Any effort to force
unanimity of view, to compel adherence to some
politico-military “party line” against the honestly expressed
views of responsible officers . . . is a pernicious practice which
jeopardizes rather than protects the integrity of the military
profession.11

I will not dwell on the second “charge” of the crisis school,
as I have written on it elsewhere.12 It is worth noting here
however that the three principal tenets of this charge are all
eminently disputable. First, while there is a growing gap
between the military and society, it is characterized by a
divergence in shared experience and understanding—not
an antagonistic cultural divide. Despite declining
participation from the populace, the military remains one of
the most admired institutions in America and there is little
evidence that any segment of the population other than a
small portion of the elite begrudges the armed services their
martial culture and particular ethos. Second, it is not
fundamentally unhealthy, nor remotely dangerous ipso
facto, for a democracy to have a military and a greater
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society that differ from each other in their values, culture,
and ethos. What serious observer would maintain that they
must have exactly congruent cultures in order to co-exist in
a free society? Last, momentum gained from the first two
tenets, which results in calls to “close the gap” by making
the military accommodate contemporary societal mores,
will in the end hurt society more than help it. Not only will
such calls force a lowest cultural common denominator
approach on the military, they will remove from the military
the very ethos that it needs for the missions that alone
justify its existence.
On the matter of the third charge, I agree that military
and civilian leadership today has less in common than at
any other time in recent American history. Similarly, on the
fourth charge, I agree that the officer corps is more overtly
Republican and conservative than in the past. But both of
these facts are phenomena, not necessarily
civil-military emergencies. The distinction is profound.
Both facts are rooted in the Vietnam conflict and can be
explained by the socio-political evolution of this country
over the past 30 years. In that short span, one political party
(which has held the White House for the last 7 years)
accommodated the anti-war movement, neo-Marxism,
radical environmentalism, feminism, multiculturalism, gay
rights, and other socio-political movements that were
anathema to a conservative, traditional institution such as
the military. To many in uniform during this period, it
seemed that the Democrats left the military and then
blamed it for looking Republican. I suspect that the friction
between civilian and military leaders and the political
imbalance in the services will re-adjust themselves over
time. The effects of the “cultural wars” that started in 1968
will take at least another generation to wash out. More
important, despite these alleged “problems,” there have
been no civil-military incidents of any note that have
resulted. Some bruised egos and political sensibilities aside,
these issues appear to be sociological phenomena that have
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had no discernible negative impact on civil-military
relations.
Nonetheless, the fact that there has been no “Seven Days
in May” occurrence does not mean all is well. Indeed, it is
incumbent on both the civilian and military
communities—as well as adherents to both schools of
thought about the current state of affairs—to join in
producing a set of rules for civil-military relations in the
future. In order to do this, one must place the immutable
aspects of American civil-military relations in the context of
the changing civil-military environment. This exercise
makes clearer the questions that need to be asked about the
shape of America’s civil-military future. I offer here some
thoughts on how to understand and evaluate the shifting
dynamics that will shape this future. By better
understanding the context in which they will emerge,
American leaders can begin to discern the parameters of
successful civil-military relations much as Huntington and
others did two generations ago.
The New Landscape and What it Portends.
Ultimately, the new boundaries of civil-military
relations —while rooted firmly in the Constitution and the
rule of law—will be subjective in nature. The lines between
political engagement and political interference, between
political identity and politicization, and between
constructive dissent and destructive disloyalty will be hotly
debated and not clearly seen. There are six variables
shaping the development of those lines today and in the
near future.

•

The lack of consensus over strategy and the use of
military force. Ultimately, civil-military relations are
determined by three sets of pressures: legal, societal,
and functional. Disagreement over the functional role
of the military in America’s affairs will keep
civil-military relations in a constant state of
agonizing flux. The famous exchange between Colin
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Powell and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
over the use of the military is perhaps the best known
example of this. Fundamental differences over the use
of the military in so-called Operations Other Than
War are likely to continue and perhaps even get
worse. This is curious for historians, who know for
instance that in over 275 shooting military
deployments since 1789, the U.S. military has been in
only five declared wars. Despite that history,
“warfighting” remains the dominant physical and
psychological template on which the nation builds
and drills its forces. This split between what the
military is doing day-to-day and who it thinks it is at
its core will continue to tear at the fabric of
civil-military relations for the foreseeable future. A
clear and cohesive national security strategy (rather
than the public relations pabulum the White House
issues today) would go a long way toward reconciling
these strains.

•

The relative sophistication of the political and
military communities have gone in opposite
directions.13 Since the end of the Vietnam conflict,
which the military views as being lost by a
combination of McNamara’s whiz kids and feckless
political leaders, the uniformed services have
struggled mightily to increase their own political
acumen and sophistication. It is not unusual today to
see dozens of junior officers destined for headquarters
staff jobs gaining advanced degrees in public policy
and political science at the best universities in
America. On the other hand, civilian leaders are
increasingly unaware of military science, or of the
history, culture, and traditions of the armed forces.
Programs to encourage participation and education in
military affairs should be a top priority for the upper
ranks of the civil service dealing with strategic
matters. Without them, the uniformed military will
fill the knowledge vacuum with savvy officers who
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will take the political initiative and thereby incur the
distrust and resentment of civilian leaders.

•

Goldwater-Nichols merely fired the first salvo in an
organizational war between the services over the
issue of jointness. The continuing evolution of this set
of policies and processes will shape civil-military
relations for some time to come. Since
Goldwater-Nichols, the powers and prestige of the
Joint Staff, the Chairman, and the Secretary of
Defense have risen. Ironically, the powers of the
civilians in the office of the Secretary of Defense have
diminished. This is principally because while the
civilians are busy setting policy, the individual
services—armed with over 85 percent of the Pentagon
budget and under almost no constraints on how they
spend it—are building the forces they wish to see in
order to execute their particular vision. In a large
bureaucracy, those with the budget authority make
the policy. So long as the policy makers (civilians) are
separated from those who plan and build the forces
(military), a fundamental disconnect will remain that
will skew not only America’s strategy—but its
civil-military relations.14

•

The growing gap between the military and society is
real and must be addressed by policy. As noted above,
the gap between the military and society on issues of
culture and values is one that has always existed and
should remain. It should, of course, be managed by
good civil-military policies but there is certainly no
need to “close the gap” by making the military look
more like society at large. There is, however, a need to
address the gap in shared experience, understanding,
and appreciation that comes from fewer and fewer
Americans having contact with their military. Along
with others, I have written about potential solutions
to this problem.15 In general, the military must adopt
much bolder personnel and public relations policies in
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order to cycle more of America—both physically and
psychologically—through its ranks. With a series of
eminently achievable policies directed at a related
problem—the lack of interest in public service among
American elites—the military could make great
strides to fix this area of friction as well.

•

Finally, the uniformed military can help reduce its
civil-military angst by reconnecting not only with
America at large, but also with the rest of its
government. As General Fred Weyand has noted,
“The American Army is not so much an arm of the
Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American
p e o p l e . ” 1 6 Improving the relationship with
Congress—to include consultation over policy and not
merely budgetary issues—would restore the proper
structure of the Clausewitzian trinity between the
military, the people, and the government. Congress,
after all, represents two sides of the trinity—the
people and the government. In recent times, our
civil-military relationship has treated the President
as the government and polls or editorial pages as the
will of the people. This is a profoundly
anti-constitutional set of devices and has thrown our
entire civil-military system out of balance. As one
constitutional scholar noted, the American system is
“an invitation to struggle” between the branches of
government over issues relating to foreign and
defense policy. Thus Madison and others accepted
some inefficiencies for the sake of democratic
governance and civilian control. McMaster noted that
the Joint Chiefs of the Vietnam era were complicit in
helping the President to “circumvent the
constitution.” If the nation does not restore the proper
role of Congress and the relationship between
Congress and the military, we could face this problem
again.
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By recognizing the shifting variables that shape
America’s civil-military relations, both the political and
military communities can work to restore a proper role for
the uniformed officer and a healthy relationship between
these two parties. It should be emphasized that the military
must be involved in this process and not merely accept new
rules of civil-military relations. Civilian control of the
military is a hallmark of modern democracies but it does not
mean that the military cannot participate in deciding on the
nature of a healthy civil-military balance. In the past few
years, most senior uniformed leaders have shrunk from
entering the contemporary debates outlined here. It is, for
instance, amazing to me that the only public officials who
have taken the opportunity to address the “gap” issue from
the perspective of the military are those civilians whose
seminal experience was in avoiding military service.
Uniformed leaders must participate in the discussions and
decisions that will shape America’s civil-military future. To
not do so is to doom civil-military relations to a rocky road
for some time to come.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. To this day, the American public is not even quite sure what
caused our ultimate victory. Most of the players involved in the
campaign have offered theories trumpeting almost exclusively the
significance of their role and actions.
2. See Bradley Graham, “Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy,” The
Washington Post, April 5, 1999, p. A1. Showing their political acumen,
the intelligence community was actually the first rat off the ship,
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CHAPTER 10
DoD IN THE 21st CENTURY
Lawrence Korb
Introduction.
The organization and operation of the Department of
Defense (DoD) in the 21st century, like the last half of the
20th century, will be a product of the conflicting and often
contradictory objectives that it must achieve. For purposes
of analysis, these cross pressures may be placed into four
categories.
First, DoD must be organized and operated to ensure
civilian control while not undermining or diluting military
professionalism. Therefore, civilian control must not be
exercised in such a manner that military opinions and
expertise are excluded from or downgraded within the
decisionmaking process. On the other hand, military
considerations cannot be allowed to dominate the process.
Maintaining a proper balance or equilibrium in this area
has been and will be both a delicate and challenging task.
Second, DoD must serve the needs of both the executive
and legislative branches simultaneously. While the
president is the chief executive and commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, the Congress has the constitutional
mandate to raise armies and maintain navies, establish
personnel policies for the armed services, and declare war.
Since the branches are often controlled by different parties
and most often have different perspectives and
constituencies, high-level DoD officials find it difficult to
serve both branches equally well. If they defer to the needs
of the president, the Congress often criticizes them for
slighting the legislature’s constitutional responsibilities.
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But if DoD’s executives, particularly uniformed leaders, air
their complaints about the executive branch’s policies in
legislative hearings, the president, in the words of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, will accuse them of
“legalized insubordination.”
Third, the political system wants DoD to be unified and
efficient without undermining the independence,
uniqueness, and statutory responsibilities of the three
separate and very different military departments and four
armed services. Whether it be in procurement, logistics,
training, or strategy, the politicians and the public expect to
receive the advantages of centralization and
decentralization at the same time.
Fourth, the department must be organized to function
efficiently and effectively during both war and peace. An
organizational structure designed to optimize the Planning,
Programming, and Budgetary System (PPBS) most
probably will be able to handle equally well a peacekeeping
mission or the enforcement of a no-fly zone.
To make a prediction or projection about how DoD will
cope with these conflicting pressures in the next century, it
is useful to take a look back at the last half-century of DoD’s
operations. While history will not repeat itself exactly, it is
reasonable to assume that DoD will respond to these
conflicts in a similar manner.
The Civil-Military Balance.
For the most part, the balance between civilian and
military concerns has been well maintained. However, on
occasion strong individuals have upset the balance. For
example, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense from
1961-68, made use of the powers granted to the secretary
and his office by the 1949, 1953, and 1958 reorganizations to
dilute the impact of the military professionals within the
policy process. McNamara employed a decisionmaking
process, PPBS, and an analytical technique, systems
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analysis, that diminished the influence of military expertise
in deciding how and where to spend defense resources.
However, the military professionals eventually learned how
to employ PPBS and systems analysis to enhance their
military perspectives, and none of McNamara’s successors
has been able or willing to use the powers of the office to
exclude military input to the extent that McNamara did.
Ironically, while most of McNamara’s successors eschewed
his methods, they continued to employ his decisionmaking
tools, i.e., PPBS’ and systems analysis.
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) from 1989 through 1993, became the military
equivalent of McNamara. Relying on the powers granted to
the Chairman of the JCS by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986 and the political and bureaucratic skills he developed
at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the White House,
Powell dominated the policy process in the immediate post
Cold War period. U.S. military strategy and force
employment doctrine were developed by him. So great was
his impact that we now speak of the “Powell Doctrine.”
Moreover, he openly and successfully challenged, even
writing op-ed pieces and giving public speeches, President
Bill Clinton on his campaign promises to allow gays to serve
openly in the military, reduce military spending, and stop
the Serb onslaught in Bosnia. However, Powell’s two
successors, Generals John Shalikashvili and Henry
Shelton, have assumed a much more low key role. They have
deferred to President Clinton on such controversial issues
as deploying forces to Bosnia and conducting an air war
against Kosovo.
While neither McNamara nor Powell did permanent
damage to the civilian-military balance, they have
demonstrated that the potential now exists for upsetting
the balance. This potential exists because the
reorganizations of 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986 have
enhanced significantly the powers of both the secretary and
chairman. Therefore, since there is little prospect of
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undoing these reorganizations, the president and the
Congress must guard against strong individuals using
those powers to overwhelm either military or civilian
considerations. Moreover, as fewer and fewer civilians have
military experience, the President must ensure that the
secretary and his key advisors are not afraid to challenge
the uniformed military.
The Executive-Legislative Balance.
Because of the separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which is built into our political system,
senior military and civilian officials in DoD are in a no-win
position when it comes to satisfying the needs of both the
President and the Congress. The problems usually arise
from DoD officials supporting the executive line on policy
while being less than candid with the Congress. Over the
past 50 years, senior Pentagon officials have been less than
forthcoming with Congress on such controversial subjects
as the progress of the war in Vietnam, the killing of the
marines in Lebanon, opinions regarding the war in the Gulf,
the length of the deployment in Bosnia and the readiness of
the armed forces in the late 1990s. With the end of the Cold
War, however, Congress has become increasingly assertive
in national security policy and will continue to insist on
more candor from DoD officials, particularly the uniformed
military.
Moreover, the resurgent Congress will continue to
establish its own bodies, like the National Defense Panel
and the Commission on National Security/21st Century, to
provide it with an alternate source of advice, particularly
from retired military. The executive may find this
development troubling, but, just as in other areas like
balancing the budget and welfare reform, it will be reduced
to reacting rather than initiating. For example, in late 1998,
President Clinton and Secretary William Cohen reacted to
the anticipated testimony of the Chiefs before the Congress
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by agreeing to a large increase in their own defense
program.
Centralization vs. Decentralization.
Because it has within it three departments and four
armed services whose existence predated it, DoD will never
be totally unified or completely efficient. The Pentagon will
always have a myriad of accounting and procurement
systems, training practices, personnel policies, and
duplicative weapon systems, (including four air forces),
laboratories, and missions. Nonetheless over the past 50
years, the power of the Central government (OSD and JCS)
has grown at the expense of the services. DoD now allocates
resources on the basis of programs or missions rather than
by individual service. OSD can, if it wishes, control the
personnel, logistic, and even acquisition policies of the
individual departments. For all practical purposes, the
main function of the service secretaries and the service
chiefs is to implement the policies of OSD and the JCS. For
example, after the Lieutenant Kelly Flinn episode, OSD
made all the services adopt a common fraternization policy;
the Air Force, Navy, and Marines are developing a common
fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter; and, finally, it is the
Secretary and the Chairman who represent and speak for
the Department at interagency meetings.
Military operations are now conducted jointly and
military officers aspiring to higher command must complete
a specified number of joint assignments. The military chiefs
of service have become advisers to the Chairman, who alone
ensures that a military point of view, his, is inserted into the
policy process. Indeed, the service chiefs were not even
consulted by General Henry Shelton prior to the cruise
missile attack on Osama Bin Laden in August 1998.
If anything, these trends will accelerate in the next
century because the scarcity of resources will compel even
more consolidation, most probably in such areas as logistics
and intelligence. However, there will never be a completely
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unified department or a single armed services along the
Canadian model. The individual services have too much
tradition and too much clout—both in Congress and with
the American public—to be completely ignored. This is
probably the reason why Secretary of Defense Cohen
refused to challenge the Marines on the issue of gender
integrated basic training, and why Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney was not able to prevent the Marines from
obtaining the V-22. These service “victories” will
nonetheless be few and far between in the future, and it
would not be surprising if the next DoD reorganization did
not completely eliminate the service secretaries.
Peace and War.
The system for providing the Secretary of Defense with
advice on policy, strategy, and budgets works reasonably
well. He has enough civilian advisers with the necessary
expertise to balance the individual and joint military
perspectives. But when it comes to such technical areas as
military operations and the readiness of the armed forces,
he must rely primarily on the JCS for advice. Theoretically,
his civilian advisers could challenge estimates of what it
would take to conduct an operation or make a unit ready for
battle, but OSD is not organized or equipped to do so.
Moreover, as fewer and fewer civilians in OSD have military
experience, they will be less inclined to do so. Therefore,
OSD needs to establish an organization of analysts with
operational expertise and experience to challenge the
military professionals on why it takes 400,000 military
people to bring peace to Bosnia or why an army tank unit
must drive 800 miles a year to be “ready.”
Conclusion.
In the next century DoD will continue to deal with these
cross pressures and continue to be criticized for leaning too
much or too little in one direction or another. At times, the
Pentagon will also probably go too far in one direction or
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another. However, if history is any guide, this tilting will
generate an equal or opposite reaction that will restore the
proper balance between military and civilian, executive and
legislative, centralization and decentralization, and war
and peace.
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CHAPTER 11
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 2002
William A. Navas, Jr.
It must be realized that there is nothing more difficult to plan,
more uncertain of success, or more dangerous to manage than
the establishment of a new order of government; for he who
introduces it makes enemies of all those who derived
advantage from the old order and finds but lukewarm
defenders among those who stand to gain from the new one.
Machiavelli, The Prince

Introduction.
In the life of a nation, the end of war marks a new
beginning. There is a marked parallel, almost surreal,
between the events after the end of World War II which led
to the National Security Act of 1947 and the situation today,
as we struggle to reform our national security policymaking
process and organization to deal with the challenges of the
new century. Actually there are those who posit, and I tend
to agree with them, that the end of the Cold War is actually
the end of a 75-year-long conflict, which started in 1914 and
ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
symbolic crumbling of the Berlin Wall. The failure of
Versailles and the emergence of Weimar Germany set the
stage for the unfinished business of the “war to end all
wars.”
As with the end of every major war (the Cold War not
being an exception), changes are deemed necessary to
support a new security strategy. These changes reflect the
perceptions of what the new realities are and the “lessons
learned” from the last war. President William J. Clinton has
made this argument in his December 1999 National
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Security Strategy.1 Today we are at a juncture, whether we
realize it or not, where forces are being set in motion for a
major revision of our national security structure. This paper
offers a case for those changes.
Background.
In 1945, the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of the
Army and the Navy returned triumphant from their battles
in Europe and the Pacific. But success was no insurance
against change. There would be painful years ahead as the
U.S. military modernized both its organization and its
philosophy. The idea of change was anathema to most in
uniform (except for the Army Air Forces, who wanted their
own military branch and got it). The Army and the Navy had
never been part of the same military command structure. In
fact, their internal command and management systems and
cultures were as different as the uniforms they wore.
Making them so was to be a painful process of compromise.
Periodically over the years, various leaders had proposed
reform, but only a national disaster of the magnitude of
Pearl Harbor was impetus enough to force change. This was
the “burning platform” of 1945—the horrific event was
blamed on incredibly poor coordination and communication
between the Army and the Navy, which together had shared
defense responsibility for the Hawaiian Islands. The result
was a bias for change among the American public.
The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in
1949 implemented that change. The act and the debate
preceding it also gave new meaning to the term national
security. In the 1940s, national security was seen primarily
as protection from external invasion. Clearly the military
dimension of national security was first among equals.
The new concept saw national security as a decisional
discipline that is neither primarily foreign nor defense
policy. Rather, national security is treated as an
overarching, interdisciplinary paradigm embracing
elements and responsibilities of a number of departments in
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a dynamic relationship. This new concept was
institutionalized in the national security bureaucracy that
was established in 1947, and, in particular, in the new
National Security Council (NSC).
Breaking Old Paradigms.
Today America faces significant technological,
economic, political, and social challenges in the national
security environment. Adapting our strategy to this new
environment will place great demands upon all of our
national security institutions, including Congress, the
Defense Department, the Department of State, the
intelligence community, the National Security Council, but
in particular the military services. Any major change will
require commitment from all involved. To succeed in such
an endeavor we must understand the motives that lie
behind the puzzling and often contradictory behavior of
America’s military forces. Carl Builder2 has observed that
this has little to do with what party controls the White
House or who writes the budget.
An understanding of the motives of the three services
must begin with an appreciation of their entrenched
institutions and distinct “personalities” or cultures.

•

The Navy sees itself mainly as heir to a glorious
tradition dating back to the British navy. Equipped
with its own land and air force, it jealously guards its
independence and is happiest when left alone.

•

The Air Force is the embodiment of a single idea—one
that also happens to be a strategy of war. Not love of
“the Air Force” but love of flight and flying machines
binds it’s members together.

•

Traditionally the Army has considered itself the
nation’s servant, charged with teaching
citizen-soldiers the art of war in times of crisis. But a
heady memory of triumph in the closing months of
233

World War II and the need for a large forward
deployed Army during the Cold War contradict this
modest role and have exacerbated the historical
tension between the Army and its principal reserve
component, the National Guard.

•

If the operational concept before World War II was
that:

•

the Navy was the instrument for wielding sea power
as the most important and flexible kind of military
power for the United States as a maritime nation;

•

and the Army, as the nation’s obedient and loyal
military servant, was the neutral instrument of state
policy, keeping itself prepared to meet the varied
demands that the American people have historically
imposed upon it, but especially prepared to forge
America’s citizenry into an expeditionary force to
defeat America’s enemies overseas;

•

then the establishment of the Department of Defense
(DoD) might have had the effect that some feared in
the tumultuous days before the reorganization of
1947.

One exasperated spokesman for the Army expressed this
fear very well,
. . . the only way to overcome the Navy’s resistance [to
reorganization] would be to do away with the War Department,
transfer all its elements to the Navy, and redesignate that
organization as the Department of Defense.3

Those words, uttered in frustration, have proven to be
somewhat prophetic.
The demands of the Cold War, with the need to project
power overseas, maintain forward deployed forces (of all
services), contain the spread of communism, and engage in
what we call today Major Regional Conflicts (Korea,
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Vietnam) made DoD the defacto U.S. Navy—the instrument
for wielding U.S. military power across the globe.
Meanwhile, the role of the Army changed from that of a
“soldier in support of the nation” to that of an “instantly
ready armored defender of Western Europe.” And the Air
Force, the new service, found its own niche, in particular, as
the instrument for the delivery of our nuclear power in an
era of strategic war and deterrence and, later on, as the
advocate of the supremacy of air power. On the other hand,
the Navy and Marine Corps remained comfortable with
their traditional roles. The last Secretary of the Navy before
the reorganization, James Forrestal, would become the first
Secretary of the newly established DoD.
The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986
(some say it accomplished what Truman wanted to do in
1947 and fell short) reinforced this situation by taking more
power from the Service Secretaries and concentrating it in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who was advised by a
very strong Chairman and a Joint Staff with a direct
command line to the Unified and Specified
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The strong personalities of
individuals like Admiral William Crowe and General Colin
Powell established the primacy of the Chairman within this
system. That is where we were when the Cold War ended in
1989, more than a decade ago.
A Decade of “False Starts.”
The last 10-plus years have been no less traumatic for
the American Military than the years after World War II. In
October of 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin
Wall came down. We were getting ready to deal with the
“New World Order” and to distribute the “Peace Dividends."
We had started our “downsizing” (another of our
fashionable euphemisms), had gone through the
“Commission on Roles and Missions,” and were considering
the permutations and combinations of the “Base Force."
Then in August 1990, the same day that President Bush
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was delivering a major national security speech at the
Aspen Institute in Colorado, Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait. In 100 days, the United States led
a coalition that stopped the aggression, expelled the
aggressors from Kuwait, and caused major damage to the
war fighting capabilities of Iraq. For the first time in more
than 40 years, American military forces returned victorious
from war. The overwhelming support of the American
people and the quick victory over Iraq had a euphoric effect
on the U. S. Military services, in many ways similar to the
atmosphere in 1945. Once again there were parades and
national heroes. There was even talk of re-establishing the
five-star rank. But once again, as at the end of World War II,
success was not an insurance against change.
This time change came in the political landscape as well.
In 1992, a very popular president during the Gulf War lost
his bid for re-election to a candidate with no military
service. “It’s the economy, stupid” was one of the most
popular slogans during that political campaign. The
American people had once again put the war behind them
and were looking at domestic issues and challenges. There
were no major threats looming out there. Threats to the
survival of the United States, such as those posed by the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, would be at the top of a
hierarchy and would be an “A list.” But that list is empty
today. According to Dr. Bill Perry in his recent book,
co-authored with Mr. Ash Carter,
the emptiness of the A list is disorienting for Americans who
made the huge transition from defeating aggression, to
deterring aggression after World War II, but who now, in
consequence, tend to conceive national security exclusively in
terms of threats to be deterred or defeated.4

They go on to say that what is left are the two Major
Regional Contingencies in the Persian Gulf and the Korean
Peninsula that undergird Pentagon planning and
budgeting that form the “B list” of imminent threats to U.S.
interests, but do not threaten the survival or the way of life
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of Americans. A third place is occupied by the Kosovos,
Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and Haitis. They compose a
“C list” of important contingencies that indirectly affect U.S.
security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests. I call
these contingencies “wars of conscience” or “wars of
interest” depending on how they are portrayed by either The
Wall Street Journal or CNN.5
It appears that Americans, in times of international
tensions and instability (when we have an “A list”), prefer a
Republican administration, strong in national security,
with a Democratic congressional majority to provide the
balance of power and advocate for domestic issues. The
perception of the United States being the only remaining
superpower shifted that equation to where we have had two
consecutive Democratic administrations and a Republican
controlled Congress.
This interesting phenomenon (the reversal of the
traditional political roles between parties and who controls
which branch of government) will be very important in the
years ahead as we attempt to establish a new framework to
allow us to pursue a national strategy for the next century.
For after all, it is the Congress that raises armies,
maintains a navy, disciplines the militia and declares war,
in addition to the more mundane tasks of appropriating and
authorizing, on a yearly basis, the “ways and means” for the
execution of what by definition should be a long term
strategy to provide for the “common defense.” Up to this
point DoD has developed the strategies, prepared the
programs, and submitted the budgets to Congress. The
services, executing their Title 10 functions, have manned,
equipped, trained, and sustained the forces. Will Congress
have the political will to “break some crockery” in order to
provide the necessary legislation (and internal
restructuring of their own committee and sub-committee
structures) to effect the required changes, as it did in 1947?
In 1993 the incoming administrations’ efforts to
re-structure defense culminated with Secretary Les Aspin’s
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Bottom-Up Review, which downsized the armed forces and
provided a strategy to fight two nearly simultaneous major
regional contingencies, while generating funds for
investments in modernization and recapitalization. It is
interesting that this was accomplished early in his tenure,
prior to the appointment and confirmation of the service
secretaries. This further weakened the position of the
service secretaries, who did not participate in the policy
debate but still had to execute the decisions.
During the second term of the Clinton administration,
initially under Secretary William Perry, and reported out by
Secretary William Cohen, DoD published the results of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the summer of 19976.
This report, mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was,
as many have stated, “dead on arrival” when it was
delivered to Congress. Most of the policy issues were vetted
at DoD and Joint Staff levels with modest participation
from the service secretaries (the Army’s in particular).
The National Defense Panel, also mandated by
Congress, submitted its report on December 1997, making a
series of recommendations for the United States to launch a
transformation strategy to meet the range of security
challenges in 2010 to 2020. The report stated that:
Transforming the armed forces into a very different kind of
military from that which exists today, while supporting U.S.
near-term efforts, presents a significant challenge. Beyond
Defense (emphasis added), we must also transform the manner
in which we conduct foreign affairs, foster regional stability, and
enable projection of military power.

It concluded that:
In the increasingly complex world that we foresee, DoD and its
armed services cannot preserve U.S. interests alone. Defense is
but one element of a broader national security structure. If we
are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, the
entire U.S. national security apparatus must adapt and become
more integrated (emphasis added), coherent and proactive.”7
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They were right on the mark on these issues.
If “form follows function” and we have a stated strategy
to enhance our security, to bolster America’s economic
prosperity and to promote democracy abroad—as stated in
the White House’s National Security Strategy, then the
question that Congress needs to ask is . . . Do we have the
adequate systems, processes, and organization to
accomplish the tasks required by the strategy?8 It is a
sobering task indeed. For at stake is the survival of the
nation itself. There are great risks but also great
opportunities because experts tell us that we have a period
of about 20 years (a strategic pause) before the next peer
competitor appears. If the United States is going to make
fundamental changes, intuition tells us that the time is
now. There is an old adage that says, “the best time to plant
a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is now.”
We have spent more than 10 years dealing with this
issue at the margins, the good news is that there have been
some encouraging initiatives within the Services and within
DoD during this period. The bad news is that the U.S. policy
making community has not yet confronted the necessity for
fundamental change in the way that national security
policy is formulated and managed.
The Way Ahead.
Just as the advent of nuclear power mandated a major
restructuring of the National Defense Establishment at the
end of World War II, so today’s Revolution in Military
Affairs, the threats of nuclear proliferation, domestic and
transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
homeland security, and the potential emergence in the
future of a power that may challenge our vital national
interests (a new “A list”) require a comprehensive “out of the
box” thinking in order to create a new National Security
Establishment which is capable of meeting the challenges of
the next era. Today those challenges demand close
cooperation across all levels of government—federal, state,
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and local—and across a wide range of agencies, including
the Departments of Defense and State, the Intelligence
Community, law enforcement, emergency services, medical
providers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The United States cannot afford to wait for a new
“burning platform” like Pearl Harbor to create a bias for
action. This would be criminal. What is needed is a
pragmatic, bipartisan approach which deals honestly with
the issue of national security as we see it evolving in the 21st
century. The administration and the Congress need to make
this a top priority.
The Secretary of Defense has established the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century, with a
mandate to conduct a 2 1/2-year effort to assist the president
and Congress in confronting this challenge. The work of the
Commission is guided by three goals: to determine the
global security environment of the first quarter of the next
century; to analyze the character of the nation during that
time frame and develop an appropriate national security
strategy; and to recommend alternatives to the current
national security apparatus and processes to implement the
new strategy. The work of that group and the results thus
far are encouraging. The most important question is what
actions will “the powers that be” take once the final work is
completed and the report is published? Congress and the
National Security Council should work with the
Commission to put in motion the actions that are required to
effect the necessary changes. A restructuring of the scope
and magnitude of 1947 might be required. We must be ready
to break old paradigms and challenge entrenched interests
in order to succeed. After all, the security of its citizens is the
primary function of government. We need the same fervor
and enthusiasm to fix our national security as we express
for our Social Security.
The United States is at a historic juncture where it must
lead in the world arena to protect our people and our way of
life. This is accomplished by a sustained commitment to
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diplomacy and a strong national security posture. As stated
in the preface to the National Security Strategy Report:
At this moment in history, the United States is called upon to
lead—to marshal the forces of freedom and progress; to
channel the energies of the global economy into lasting
prosperity; to reinforce our democratic ideals and values; to
enhance American security and global peace.”9

A new National Security Act that establishes a
Department of National Security, bringing together DoD,
State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Justice, Energy,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to be able to meet the national security challenges of the
future may be the solution.
Following are some recommendations that might be
worth considering as the U.S. begins to confront the need for
reform the national security policy making system.

•

Restructure the service staffs along functional rather
than operational lines. This is consistent with the
goals of the Goldwater Nichols Act and will help the
services to perform their Title 10 duties of manning,
equipping, training and sustaining.

•

After 50 years, the NSC has taken many forms and
roles under different presidents. However, the
inexorable forces of the international system are
driving modern presidents into more intimate
involvement in national security affairs.10 If that
trend continues, then serious consideration should be
given to the development of a new set of principles for
the organization and functions of the NSC and NSC
Staff. These principles should be adaptable enough to
accommodate the desires and styles of each occupant
of the White House, while at the same time assuring
that the President receives well thought out, unbiased
and unvarnished alternatives and courses of action
for his consideration. One helpful reform of the NSC
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would be the introduction of a Goldwater-Nichols type
personnel policy in order to avoid the inevitable
parochialism and careerism associated with the
current system of staffing of NSC positions.

•

The National Security Panel noted in their 1997
Report that all elements of national power, including
military, diplomatic, and economic elements, needed
to be integrated in order to meet the security
challenges of the 21st century. 1 1 They also
recommended, and I strongly support this proposal,
that some agencies which have traditionally had a
domestic focus should now play a larger international
role. One example is the U.S. Coast Guard, which is
part of the Department of Transportation. This
service can play an important role as a model for some
of the navies of the world.

•

Make foreign and national security policy an issue
during the current and future presidential and
congressional campaigns, in order to know the
candidates’ views, educate the public, and express a
mandate to elected officials from the American
people.

•

Reinstate a form of draft to provide for universal
military training or some other form of national
service as a means of reinforcing the sense of
citizenship obligation among young Americans. This
could help tremendously with the current manpower
shortfalls in the Services and reduce defense costs.

•

Institutionalize the Weinberger Doctrine—

1. Do not commit combat forces overseas unless the
engagement is deemed vital to our national interest.
2. If combat troops are committed, do so
wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning, and
with clearly defined political and military objectives.
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3. The commitment of combat forces abroad should be
a last resort.

•

Establish Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)
responsibilities based on the nature of the threats,
operational or functional responsibilities, not
geography.

•

Re-engage the American people in national security
matters to avoid the “law enforcement syndrome”
when Americans no longer feel the obligation to help a
fellow citizen in distress but lock themselves up and
dial 911 for the law enforcement “professionals” to
deal with the situation. Increased emphasis on the
Reserve Components and reinstating some form of
draft would facilitate this process.

•

Sponsor a Revolution in Business Affairs to free DOD
of the tyranny of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) with its
5-year “directed economy” approach to the Service
Project Objective Memorandum (POMs). We need to
reduce the DOD decision cycles in order to take
advantage of the explosion of technology.

•

Create a Homeland Security “czar” to coordinate the
efforts of consequence management for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
explosive acts of terrorism among federal, state, local,
and non-government players.

Proposals such as these need to be discussed and vetted
as alternatives to the status quo if we are to successfully
develop a unified and shared vision in support of a new
National Security Act. After a 75-year period of conflict,
America is the only remaining superpower. History will be
harsh in her judgment if we fail to capitalize upon this
opportunity.
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CHAPTER 12
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING1
Robert D. Steele
Background
The Ninth Annual Strategy Conference, held at the U.S.
Army War College in 1998, addressed the theme of
“Challenging the United States Symmetrically and
Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?” In the course
of that event, a number of speakers and participants,
including the author, reflected on our existing policymaking
process and our existing force structure, but without
making recommendations for specific changes.
In the largest sense, the Ninth Annual Strategy
Conference called into question every aspect of Joint Vision
2010 and clearly identified a need to come to grips with
several asymmetric threats for which our existing force
structure is not well suited as a primary defense. A
summary of the conference was subsequently published and
is readily available online.2
In the aftermath of last year’s conference, and again at
the invitation of the Army War College, the author
undertook the task of considering and integrating three
aspects of presidential leadership and national security
policymaking:
1. Implications of the symmetric threat;
2. Organizational pathologies in policymaking;
3. Potential Information Solutions.
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Out of that reflection and in keeping with guidance to the
effect that one should seek to provoke with “big ideas” that
might or might not be immediately or practically amenable
to adoption, the author selected the following three ideas for
presentation to the Tenth Annual Strategy Conference:
1. Four threat types need four forces after next;
2. Must modify White House staff and leadership
method for three departments;
3. Need a national information strategy and a virtual
intelligence community approach.
When considered together, these three ideas suggest
that we must simultaneously reinvent how we think of the
threat, how we organize to deal with the threat, and how we
communicate both internally and externally as we make
plans and execute operations to confront the threat. At root,
our challenge is neither technical nor financial but rather
intellectual—how do we modify our perceptions, our
information collection, our information processing, and our
information sharing so as to permit the president to be
much more effective in understanding the threat,
confronting the threat, and neutralizing the threat?
Setting the Stage.
As we consider how best to restructure the manner in
which the president provides leadership with respect to
national security matters as well as how that leadership is
implemented, we must face three realities.
First, the Department of Defense (DoD), whatever
course it is directed to follow in the early decades of the 21st
century, is severely underfunded. As one distinguished
former Secretary of Defense stated in congressional
testimony early in 1999:
. . . the course on which we are now embarked involves
increasing strains and growing costs in the short term, and is
unsustainable in the long run.
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. . . we shall need gradually to increase procurement outlays to
$100 Billion per year (from $40 Billion).
(this does not address) homeland defense . . . which) would
include protection against chemical and biological weapons,
protection of the critical infrastructure against cyber attacks,
space control . . . and certain other areas.3

Of special interest to us all is the noted reference to the
fact that “traditional” DoD funding shortfalls are being put
forward that do not provide for homeland defense. The
concepts and doctrine as well as the legislation needed to
determine who is responsible for homeland defense, and
how that is handled in relation to DoD as well as other
departments of government, do not exist.
Second, even if the president were to choose a rational
course and seek to make substantive changes in how we
make policy and execute national security initiatives, it will
take many years—from 5 to 25—before such change is
agreed to by Congress, accepted by the public, and fully
institutionalized.4
Third and finally, we come to the complex nature of
bureaucracy. No matter what the president may decide and
what Congress may legislate, ultimately it will take years to
effect substantive change within the U.S. Government
bureaucracy if we adhere to traditional forms of
change—this paper proposes a nontraditional solution that
can be implemented immediately.
Four Threat Types.
As the United States prepares to enter the 21st century
there is much discussion about Joint Vision 2010 and the
“force after next.” Unfortunately, the net assessment
process, so well-regarded during the Cold War, has failed
us. Furthermore, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
is nothing more than a perpetuation of our fascination with
technical solutions, and fails completely with regard to the
much more complex issues of human conflict, culture,
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history, diminishing resources, and sustainability. We ran
out of precision munitions in 8 days during the Gulf War.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ran out of
precision munitions for Serbian attacks in just three days.
There are those who feel that our stocks of conventional
ammunition for plain infantry are also severely inadequate.
The net assessments process of the 21st century will
have to deal with four threat types, not one; it must be able
to deal easily with both domestic or home front issues that
are not obviously military in nature; and it must also deal
with the human factors associated with avoiding as well
as deterring threat conditions from arising both at home
and abroad. By human factors I mean historical, cultural,
social, and psychological intelligence, four forms of
intelligence at which we are especially poor.
Figure 1 shows that each threat type relies on different
forms of power, different forms of concealment, and
different objectives. At the same time, we see that between
the four types of threat there are also four different kinds
of nontraditional conflict.
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Figure 1. Four Threat Types.
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High-Tech Brutes—The Violent State Threat.
DoD and the U.S. intelligence community dedicate the
majority—well over 80 percent, if not 90 percent—of their
resources to training, equipping, and organizing forces
focused on dealing with the “high-tech brute,” the violent
state.
This warrior class relies on strategic nuclear and
conventional capabilities including uniformed troops and
marked equipment. It applies high-technology to achieve
some physical stealth, and relies heavily on precision
targeting.
This is the only threat that we focused on during the
Cold War, and this is the threat that we understand best.
Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, India, Pakistan, and, to a
much lesser extent, Cuba represent this kind of threat. The
major countries in Europe, were they to become our
enemies, also represent this kind of threat.
This is the easiest threat to monitor and the easiest
threat to plan against because it is so obvious, so large, and
so complex that it cannot, by and large, surprise us.
Low-Tech Brutes—The Violent Non-State Threat.
The “low-tech brute” is violent but generally does not
represent a state. Transnational criminal gangs present
both defense and intelligence agencies with a threat which
is extremely difficult to detect in the absence of a pervasive
human intelligence network. This type of threat also very
“random” in nature in that it does not have obvious military
goals and can rely on an unlimited fifth column of either
well-paid volunteers, or volunteers recruited for one-time in
extremis support tasks.
The low-tech brute is the most common threat to the
good order and prosperity of organized states and their
peoples. Unlike “low-intensity conflict” (LIC) threats for
which Congress wisely created the Special Operations
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Command and the new Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) Program, the low-tech brute is
not state-sponsored but rather an aggregation of violent
individuals who come together in random or covert ways
that are extraordinarily difficult for our intelligence and law
enforcement communities to detect and counter.
Perhaps more to the point, our national security
structure—in policymaking terms, in acquisition terms,
and in day-to-day operational capability terms—is not
geared to effectively challenge this threat class.
Low-Tech Seers—The Non-Violent Non-State
Threat.
This “threat” class is not inherently violent although
some of its extremist elements may be. It should be viewed
primarily as a challenge characterized by the unresolved
and largely legitimate needs of large groups of people whose
circumstances, culture, and history force them into
confrontations with either established states or other
non-state groups. At root, this threat class is about water,
food, and freedom from fear.
Our intelligence community, with the tacit if not the
active consent of our national security policymakers, has
neglected this threat because it has been perceived as one
that does not require the collection of secrets and one that
can be adequately understood through common academic,
think tank, business, and other non-governmental study.
More recently we have begun to realize the error of our
ways. The Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production, Dr. John Gannon, has spoken
publicly several times about the challenges facing us in the
2015 timeframe, and he clearly appreciates the national
security implications of population growth, migration and
immigration, the environment including energy and water
supplies, and disease. In May 2000, the administration
declared that Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is
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now a national security threat. This is all to the good, but
just as it took us 50 years to evolve a national security
structure—including the all-important intelligence support
structure—so also will it take us at least a decade, if not
more, to redirect our sources and methods so as to
adequately address this threat.
High-Tech Seers—The Volatile Mixed Threat.
In just the past few years, a new threat has catapulted
itself to the top position in our consciousness. Although
terms such as cyberwar and information warfare are in
vogue, this threat is much more complex. On the one hand,
we see in this threat class deliberate state-sponsored
capabilities to wreak havoc with our domestic
infrastructure (power, communications, transportation,
and finance) as well as individual or gang capabilities to be
very destructive while remaining anonymous. On the other
hand, we see more subtle uses of electronic access to conduct
economic espionage at the state level, “political theft” at the
terrorist gang level, and plain theft at the individual level.
This threat class also includes information vandalism by
our own disgruntled citizens as well as outsiders, and
corporate irresponsibility in failing to provide properly
developed communications and computing products that
are “safe” on the information superhighway.
Let us take each in turn. Winn Schwartau was the first
to warn America publicly and effectively about the
vulnerability of our critical infrastructures, with his books
Terminal Compromise (1990) and Information Warfare:
Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (1994). I myself
issued a press release in August 1994 documenting the
urgent need for a $1 billion a year investment in critical
infrastructure protection. We have a very long way to go
before our financial, transportation, power, and
communications systems are safe from attack because we
have spent decades building computer-driven systems that
“assumed” there was no threat other than normal
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operational inefficiencies. The entire insurance program for
such systems is geared toward “acts of God” and not acts of
man. The moment one contemplates vulnerabilities to
deliberate human attacks on our most fundamental
electronic systems, the risk of catastrophe increases by
several orders of magnitude.
We also have a grave problem in dealing with individual
insider attacks against all manner of electronic systems
because no one ever contemplated the possibility that a
trusted employee would deliberately tamper with basic
computer software and hardware. Fully 20 percent of our
losses in the electronic world are attributable to insider
attacks that are motivated by either dishonesty or a desire
for revenge. This is four times the losses from outside
attacks.5
Finally, we come to the whole issue of what comprises
appropriate “due diligence” on the part of both the
manufacturers of computer hardware and software, and on
the part of organizations that install and administer
electronic systems on behalf of their stockholders,
employees, or members. The reality is that there are no
standards today. There is nothing comparable to the
accounting and other fiduciary standards for electronic
systems. We are still operating our critical infrastructures
on the basis of “buyer beware,” or “as is” without warranty.
This is completely unacceptable since the center of gravity
for national security is now in the private sector—in our
intellectual property and in our critical infrastructures.
Existing Organizational Pathologies.
As we contemplate presidential leadership options in the
national security policymaking process, we quickly identify
three major problem areas:
First, the National Security Council staff structure is too
limited. It is formed along regional and issue area lines that
are undeniably important, but not staffed in consonance
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with the emerging fault lines—the environmental element,
for example, has the fewest people assigned to it, and the
senior position is too easily left vacant.
Second, we have schisms among the three major
Departments dealing with national security: Defense,
State, and Justice. As now managed and organized, they no
longer provide the United States with the most effective
arrangements for: defending our population, resources and
interests; for exerting necessary influence abroad; and for
dealing with individual and gang threats to our prosperity
and personal security. The schisms between Defense, State,
and Justice are of three kinds: conceptual, financial, and
informational.
1. Conceptually we have not yet devised common
approaches for dealing with emerging crises such as
Burundi, Somalia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sri
Lanka—we are especially poor at early warning, at early
resolution or deterrence, and at transitioning from
diplomatic to enforcement to military means;
2. Financially we still have the bulk of the money
invested in standing armies that are increasingly hollow in
both personnel and technical terms; and
3. Informationally we do not have an integrated
operational, resource management, or intelligence system
adequate to the task of harmonizing cross-departmental
inputs, decision processes, and outputs.
Third, and finally, we have a strategic vacuum overall,
with no element on the National Security Council having a
clear mandate and the necessary resources to marshal for
the president and the Cabinet the necessary mix of private
sector and other capabilities through which to achieve deep
historical and cultural understandings while also assuring
access to the widest possible range of multi-lingual content.6
Where we see major gaps in the existing White House
staff structure are: with respect to policy development at the
interface of external requirements and internal
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capabilities; with respect to the deliberate introduction of
“grand strategy” as well as deliberate net assessments and
operational control over integrated defense, diplomatic, and
transnational justice initiatives; with respect to much
improved national intelligence capabilities that fully
exploit open sources of information; and with respect to
improved control and coordination of national investments
in research.
General Organizational Changes.
Three kinds of organizational change are recommended
to improve presidential leadership with respect to national
security policymaking.
First, the National Security Council staffing plan needs
to be modified to achieve the following objectives:
1. Provide for equal focus on each of the four threat types;
2. Provide for cross-cutting staffing between security
and competitiveness issues;
3. Significantly upgrade the role of intelligence in the
White House staffing process;
4. Introduce a dedicated strategy element co-equal to the
policy and intelligence elements;
5. Introduce a national research element co-equal to the
other elements.
Second, and this would naturally require congressional
support in the form of legislation, establish the position of
Secretary General for National Security. This position
would have executive authority over the Secretaries of
Defense and State as well as the Attorney General, and
would thus be able to better realign resources and integrate
programs of common interest. One of the three individuals,
ideally the Secretary of State, could, if desired, be
“double-hatted” as Secretary-General, if the first incumbent
is to be considered a pathfinder in testing this idea.
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Third and finally, we must develop an integrated Net
Assessments and Operations Staff under the cognizance of
the Secretary General for National Security.
These suggested changes avoid major organizational
restructuring, avoid any dislocation between the existing
executive structure and existing legislative authorization
committees, and avoid any major new programmatic
initiatives.
At root, these suggested changes are built on three
simple principles:
1. Put one person in charge of the three Departments at
the policy and resource level;
2. Provide for the needed day-to-day decisiveness
regarding cross-departmental activities, personnel
assignments, and incremental resource realignments; and
3. Provide for the needed information system
integration, especially with regard to shared operational
and intelligence information.
Recommended National Security Council Staff
Changes.
The existing staff arrangements in the NSC handicap
the president in the following ways:
1. national security and competitiveness policy are not
always reconciled—some would even say never;
2. national intelligence is severely limited in its ability to
exploit open sources of information and harness distributed
private sector and international expertise on behalf of the
president and public policymaking;
3. we have no global strategy office nor any means of
providing continuing education to presidential appointees
and their private sector counterparts—we have no effective
means of “thinking in time” or across cultural and religious
and ethnic boundaries;7
255

4. national research is fragmented among departments
and special programs.
Block and wire diagrams are an unfortunate but
necessary evil. Figure 2 is intended to illustrate some basic
alterations in our concepts for approaching presidential
leadership with respect to national security policymaking.

President

Chief of Staff

Director General
National Policy (NP)

Director General
Global Strategy (GS)

Director General
National Intelligence (NI)

Director General
National Research (NR)

Figure 2. Top-Level Presidential Staff
Leadership Positions.
The most basic aspect of a new approach to presidential
leadership must be reflected in the integration of national
policymaking between national security and national
competitiveness together with the simultaneous elevation
of global strategy (more properly “grand strategy” but the
pundits would take unfair advantage), national
intelligence, and national research to the top table. We will
discuss each of these blocks in turn.
National Policy.
Figure 3 illustrates an approach to national
policymaking that provides balance between three major
tracks in national policy: security, competitiveness, and
treasury, while also providing for directed attention to each
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of the four threat types. Perhaps most importantly, each
threat type has its policy counterpart in each of the three
tracks.
Director General
National Policy

Deputy Director
National Security

Deputy Director
National Competitiveness

Deputy Director
National Treasury

Associate Director
High Intensity Conflict

Associate Director
National Education

Associate Director
Entitlements

Associate Director
Low Intensity Conflict

Associate Director
Sustainable Growth

Associate Director
Global Assistance

Associate Director
Environment

Associate Director
Natural Resources

Associate Director
Internal Revenue

Associate Director
Cyberwar

Associate Director
Infrastructure

Associate Director
Electronic Systems

Figure 3. Balanced Approach to National
Ideally, what will emerge out of such a staffing approach
is a matrixed policy, planning, and programming process
that specifically charts national treasury, national
competitiveness, and national security investments in
relation to one another.
A situation like Kosovo, for example, would have
inspired, several years before-hand, a deliberate calculation
of the costs of substantial foreign assistance to include
resettlement funding intended to avoid the genocide that
has occurred, versus the costs of an after-the-fact aerial
bombing campaign seeking to limit the genocide and the
consolidation of Serbian power.
Such a staff approach would place a very high value on
understanding and utilizing non-military sources of power
while also appreciating the degree to which others can use
non-military sources of power to affect U.S. national
security and U.S. competitiveness.
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Global Strategy.
David Abshire has written an entire book on what a
strategic element might look like if placed within the
National Security Council.8 His thoughts on the need for an
autonomous oversight body for strategic thinking run
counter to the popular misconception among policymakers
that they can handle strategic thinking en passant.
Figure 4 suggests a distinction between broad and
independent global strategizing and integrated response
management. The global strategy arm is provided with
international strategic council as well as a global reserve for
providing recurring independent looks at long-range issues.
The global strategy arm should have the flexibility to
undertake special projects while also being responsible for
recurring leadership retreats at which a mix of executive,
legislative, and private sector leaders would review a given
strategic question.
Director General
Global Strategy

Deputy Director
Global Strategy

Deputy Director
Response Management

Associate Director
Strategic Council

Associate Director
Response Center

Associate Director
Special Projects

Associate Director
Non-State Actors

Associate Director
Global Reserve

Associate Director
Civilian Reserve

Associate Director
Leadership Retreats

Associate Director
Public Liaison

Figure 4. Enhancing Presidential Capabilities
for Strategic Action.
On the response side, we move away from the popular
term “crisis management” and provide for a more balanced
and integrated response capability. The Response Center
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intelligence community, Net Assessments, National
Security Operations staff and others. The Response Center
equipped, and organized to leverage people—a civilian
reserve of experts, the mass media, and large non-state
National Intelligence.
The national intelligence community, traditionally
secrets, is no
relation to either national security—its focus during the
Cold War—or national competitiveness and electronic
There is nothing wrong with the very good people or the
very good process embodied in national intelligence. Where
organization, resource trade-offs, and outreach to both the
U.S. private sector and to other international intelligence
In the absence of any internal reform responsive to the
Aspin-Brown Commission, we must return to legislatively
leading the charge for a complete makeover of our national
intelligence community.
The fundamental proposition in the Figure 5 is that our
existing classified intelligence community is good and
not good enough to fully satisfy presidential requirements
for what joint doctrine calls Relevant Information. The
president needs a Director General for National
routine staff capabilities while overseeing the following
substantive enhancements.

Director General
National Intelligence
President
University of the Republic

Executive Director
President's Advisory Board

Chief of Staff
National Intelligence Staff

Executive Director
National Intelligence Forum

Director
Classified Intelligence

Director
National Intelligence Council

Director
Global Knowledge Forum

Figure 5. Enhancing National Intelligence
Support to the President.
1. Elevation of the National Intelligence Council to a role
co-equal to that of the entire classified intelligence
community. This larger body of perhaps 60 experts would
provide direct support to the president, the Cabinet, and
congressional leaders.
2. Creation of a 60-person Global Knowledge Forum with
a budget of between $1.2 and $1.5 billion a year with which
to acquire open source intelligence on behalf of the president
and the executive departments as well as the classified
intelligence community.
3. Establishment of a 15-person administrative faculty
for a University of the Republic charged with bringing
together leadership “cohorts” across government and
private sector lines.11
National Research.
Both national security and national competitiveness
depend heavily on national research. The problems with
duplicative waste (government not knowing what private
sector has already mastered) have gotten out of hand,
especially in the high-profile Critical Technologies arena.
260

Dirre
Di
ec
ctto
orr G
Ge
en
ne
erra
all
N
Na
attiio
on
na
all Re
Res
se
ea
arrcch
h
Dep
De
pu
uttyy Di
Dirre
ec
ctto
orr
IIn
nd
de
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
ntt Ag
Age
en
ncciie
ess

De
D
ep
pu
uttyy Di
Dirre
ec
ctto
orr
C
Co
on
nsso
orrttiiu
um
mss

Na
National
atio
onall A
Aeronautics
errona
autiics an
and
a d
Sp
Space
S ac
ce Administration
Ad
dmin
nisttrattion
n

Nattiio
Na
on
na
all Sc
Sciie
en
ncce
eF
Fo
ou
un
nd
da
attiio
on
n

Nattiio
Na
on
na
all Oc
Oceanographic
O
ea
anog
grap
phic
ca
and
nd
d
A
Atmospheric
tm
mosp
pherric Ad
Administration
A
miinis
stra
atio
on

Nattiio
Na
on
na
all Ac
Aca
ad
de
em
my
yo
off Sc
Sciie
en
ncce
ess

National
Na
atio
onall L
Laboratories
ab
bora
atorriess
Dep
De
pa
arrttm
me
en
ntt of
of E
En
ne
errg
gy
y

Na
N
attiio
on
na
all Co
Con
ns
so
orrttiiu
um
m ffo
orr
Hiig
H
gh
hP
Pe
errffo
orrm
ma
an
ncce
eC
Co
om
mp
pu
uttiin
ng
g

De
D
effe
en
ns
se
e Ad
Advva
an
ncce
ed
dR
Re
es
se
ea
arrcch
h
Pr
Pro
ojje
eccttss Ag
Age
en
nc
cyy

Nattiio
Na
on
na
all Ac
Aca
ad
de
em
my
y ffo
orr
H
Hu
um
ma
an
n De
Devve
ello
op
pm
me
en
ntt

Figure 6. Establishing Presidential Leadership
Over Research.
Figure 6 proposes one response to this challenge. This
staff element will provide for presidential leadership over
research, with one half of the staff serving to better
coordinate government investments in directed research,
while the other half of the staff will improve the ability of
government to work jointly with selected private sector
partners in a variety of consortiums exempted from
anti-trust actions by the Department of Commerce.
A National Academy for Human Development is
suggested because the United States is spending too much
money on technology and not nearly enough on human
factors.
By placing this staff at the presidential level instead of
the departmental level, opportunities for presidential
leadership will be enhanced in other ways. The other staff
elements (national security, national competitiveness,
national treasury) will be better able to matrix their
requirements away from the parochialism of the
departments.
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Cabinet and Operational Changes.
Apart from changes within the president’s immediate
staff, this chapter recommends only two other changes of
significance. First, and this would require congressional
legislation, we should acknowledge the complexity of the
inter-relationship between the three major departments
responsible for national security and put a “human in the
loop.” Specifically, it is recommended that a Secretary
General for National Security be placed above the
Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Attorney General.
The latter three would remain members of the Cabinet and
retain all of their previous prerogatives.
We must mention General Colin Powell here. Regardless
of who wins the presidential election in November 2000, it
would make sense to appoint Colin Powell as Secretary of
State and also as the first Secretary General for National
Security, with the South-Central campus, adjacent to State,
as the shared national security staff facility. His stature and
good will would comfort both the public and the
international community as we experiment with this new
system. The prestige of State would be elevated, Defense
would be under control, and Law Enforcement would
receive attention from a leader of great gravitas.
Secretary General for National Security.
The Secretary General would serve as a presidential
surrogate in addressing the constant day-to-day decisions
that require guidance in order to rapidly resolve issues of
policy, planning, and programming within the larger
context of the budget submitted to Congress by the
president and appropriated by Congress for operations. No
more than 10 percent of any one department’s budget need
be subject to administrative reallocation.
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Secretary General
National Security
Director
Net Assessments
Secretary of
State

Director of Operations
National Security

Secretary of
Defense

Attorney
General

Figure 7. Enhancing Presidential Leadership
for National Security.
The Secretary General would focus primarily on the
larger policy issues where the secretaries themselves have
not been able to come to rapid resolution, and would serve as
a means of integrating national security policy making
across departmental boundaries.12
Integrated Net Assessments and Operational
Direction.
Second, the Secretary General would require both an
integrated Net Assessments staff, and an integrated
Operations staff. Both could be built around a very modest
cadre of the “best and the brightest” drawn from each of the
three departments to create truly inter-agency capabilities.
The Net Assessments staff, to be elevated above the
three departments and given a substantial budget for
conducting net assessments in relation to each of the four
threat types (to include relative homefront vulnerabilities)
would be the primary means by which the Secretary
General would examine alternative options for proposing to
the president new capabilities and realignments of
resources between the three departments.
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1. The existing DoD Net Assessments staff would
continue to focus on conventional threats and the
Revolution in Military Affairs.
2. A new element would focus exclusively on Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and would include a
mix of paramilitary, peacekeeping, and transnational law
enforcement experts.
3. Another new element would bring together experts on
major religious and ethnic groups as well as environmental
issues, and focus on assessments of alternative timelines
and costs for precluding major clashes between large groups
of non-state actors.
4. Finally, a new element would be added, which would
focus upon a mix of trade and technology competition,
economic espionage and information warfare.
Although the Secretary General should have the
authority to realign up to 10 percent of any Department’s
resources in any single fiscal year, multi-year initiatives
and major realignments would have to be submitted
through the president’s budget process and approved by
Congress.
At the same time that the Secretary General would
require a Net Assessments process, there would also be
required a joint Operations staff. A portion of the existing
Joint Staff could be assigned as the cadre for this element.
Modest in size, its role would be to serve as an operational
interface to the three departments, the national intelligence
community, the Net Assessments staff, and the presidential
staff.
This staff, also, would be organized by threat type, and
help bring together inter-departmental resources
applicable specifically to each threat type. A significant
mission for this operational staff would be to recommend
“on the fly” adjustments to departmental programs.
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Budget Realignments.
Depending on who is counting what, the DoD budget
ranges from $250 billion to $270 billion per year (with new
construction) to over $300 billion a year (with
DoD-controlled national intelligence elements). Regardless
of whether or not the United States gets the additional
procurement funds that many concerned leaders have
advocated, some form of interim adjustment of DoD
priorities must be made, to allow us to develop minimal
mandatory capabilities against emerging threats.

BUDGET
70% of DoD Budget for
Traditional Warfighting
20% of DoD Budget for
Emerging Threats
10% of DoD Budget for
Cultural & Information War

Figure 8. Leveraging the DoD Budget.
While remaining under the oversight of the armed
services and national security committees, it is essential
that additional funds be earmarked for emerging threats
(for which a new sub-committee has fortuitously been
formed this year on the Senate side) and for cultural and
information war. The Emerging Threats oversight
authorities in Congress will require some form of cross-over
authorization authority with their counterparts on the
Judiciary committees (to address special operations and
transnational crime) and on the Foreign Affairs committees
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(to address realignments toward information peacekeeping
and assistance).
Reserve and Guard Implications.
The Reserve and National Guard forces that exist today
are a vestige of the past, when generic manpower was the
critical weak link in mobilization. Utilizing the Reserve and
the National Guard was primarily about bodies—about
manpower and being able to supplement the active duty
forces. While that aspect remains, what has really become
important about the Reserve and the Guard, at least
conceptually, is their ability to “bank” special skills that
need not be on active duty until they are actually
needed—this is about brainpower.

Figure 9. Leveraging Private Sector Through
Reserve and Guard
Instead of fruitlessly attempting to train active duty
personnel in specific foreign languages they are allowed to
use for only one operational tour before returning to the
normal career pattern, the United States should use the
Reserve. We should create entire regiments dedicated to
specific language groups (e.g., Arabic, Chinese, Russian),
with each regiment having a battalion of intelligence
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specialists, a battalion of military police, a battalion of
engineers, and a battalion of judge advocates and public
affairs specialists.
With such a regiment, it would be a simple matter to
rotate each company within the battalion in sequence, and
in this way provide for very high quality foreign language
and foreign area support. Such a regimental organization
could be “virtual” in that members could be located
anywhere in the world, training together just once a year,
but familiar with one another through collaboration tools
and online exercises, and intimately familiar with their
area of interest because of their civilian employment.
The National Guard could fruitfully consider a complete
make-over in which it becomes the heart of Homeland
Defense, with separate battalions or even brigades trained
to support law enforcement, to carry out disaster relief, and
to provide for electronic security and counterintelligence.
The legal restrictions on the use of the military to carry out
law enforcement duties within our borders are sound, but
represent an old paradigm. Those elements of the National
Guard assigned to law enforcement duties should in fact be
a law enforcement reserve, not a military reserve, and
should have all of the training, certification, and authority
of a normal law enforcement officer.
The Reserve and the National Guard would also be
excellent environments within which to test new roles and
relationships, as well as new legal parameters, without
interfering with our active duty readiness, and without
detriment to the effectiveness of our active duty forces.
Private Sector Roles and Responsibilities.
The 21st century will see a transformation in the
relationship between government and the private sector,
between the military and commercial providers, between
law enforcement and private security companies.
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PRIVATE SECTOR
50-50 Split in Relation to
Emerging Threats
75-25 Private Sector Role in
Relation to IW/Economic Security
Need both a National Information
Strategy & a C4I Industrial Policy

Figure 10. New Roles and Responsibilities
for the Private Sector.
“Overt action” will replace “covert action” as the primary
means of influencing emerging threat groups. 1 3 In
combination with legislative incentives and insurance risk
premiums as well as employee demands, multinational
corporations will finally find that their best interests are
served if they plan jointly with government for the
achievement of selected national security objectives of
mutual interest. A major task for the Emerging Threats
Subcommittee in the Senate will be that of leading the
discussion and definition of what these new roles and
responsibilities for the private sector must be.
In relation to information warfare and economic
security, it will be incumbent on Congress to pass “due
diligence” legislation that places the major responsibility
for self-protection on the private sector, while also requiring
the communications and computing industries to live up to
tough real-world standards for “safe computing.”
Finally, both Congress and the Administration will have
to come together to establish in carefully selected areas
where consensus is achievable, both a national information
strategy and a Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) industrial policy. We
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have neither a national information strategy today, nor an
industrial policy. The National Information Infrastructure
is primarily focused on connectivity and was originally a
plan to provide five selected research centers with very high
bandwidth—the plan was hijacked by the civil libertarians
and became a popular initiative to wire schools and
businesses into the Internet. At the same time, the U.S.
Government historically eschews an “industrial policy” for
fear of being tarred with the brush of government
interference with business. In fact, the vulnerability of
America to both electronic attack and global economic
instability are so great that nothing less than a coherent
collaborative effort between the government (both Federal
and State) and the private sector (with the knowledge and
the resources) will permit us to establish a national
information strategy as it pertains to homeland defense and
home-based aspects of both national security and national
competitiveness.
Information Strategy.
Today’s decisionmaker, from the president and the
Secretary of Defense down to the most junior commander,
lacks both a focused collection capability for obtaining all
Relevant Information, and a reliable “all-source” analysis
system able to fuse secret and non-secret sources into
distilled, reliable and timely “intelligence.”14 The current
staff process for any decisionmaker relies almost completely
on a stream of “free” inputs received from counterpart
bureaucracies, international organizations, and private
sector parties pursuing their own agendas. At the same
time, the narrowly focused secret or restricted steam of
information is often afforded direct access to the
decisionmaker without being subject to in-depth staff
scrutiny and proper integration with unclassified official
and external information. Functionally, today’s staff
process lacks the organization, knowledge, and funding
necessary to methodically obtain information from specific
international and other non-governmental organizations or
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Figure 11. Enhancing Internal Capabilities
Through Relevant Information.
to manage the collection of original information from
external sources. Over-arching both these limitations, there
is no top-level Relevant Information analysis staff
organization that is able to provide the decisionmaker with
filtered, fused and analyzed “all-source” decision-support.
The major initiative in the early 21st century within defense
must be the restoration of command responsibility for being
properly informed, to include major procurement actions
pertaining to open sources of information.
Changing Rules of the Game.
The United States has spent decades—a half-century—
refining an information management system which
assumes that
1. secret sources and methods are the heart of our
national-level decision-support process;
2. leaders will decide and the people will follow; and
3. our most important decisions are “time-sensitive”
with relatively obvious detail.

270

TOP-DOWN
COMMAND & CONTROL

SINGLE-CULTURE
SINGLE-ORGANIZATION
EQUITIES

OLD

LEADERS
DECIDE
SECRET
SOURCES & METHODS
OBSCURE DETAIL

TIME
IMPACT
SHORT

TIME
IMPACT
LONG
OBVIOUS DETAIL

OPEN
SOURCES & METHODS
PEOPLE
DECIDE

NEW

BOTTOM-UP
INFORMATION-SHARING
MULTI-CULTURAL &
TRANS-NATIONAL
EQUITIES

Figure 12. From “Control” to Consensus.
Our traditional construct is still applicable to many
issues, but both our political environment and the
information environment have turned many of our basic
premises upside down. We are entering a century when the
ability to master open sources—the vast flood of open
sources in many languages, many mediums, many levels of
detail—will be vital to public decisionmaking about very
complex issues including the survival of several generations
across several continents. Unfortunately, we have
constrained our ability to confront the challenges of the day.
As Senator David L. Boren notes in his foreword to my
book, On Intelligence, presidential policymaking in the
future must pay much greater heed to cultural and
psychological factors. Our decisions in the future must be
made in partnership with non-governmental organizations,
as they control the majority of the needed information and
also have superior networks for achieving consensus within
their chosen issue areas.15
What this really boils down to is a need to both think, and
produce, intelligence in forms that can be shared with
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domestic as well as international constituencies. We must,
in other words, turn our own intelligence community on its
head, and focus on creating a new and much enhanced
community that embraces the private sector’s mastery of
open sources of intelligence, while refocusing our secret
capabilities much more narrowly.
Building Blocks for Creating a “Smart Nation.”
In the age of information, “warfare” and “national
security” are at root about how a nation manages its
intellectual resources. A nation’s ability to discover,
discriminate, distill, and digest “intelligence” is the core
competency in the age of information.
Policy intelligence cannot and should not exist in
isolation. To be truly effective in a networked world where
the “butterfly effect” can have significant unanticipated
consequences, policy intelligence needs to have four pillars:
international intelligence that draws on military, coalition,
law enforcement, and business as well as media sources;
domestic intelligence that draws on legally and ethically
available domestic sources of all kinds; strategic
intelligence that deliberately draws out alternative
scenarios and thinks unconventionally about both domestic
and international issues; and integrative intelligence that
makes sense of the other three in relation to both external
threats and domestic imperatives.
The foundation for a “smart nation” is an educated
citizenry. Indeed, a wise man once said that “a nation’s best
defense is an educated citizenry.” A major aspect of any
national information and intelligence strategy must be the
development of architectures and protocols, including
oversight standards, that nurture civic duty, educate
citizens as to both the threats and opportunities facing
America, and provide a means for individual citizens to
contribute vital indications and warnings at every level of
government.
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Elements of a National Information Strategy.
Three specific elements of a national information
strategy are recommended. None exists today, nor is any
one of these three elements being seriously discussed at any
level of government.
First, it is essential that a national strategy be devised
for the digitization and preservation of content. Although
our leaders have long understood that vast stores of
knowledge were going to waste for lack of connectivity, the
vaunted National Information Infrastructure (NII) does
little to encourage the organization and enhancement of
web-based knowledge. A wide variety of standards, as well
as financial incentives, are required if we are to rapidly
move dissertations, conference proceedings, and other
mainstream publications to a web-based architecture that
is properly indexed and also properly protected in terms of
electronic copyright and electronic payment.
Second, it is essential that the process for developing
standards for software be accelerated and also stabilized. A
minimal standard for compound documents (integrated text
and images) is required by law if we are to leverage the
power of the Internet and the power of desktop capabilities
across organizational lines. Security and inter-change
standards are also required and they must be
understandable by anyone with access to a computer. The
current debate over Microsoft illustrates this problem
perfectly—Microsoft’s continued unwillingness to make its
Application Program Interfaces (API) transparent and
stable could be said—has been said by some—to have
seriously undermined U.S. national security and national
competitiveness.
Finally, we need a digital Marshall Plan as well as a
digital New Deal. America lives in a glass house and is
terribly vulnerable, not only to asymmetric attacks on its
electronic infrastructure, but to self-generated crises
caused by ignorance and a lack of global understanding. We
273

NATIONAL STRATEGY
PRIORITY TO DIGITAL
CONTENT IN REAL-TIME
ACCELERATE STANDARDS
FOR SHARABLE DATA
DIGITAL MARSHALL PLAN
FOR REST OF WORLD

Figure 13. Recommended National Information
Strategy.
must bring Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Balkans, and
Latin America into the 21st century, and do so in the grand
manner that we evinced when saving Europe in the
aftermath of World War II. At home, we must exert special
efforts to empower every individual, whether schoolchild or
adult with reading difficulties, so as to make our entire
population, within a single generation, Internet-capable.
Elements of a DoD Information Strategy.
I have written elsewhere 1 6 about information
peacekeeping as the purest form of war and about the
central role that intelligence must play in the 21st century.
It is vital for all of us to understand that in the Information
Age, bytes are bullets, we are in a state of constant chaos
and competition, and we require the total mobilization of all
of the brain-power, all of the intellectual property, all of the
information, that is in any way available for harnessing to
the common good. In this era, the heart of national security
and national defense lie in the domains of information and
intelligence and not in the traditional domains of armed
forces. DoD, however, must still take the lead.
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This chapter suggests that DoD ask not what the
president can do for DoD but rather ask what DoD can do for
the president. The bottom line here is that only DoD has the
resources—if managed wisely—to provide the president
with the flexibility to create new methods for managing
national security, and for funding new priorities that are
unconventional in nature and span traditional
departmental boundaries.
DoD must choose to pay the bill for this larger national
construct—it must help pay the bill for a restructuring of
the National Security Council; for the creation of a position
of Secretary General for National Security; for the creation
of four separate net assessment centers; and for the funding
of modest but very valuable initiatives including a digital
Marshall Plan and a digital New Deal.
DoD can set the example for how policy and operations
will be managed in the 21st century by going virtual on its
task forces and devising means for rapidly and readily
including private sector experts—from all walks of life, all
nations, with and without clearances, into its
decisionmaking process.

DoD STRATEGY
$$$

Pay the bill, leverage information
Go virtual on task forces including
private sector experts, coordination,
archives
Migrate from existing C4ISR toward
web-based commercial network,
release best encryption to public

Figure 14. Recommended DoD Strategy.
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At the same time, because this kind of global virtual
architecture must of necessity be web-based, it is essential
that DoD plan now for quickly migrating away from its
existing Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
infrastructure. DoD must become the champion for
permitting presidential-level encryption—the best that the
National Security Agency is capable of devising—into the
public domain, for the simple reason that in the 21st
century, the president’s most important counselors and
sources of insight are going to be in the private sector, not
within the U.S. Government. Only DoD can lead this radical
migration.
Elsewhere, in the rapid expansion of NATO with its
constantly increasing number of bi-lateral Partners for
Peace (PfP), we see opportunities for new forms of regional
intelligence concepts, doctrine, and architectures. The PfP
can be best served by having NATO move away from the
U.S.-dominated C4I infrastructure that is very secret and
very expensive, and adopt instead an Internet-based
architecture that anyone can join at whatever their level of
computer and communications sophistication.
Also in Europe we see the forthcoming demise of the
Western European Union (WEU) actually sparking a very
robust discussion about the need for a European
intelligence policy and regional European intelligence
architectures. The WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejon,
having proven its value, is likely to become the centerpiece
of the first-ever regional intelligence community, where
selected national and even U.S. capabilities are connected
“virtually” to produce regional intelligence. The United
Kingdom Open Source Information Centre; the Joint
Analysis Center at Molesworth, and the German pilot
project to mix civilian, military, and law enforcement
intelligence specialists are all candidates for virtual
integration to serve both Europe and NATO.
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Virtual Reach.
Figure 15 describes this new approach to information
sharing. Instead of relying on a single President’s Daily
Brief as the top-level intelligence document for each day,
instead of relying on a tiny cadre of grossly over-worked
members of the National Security Council staff, the
president, and his principals in government, will have
achieved a “virtual reach” that embraces and leverages all
knowledge available throughout the government (and down
to the state and local governments), all knowledge available
throughout the nation, including the richest possible
sources of knowledge in academia, the media, and the
business community, and all knowledge available globally.
We have a long way to go before we can move within this
virtual intelligence community with ease. New standards
and understandings will have to be developed
encompassing how we share information, how we
compensate one another for shared information, how we pay
for selected services, and how we authenticate individuals
and organizations as sources of information. This is nothing
short of a major global campaign to “make sense” across
national, ethnic, class, and educational boundaries. Just as
the world once had to devise fuel, rail, and highway
standards to facilitate global commerce, so now must the
world establish information exchange and information
compensation standards.
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Figure 15. Creating the Virtual Intelligence
Community.
Conclusion.
The conclusions to this study are straight-forward.
1. DoD leadership must empower the president—it will
not work the other way around. DoD leadership, working in
concert with its authorization and appropriations
counterparts in the Senate and the House of
Representatives, must come to a deliberate understanding
of the world, of the need, and of the means by which to
empower the president and restore coherence to U.S.
national security policy making and operations.
2. DoD has the funds to enable full cooperation from both
the Department of State and the Department of Justice.
This entire program will cost no more than $3 billion a
year—$1.5 billion for a national intelligence make-over that
fully integrates open sources of intelligence into Federal
decisionmaking—and $1.5 billion a year for a global digital
Marshall Plan that has digital New Deal elements here at
home.
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3. There is no need to physically restructure the
government. Speaking in very practical terms, the
Secretary General for National Security and all of the new
elements proposed for the National Security Council can be
housed in the South Central campus near the Department
of State and recently vacated by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
4. There will need to be a Presidential Decision
Memorandum and consensus on the Hill in order to achieve
legislation with the necessary statutory authority for both
the new Secretary General for National Security, and
several of the president’s principal staff including the
Director General for National Policy, Director General for
National Intelligence, the Director General for Global
Strategy, and the Director General for National Research.
The United States is at a juncture where the president
can neither direct nor persuade. Presidential leadership in
national security policymaking requires a startling leap
forward, a leap that can only be financed and
bureaucratically enabled by the Department of Defense. It
will take a small group of like-minded leaders, but if such a
group can be put into place, the rest of the department, and
hence the rest of the government, will follow. Only in this
way can cohesion and continuity be restored to presidential
leadership and national security policymaking.
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
Douglas T. Stuart
As this volume goes to the printer, the American people
are once again engaged in the quadrennial process of
selecting a new president. Whichever candidate is elected,
the new commander in chief will confront daunting national
security problems, many of which have been discussed in
this volume. He may also have to make substantial changes
in the national security bureaucracy in order to cope with
these problems.
The incoming president will be able to draw on many
sources of information and advice as the new
administration begins to consider reconstructing the
machinery for national security planning and execution.
One particularly valuable resource will be the Commission
on National Security/21st century, which will be submitting
its Stage Three report to the Secretary of Defense in the
spring of 2001. Their report will offer specific
recommendations for reform of the national security
bureaucracy.
The incoming president (or, more realistically, his policy
advisers) will also benefit from reading this volume. If
members of the next administration do pick up this book,
they will find several interesting and, we believe, important
points of consensus among the contributors. Three bear
special mention.
First, most of the authors in this volume have either
asserted or implied that 21st century threats to U.S.
national security will be more complex, multifaceted, and
variable than at any time in our history. These threats will
provide both challenges and opportunities for a new
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Administration seeking to reform national security
institutions. Furthermore, to a much greater extent than in
the past, these threats will be composed of both domestic
and international elements. Transnational crime, which
Senator John Kerry has described as the “new war,"
epitomizes the problem of “intermestic” threats to our
national security. Arguing that the “new war” against
transnational crime demands both coordinated
international action and American leadership, Kerry
concludes that:
While none of us is willing—nor should we be—to give up any
sovereignty; we must reexamine and, if necessary, change some
laws to harmonize with a new, effective system of international
law.1

As the president’s incoming team develops plans and
procedures for confronting intermestic threats to U.S.
national security, they would be well advised to heed
Senator Kerry’s argument. But they would also be well
advised to err in favor of caution as they review proposals for
the application of the machinery of international war
fighting to issues which have traditionally been within the
purview of domestic law enforcement. Such proposals will
founder on three realities:

•

Public opposition to perceived infringements on the
constitutionally-protected civil liberties of U.S.
citizens.

•

Congressional resistance to the expansion of
executive authority.

•

The exacerbation of existing tensions in civil-military
relations.

The second point of consensus among most of the
contributors to this volume is that a national security
bureaucracy that was created in 1947 cannot adequately
address the 21st century global security environment. Even
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allowing for the changes which have taken place in the
national security system over the last 5 decades(successive
revisions of the National Security Act, passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, etc.) the system is simply too slow
moving and unresponsive in its processes, too “stove piped”
in its structure and too narrow in its focus. Defending the
national security of the United States in the age of
globalization and information will require dramatic reforms
to the U.S. Government’s industrial age organizations and
planning processes.
Several contributors to this volume have responded to
these defects by recommending some form of Goldwater
Nichols Act for the interagency process. To the extent that
such a reform would require omnibus legislation, the
incoming president may be well advised to steer clear of this
kind of ambitious structural reform at the beginning of his
administration. The need is certainly great, but the timing
and the circumstances may not be conducive to success.
Determining the scope and timing of defense reform will
be a major issue for the next administration. Harry Truman
was able to work with the “damned 80th Congress” to pass
the 1947 National Security Act because all parties shared a
sense of emergency derived from their common experiences
with Pearl Harbor and World War II. No comparable
“burning platform” (to borrow William Navas’ phrase)
exists today.
This having been said, the incoming president should
waste no time in reaching out to key members of Congress to
establish new, informal procedures for dialogue on issues of
national security and defense reform. As Harold Koh has
observed in The National Security Constitution, “When
Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947, its
greatest error was its failure to address its own role in the
national security system.” 2 The transformation of the
relationship between the president and Congress in the
area of national security is one of the least appreciated and
most problematic aspects of the history of the 1947 Act.
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Congressional punishment, or micromanagement, of the
executive branch, by means of such devices as
appropriations and oversight, is no substitute for
productive executive-legislative consultation on issues of
national security. It will not be easy for the incoming
president to establish new procedures for working with
members of the House and Senate, in particular because of
generational and demographic changes in the makeup of
Congress. But new procedures and attitudes are essential
for the efficient handling of America’s national security
challenges. They are also a necessary first step toward
fundamental reform of the national security bureaucracy
for the 21st century.
The third point of agreement is that any reform of the
national security bureaucracy must be guided by a coherent
and compelling national security strategy. This will be an
extraordinarily difficult task, due to the aforementioned
complexity and fluidity of the threat environment. The
problem will be exacerbated by the fact that no major power
poses a near-term threat to American survival. This
combination of multiple, abstruse, and asymmetric threats,
and an overall environment of relative security, are not
conducive to the articulation of a coherent and compelling
national security strategy. But difficulty will not exempt the
incoming president from the responsibility to develop such a
strategy.
As the only branch of the government that has a large
and well-established infrastructure dedicated to strategic
planning, the Department of Defense (DoD) is in a unique
position to assist the president in formulating such a
strategy.
One important instrument which is available to the
Secretary of Defense to help shape future discussions about
national security is the congressionally mandated
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2001 QDR is
currently under construction within the defense
community. The primary QDR authors would be well
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advised to begin by accepting one of the conclusions of the
Phase Two report of the U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century: “. . . American national security
strategy must find its anchor in U.S. national interests.”3
The concept of national interest is a notoriously soft and
unreliable guide for foreign and defense planners, but it is
also an unavoidable and indispensable precondition for
thinking about national security.
The Phase Two Commission report made a very modest
attempt to stimulate thinking about America’s interests. So
did the 1997 QDR, which sought to distinguish between
vital, important, and humanitarian interests.4 The QDR
2001 authors should consider being much more
ambitious—and accord a high priority to the articulation of
a coherent and compelling vision of U.S. national interests.
Ideally, this vision will be specific enough to guide policy but
also general enough to obtain the support of a wide
cross-section of the Washington policy community and the
American people.
Formulating such a list of interests will be a demanding
exercise but it will also be beneficial, in three ways. First
and most importantly, a well-constructed list of national
interests will provide the logical basis for the QDR’s
proposed national security strategy. Second, a listing of U.S.
national interests will stimulate national debate about
America’s role in the post-Cold War international system.
Third, in order to develop a list of U.S. national interests,
DoD will have to work closely with other executive branch
agencies, including the Department of State and the
National Security Council (NSC). Ideally, this exercise will
result in the establishment of new procedures for, and
habits of, interagency consultation and policy coordination.
Until the American people, Congress, and the president are
ready to pass a new National Security Act, these types of
modest improvements in interagency cooperation may be
the best that we can hope for.
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to use military forces should be guided, first and foremost, by the U.S.
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www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec3.html.
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